Abstract

Die Ombuddiens Prestasie Jaarplan 2025/2026 meld dat die ombuddiens diensleweringsmodel gegrond is op die suksesvolle registrasie van gemeenskapskemas en dat hulle onderneem om registrasie binne sewe dae na ontvangs van ’n aansoek te voltooi. Die jaarplan vermeld dat 13 141 gemeenskapskemas gedurende die boekjaar geregistreer is en dat die getalle steeds groei. Die jaarplan vermeld verder dat ombuddiensheffings die belangrikste inkomstebron is om dienslewering te befonds en dat ongeveer R425 miljoen in die 2023/24 finansiële jaar daarvoor ingesamel is. Verder word aanvaar dat die verpligting van gemeenskapskemas om jaarlikse inkomste opgawes, jaarlikse finansiële state en enige ander voorgeskrewe dokumentasie of inligting, aan die ombuddiens te verskaf, noodsaaklik is vir die behoorlike finansiële bestuur van gemeenskapskemas.
Om hierdie doelwitte te bereik, ontbloot die Gekonsolideerde Praktyksriglyne vir Gemeenskapskemas die tande van die Wet op die Ombuddiens vir Gemeenskapskemas vir die volgende drie gevalle:

(1) Wat die registrasie van gemeenskapskemas by die ombuddiens betref, bepaal die Gekonsolideerde Praktyksriglyne dat skemas by die ombuddiens deur middel van die CSOS connect-platform moet registreer as deeltitelskema, eiendomsontwikkeling onder beheer van ’n eienaarsvereniging (HOA), behuisingkoöperasie, behuisingskema vir afgetrede persone of aandeleblokskema. Die ombuddiens sal met die betrokke skema in gesprek tree om die registrasie te bewerkstellig. Ombuddiensveldwerkers sal skema-tot-skema besoeke organiseer om vas te stel of die betrokke skema geregistreer is en skemas identifiseer wat toegang tot inspeksie weier of nie geregistreer is nie. Indien dit nie slaag nie, sal die ombuddiens die saak na die nasionale vervolgingsgesag verwys om registrasie te bewerkstellig wat boetes of gevangenisstraf tot gevolg kan hê.

(2) Ingevolge die Wet en Regulasies op die Ombuddiens vir Gemeenskapskemas moet elke lid van ’n gemeenskapskema kwartaalliks ’n heffing aan die ombuddiens betaal. Die Gekonsolideerde Praktyksriglyne bepaal dat gemeenskapskemas moet verseker dat lede hul ombuddiensheffing gereeld betaal en dat die betaling aan die ombuddiens oorgedra word. Betaling word gemaak deur die korrekte CSOS-registrasienommer as verwysingsnommer te gebruik om te verseker dat betalings korrek aan die betrokke skema-rekening toegeken word. By die betaling van die ombuddiensheffing moet die skema ’n e-pos aanstuur met bewys van betalings wat sowel die lid se administratiewe heffing en die CSOS-heffing uiteensit om die bedrag wat elke eenheid betaal, te rekonsilieer by levypayments@csos.org.za. Gemeenskapskemas is dus verplig om maandeliks ’n bedrag van hul lede te verhaal en om dit aan die Ombuddiens oor te dra. Die Ombuddiensheffing is gelyk aan 2% van die bedrag waarmee die maandelikse administratiewe heffing R500 oorskry, maar nie meer as R40 per eenheid per maand nie. Wanbetaling van CSOS-heffings op die vervaldatum veroorsaak dat rente ingevolge die Nasionale Kredietwet verhaal word. Die Gekonsolideerde Praktykriglyne bepaal verder dat wanbetaling van ombuddiensheffings ’n misdryf ingevolge artikel 34(1)(b) van die Wet op die Ombuddiens vir Gemeenskapskemas daarstel wat die oortreder aanspreeklik maak vir ’n boete en/of gevangenisstraf vir ’n tydperk van nie meer as tien jaar nie.

