ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Affiliated with the University of South Africa; Affiliated with the University of Pretoria
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2019, p. 127 – 137
None
ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Affiliated with the University of Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2019, p. 108 – 126
None
ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Affiliated with the University of Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2019, p. 97 – 108
None
ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Affiliated with the Johannesburg Bar
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2019, p. 91 – 97
None
ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Affiliated with the University of Stellenbosch
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2019, p. 78 – 90
KUWAIT ASIA BANK EC v NATIONAL MUTUAL LIFE NOMINEES LTD HERBESOEK: DIE MOONTLIKE MIDDELLIKE AANSPREEKLIKHEID VAN ‘N HOUERMAATSKAPPY VIR DELIKTE VAN SY GENOMINEERDE DIREKTEUR OP DIE DIREKSIE VAN ‘N FILIAAL VAN DIE HOUER In Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd is beslis dat ‘n houermaatskappy nie middellik aanspreeklik gehou kan word vir die deliktuele skade, wat sy genomineerde direkteur (wat ‘n werknemer van die houer is) op die direksie van sy filiaal vir die filiaal veroorsaak nie. Die outeur ondersoek of hierdie saak nog hedendaags dieselfde beslis sal word. In Van der Berg v Coopers & Lybrand Trust (Pty) Ltd skep die hoogste hof van app\xc3\xa8l die indruk dat daar wel sodanige aanspreeklikheid in die gegewe konteks mag wees. Die outeur toon dat die hof in hierdie geval slegs die arbeidsregtelike verhouding tussen die houer/werkgewer en die direkteur/werknemer oorweeg het om die vraag van middellike aanspreeklikheid te oorweeg sonder om die impak van ander regsnorme te oorweeg. In Public Investment Corporation Ltd v Bodigelo noem die hof dat ‘n direkteur in sy hoedanigheid as werknemer deur die aandeelhouer aangestel is en skep dus ook die indruk dat sou sodanige direkteur skade vir die maatskappy, waar hy as direkteur dien, veroorsaak, die aanstellende maatskappy middellik aanspreeklik sou wees. Die gevolgtrekking wat gemaak word, is dat ‘n hof nie die vraag van middellike aanspreeklikheid bloot op grond van die diensverhouding tussen die houer en die direkteur kan beantwoord nie. ‘n Hof behoort ook, soos in die Kuwait Bank-saak, die maatskappyregtelike werklikheid, naamlik dat die houer nie ‘n direkteur van die filiaal mag wees nie en dus genoop is om ‘n natuurlike persoon as direkteur aan te stel, te oorweeg. Die verhouding is egter dan nie een van werkgewer/werknemer nie, maar die unieke verhouding tussen ‘n aandeelhouer en ‘n direkteur wat deur die aandeelhouers verkies word. Die toets vir middellike aanspreeklikheid kan dus nie net vanuit ‘n arbeidsregtelike oogpunt beskou word nie, maar ook vanuit ‘n maatskappyregtelike oogpunt soos in die Kuwait Bank-saak.
ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Affiliated with the University of the Free State; Affiliated with the University of South Africa
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2019, p. 63 – 77
THE LEGAL RELEVANCE OF ADULTERY: QUO VADIS? At common law, adultery constituted an actionable iniuria against the innocent spouse. In RH v DE and DE v RH the supreme court of appeal and the constitutional court made a radical turnabout. On the basis that the court has a duty to develop the law in accordance with contemporary boni mores as delictual criterion for wrongfulness and the bill of rights, both courts came to the conclusion that, in the light of the boni mores, adultery can no longer be regarded as wrongful, and that it may accordingly no longer ground the actio iniuriarum. This conclusion is supported by the majority of South African writers and most Western countries. Some of the other reasons for this finding were found to be as follows: the origin of the action is archaic as the husband was considered to have some proprietary interest in his wife and, later, because of the view that both husband and wife were entitled to the sole use of each other’s body; it is a clear anomaly that the action is available against the third party only and not against the adulterous spouse; the action for adultery does not protect the institution of marriage and also does not have a deterrent effect against adultery; even though the innocent spouse’s feelings (of dignity) may be subjectively infringed by the adultery, a reasonable person would not be hurt by the adultery and it is therefore not wrongful; the hurt and harm brought about by the action (for example, for the children involved and the defendant) would far outweigh the advantage which the action may have for the innocent spouse; and the constitutional rights to freedom and security of the person, privacy and freedom of association of the adulterous spouse and the third party do not necessarily weigh less than the right to human dignity of the innocent spouse just because they have committed adultery. Nevertheless, adultery remains relevant where the circumstances surrounding the adultery were of such a nature that it may be regarded as an actionable iniuria. Thus, adultery-related conduct which is of an insulting nature or infringes the victim’s feelings, should in appropriate circumstances amount to the iniuriae insult and injury to feelings. Furthermore, an allegation that a person committed adultery, should in principle constitute actionable defamation. The action for pain and suffering should also remain available where the conduct relating to adultery causes, for example, emotional shock with accompanying psychological lesion. In addition, the innocent spouse should be able to institute a claim with the Aquilian action for patrimonial loss, such as expenses for the supervision of the household and children. Adultery also remains relevant for divorce law as it may still indicate that the marriage has broken down irretrievably and can be taken into account as a factor affecting the redistribution of assets and the forfeiture of patrimonial benefits. Finally, it is submitted that enticement (which is often accompanied with adultery) should be retained in our law as an independent cause of action. Although the legal condemnation of adultery has softened manifestly, marriage fidelity is still highly regarded on the basis of the community’s moral and religious convictions. Accordingly, marriage infidelity as a result of adultery is still condemned and considered blameworthy on such grounds. It is therefore understandable that adultery remains relevant in certain areas of the law as well, as pointed out in this contribution.