(3) Artikel 59(b) van die Wet op die Ombuddiens vir Gemeenskapskemas bepaal dat elke gemeenskapskema jaarlikse inkomste-opgawes met ondersteunende dokumente binne vier maande na die einde van die finansiële jaar by die ombuddiens moet indien. Aanhangsel F bevat byvoorbeeld die volgende lys van ondersteunende dokumente wat vir deeltitelskemas ingedien moet word: ’n voltooide ondertekende CS 2 vorm; verplig geouditeerde finansiële state; ondertekende notules van die mees onlangse algemene jaarvergadering; die mees resente heffing; die name, ID-nommers en kontakbesonderhede van trustees; alle relevante dokumentasie wat verband hou met die reëls en besluite van die deeltitelskema en ’n afskrif van die registrasiesertifikaat.
By nienakoming sal ’n gemeenskapskema ’n nienakomingsertifikaat ontvang en aangesê word om binne ’n bepaalde tyd die nodige dokumente te verskaf. Indien nie, sal ’n rekeningbeampte aangestel word om te bepaal of ’n boete opgelê moet word. Klousule 14.9 bepaal uitdruklik dat die ombuddiens alle redelike stappe sal neem om, indien nodig, sanksies ingevolge subklousule 2.9 van die Gekonsolideerde Praktyksriglyne te kan instel wat ingevolge artikel 34 van die Wet op die Ombuddiens ’n boete en/of gevangenisstraf van nie meer as vyf jaar nie insluit.
Benewens die bogenoemde drie gevalle, bepaal die Gekonsolideerde Praktyksriglyne dat enige persoon of skema wat versuim om ingevolge artikel 34 van die Wet op die Ombuddiens vir Gemeenskapskemas toegang tot enige boeke, rekeninge, dokumente of bates te verskaf of nalaat om data of inligting te verskaf, of vals of misleidende inligting verskaf, of opsetlik weier of ’n persoon verhinder om ’n wetsverpligting na te kom, blootgestel is aan dieselfde bogenoemde sanksies.

Abstract

After the statutory abolition in South African law of succession of claims to a legitimate portion, no person has any legal claim to a hereditary benefit from another’s estate after the latter’s death. Freedom of testation means, among other things, that every person competent to execute a valid will may do so and in the process amend or revoke any previously executed documents, provided that the requirements of execution of a will have been complied with. The fact that the testator once executed a supposedly joint and mutual will with his spouse under which the surviving spouse would be the exclusive beneficiary of the “joint estate” does not deprive any of the testators concerned of the capacity to subsequently even secretly execute a new will and, by revoking the previous will, also dispose of his assets quite differently from the erstwhile disposition indicated in the joint will. The disillusioned surviving spouse will not hold any claim against the appointed executor of the deceased’s estate founded on the law of succession.
Under the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 the surviving spouse may have a claim against the estate of the first dying spouse for future maintenance if all the requirements of the act can be met. Such a claim should be timeously lodged with the executor after the latter’s advertisement calling upon all persons having claims against the estate to lodge such claims with the executor within the advertised period for lodging (usually 30 days). However, the intention of the legislature is not that, under the guise of this claim for future maintenance, a redistribution of the testator’s assets may take place despite the latter’s express disposition. Any claim for future maintenance ranks after all other existing claims against the estate and just before the application of the norms of the law of succession that determine the distribution of the remaining assets in the estate. Section 31(b) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 determines that if any person fails to lodge his claim against any deceased estate before the expiry of the period specified under section 29(1), he shall not be entitled in respect of his claim to demand restitution from any other claimant of any moneys paid to such other claimant at any time or before he lodged his claim, as the case may be, in pursuance of a valid claim against the estate.
In Bellingan v Bellingan ((CA110/2024) 2025 ZAECMKHC 101 (4 Dec 2025)) the court upheld the appeal against a blatantly wrong decision of the district court in Humansdorp that honoured the presumed claim of the applicant against the stepson as beneficiary in his late father’s will notwithstanding the fact that the alleged claim was not founded on any valid agreement reached between the parties. The applicant alleged that she agreed not to contest the will of the late Mr JVH Bellingan or to lodge a claim against the said estate of her late husband in exchange for certain benefits she claimed the appellant should provide for her maintenance for a limited period of five years.
Because no agreement was reached, there is no valid pactum de non petendo and in principle the respondent may be enticed to consider lodging a claim against the estate in the light of this judgment. It is submitted, however, that the chances of her succeeding with any claim for maintenance against the estate are very slim if the executor had in the meantime finalised the administration of that estate to the satisfaction of the master. Nothing in the judgment points to any timeously lodged claim founded on Act 27 of 1990 that meets the requirements of sections 29 and 31 of the Administration of Estates Act. The widow may justly be disillusioned – she trusted both that her late husband would not secretly amend his will contained in the joint document and that his son would be a gentleman – but a contested gentlemen’s agreement is seldom enforceable on its own. Although she may have had a claim for future maintenance against the estate, she waited too long to lodge that claim. The law helps the vigilant, not the slumbering or gullible.

Abstract

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Abstract

This judgment attracted considerable media attention, because for the first time in South Africa sentimental damages were awarded for psychological lesion caused to a dog owner who had been deeply shocked by observing lacerations to his pet, caused by the negligence of a veterinarian practice. The plaintiff-owner instituted a contractual claim for malperformance against the defendant, for consequential damages on the basis that the defendant’s negligent conduct had rendered his dog unfit for competing in dog shows which could benefit him financially and compelled him to visit her for a prolonged period while undergoing treatment, as well as for general damages for emotional shock. In the alternative he claimed for the psychological harm caused by his emotional shock on the basis of delict. Finally, he applied for a declaratory order to have the defendant declared unfit to be in charge of any animal for a period of 12 months due to contravention of the Animal Protection Act 71 of 1962. The plaintiff was awarded consequential damages, as well as sentimental damages on the basis of breach of contract. The court found it unnecessary to pursue the delictual route, while it refused to issue the declaratory order prayed for.
The court’s decision on refusing the contractual action for malperformance, its award of consequential damages and its refusal to issue the declaratory order were well-founded. Its award of sentimental damages for the psychological harm suffered by the plaintiff on the basis of contract flies in the face of established contractual principles, as contractual claims are intended to place a creditor as much as possible in the same position regarding his or her property that he or she would have been if the contract had been performed. It would appear that some support for this part of the judgment can be found in a few American judgments. The court’s erroneous judgment on this point ruled out any decision on the merits of a delictual claim for sentimental damages due to suffering psychological lesion due to nervous shock. A further unacceptable aspect of the judgment was its failure to require expert evidence on the plaintiff’s psychological harm.
An assessment is made of the chances of success of a claim for sentimental damages on the basis of delict, accepting that the plaintiff had been successful in proving clear psychological harm. Reference is made to case law which appears to be adverse to a claim such as the present, as well as to certain South African authors who are well disposed to allowing a claim such as the present on the authority of an obiter dictum from the judgment of Masiba v Constantia Insurance Co Ltd (1982). A brief survey of American law shows that the majority of states do not allow claims of this kind for harm caused to companion animals, whereas the present state of English law also does not appear to favour such claims. The judgment fails to conform to any of the recognised precepts of judgment writing, in particular in omitting any reference to authority. The court in fact issued an order which is neither final, nor able of execution. It stands as a stark display of how the court’s patent sympathy with the plaintiff’s unhappiness affected its judgment in discarding basic contract law precepts, as well as established evidence and procedural rules in order to reach a judgment in conformity with mere empathy.

Abstract

Suid-Afrikaanse howe volg ’n rigiede territoriale benadering om jurisdiksie in oorgrens arbeidsgeskille te bepaal, gesentreer op die “plek van die onderneming” waar werknemers werk. Hierdie raamwerk, wat in Astral Operations Ltd v Parry gevestig is en onlangs in Sorrell v Petroplan Sub-Saharan Africa (Pty) Ltd en Ephraim v DRG Outsourcing (Pty) Ltd herbevestig is, is afgelei van regspresedente wat beslis is ingevolge die herroepe Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge 28 van 1956 – wetgewing met fundamenteel verskillende bewoording, doeleindes en grondwetlike konteks as die huidige Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge 66 van 1995. Die benadering reduseer komplekse internasionale diensverhoudinge tot binêre karakteriserings: oorsese bedrywighede is óf “afsonderlik en geskei” van binnelandse ondernemings (wat jurisdiksie ontken) óf “onlosmaaklik verbind” (wat jurisdiksie toelaat). Ten spyte van volgehoue akademiese kritiek, het howe versuim om met gesofistikeerde alternatiewe te werk. Rinaldi waarsku dat howe jurisdiksie met die keuse van reg verwar terwyl hulle onvanpaste presedente invoer en grondwetlike imperatiewe ignoreer. Calitz en Garbers bepleit begeleide diskresie met inagneming van verskeie nie-hiërargiese verbindende faktore. Fredericks stel hiërargiese verbindingsfaktore voor met die lex loci-oplossing as vermoedelik bepalend. Mundlak bevorder radikale deterritorialisering gefokus op ekonomiese afhanklikheid. Elke raamwerk bied gereedskap wat spesifiek ontwikkel is vir oorgrens regskwessies, maar howe gaan voort asof hierdie studies nie bestaan nie. Die onlangse Naidoo- en Ephraim-uitsprake bevestig voortgesette geregtelike nakoming van territoriale rigiditeit, met die Ephraim-saak wat Suid-Afrikaanse werknemers wat deur ’n Suid-Afrikaanse entiteit gewerf en vergoed is, beskerming ontken het bloot omdat hulle dienste aan buitelandse kliënte gelewer het. Hierdie beslissings laat formule-karakterisering toe sonder om grondwetlike dimensies of verbindingsfaktoranalise te betrek. Hierdie akademies-geregtelike ontkoppeling laat Suid-Afrikaanse werknemers wat in die buiteland werk met onsekere beskerming, maak potensiële regulatoriese omseiling moontlik en weerspreek die grondwetlike fondamente van arbeidsreg. Totdat howe samehangende raamwerke vir die internasionale privaatreg ontwikkel wat die onderskeidende karakter van die arbeidsreg erken, sal Suid-Afrikaanse werkers in die buiteland onvoldoende beskerming in die gesig staar juis wanneer hulle dit die nodigste het. Die skeiding tussen regterlike praktyk en akademiese vakkundigheid vereis dringende aandag. Howe moet óf betekenisvol met beskikbare verbindende faktore-metodologieë omgaan, óf die parlement moet ingryp deur middel van wetswysigings wat die territoriale omvang van Wet 66 van 1995 verduidelik. Die grondwetlike waarborg van billike arbeidspraktyke vir “almal” vereis interpretatiewe benaderings wat die realiteite van globalisering erken eerder as om formalistiese toetse wat afgelei is van gediskrediteerde apartheidsera-raamwerke, te laat voortduur. Die legitimiteit van Suid-Afrikaanse arbeidsreg hang af van die ontwikkeling van beginselvaste reaksies op die kompleksiteite van transnasionale indiensneming.

Abstract

The liability of Z as purchaser under numerous credit-sale agreements was ostensibly secured by a surety agreement concluded with six sureties more than a year before the first instalment sale was concluded by Z with M. That surety agreement provided:

“We the undersigned … do hereby interpose and bind myself /ourselves jointly and severally as surety for and co-principal debtor in solidum with SA Zero Waste Pty (Ltd) (‘the debtor’) for the due and punctual payment by the Debtor to Mercedes-Benz Financial Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd (‘the Creditor’) of all sums of money which the Debtor may now and from time to time hereafter owe or be indebted to the Creditor, its successors, order and assigns from whatsoever cause arising whether such indebtedness be incurred by the Debtor solely, jointly or in partnership with any other person, firm or company, and further for the due, punctual and faithful performance by the Debtor of any obligation of whatsoever nature, whether actual or contingent and whether in contract or in delict, which he may now or in the future owe to the Creditor” (judgment bundle 206– emphasis added).

It is submitted that notwithstanding the alleged practice of accepting “continuing suretyships” to cover unspecified and uncertain future claims by the creditor against the principal debtor, such a contract is in contravention of the accessory principle that governs all forms of real and personal security agreements. Suretyship is an accessory obligation – it is accessory to the transaction that creates the obligation of the principal debtor.

M subsequently ceded all its rights and obligations (sic) founded on its credit agreements with Z to D without informing Z of the cession. More than four months later, M entered into an agreement of voluntary surrender and termination of the initial agreements with Z as debtor whereby all vehicles purchased were returned by Z to M. The parties agreed that Z would be liable to M for any outstanding liability not covered by the revenue of the sale of the vehicles to third parties. Thereafter Z was finally liquidated. Almost two years later D claimed performance from the six sureties for the amount still outstanding.

It is submitted that the judgments discussed leave some serious questions unresolved. It is doubted whether M as cedent could have the competency to enter into a cancellation agreement with Z cancelling the claim that had been ceded to D more than four months earlier – nemo plus iuris. Also discussed is the extent to which the sureties who were not party to the cancellation agreement can be held liable as sureties for a claim that apparently cannot be founded on the cancelled original agreements given that it originated only some five years after the surety agreement was concluded. M’s claim, founded on the cancellation agreement, was not secured by a new surety agreement at all.

The supreme court of appeal should carefully reconsider the validity of so-called continuing suretyships where, as in this instance, the agreement provides for liability ad infinitum founded on whatever contract or delict that may come about in clear contravention of the accessory principle.