Abstract

This judgment attracted considerable media attention, because for the first time in South Africa sentimental damages were awarded for psychological lesion caused to a dog owner who had been deeply shocked by observing lacerations to his pet, caused by the negligence of a veterinarian practice. The plaintiff-owner instituted a contractual claim for malperformance against the defendant, for consequential damages on the basis that the defendant’s negligent conduct had rendered his dog unfit for competing in dog shows which could benefit him financially and compelled him to visit her for a prolonged period while undergoing treatment, as well as for general damages for emotional shock. In the alternative he claimed for the psychological harm caused by his emotional shock on the basis of delict. Finally, he applied for a declaratory order to have the defendant declared unfit to be in charge of any animal for a period of 12 months due to contravention of the Animal Protection Act 71 of 1962. The plaintiff was awarded consequential damages, as well as sentimental damages on the basis of breach of contract. The court found it unnecessary to pursue the delictual route, while it refused to issue the declaratory order prayed for.
The court’s decision on refusing the contractual action for malperformance, its award of consequential damages and its refusal to issue the declaratory order were well-founded. Its award of sentimental damages for the psychological harm suffered by the plaintiff on the basis of contract flies in the face of established contractual principles, as contractual claims are intended to place a creditor as much as possible in the same position regarding his or her property that he or she would have been if the contract had been performed. It would appear that some support for this part of the judgment can be found in a few American judgments. The court’s erroneous judgment on this point ruled out any decision on the merits of a delictual claim for sentimental damages due to suffering psychological lesion due to nervous shock. A further unacceptable aspect of the judgment was its failure to require expert evidence on the plaintiff’s psychological harm.
An assessment is made of the chances of success of a claim for sentimental damages on the basis of delict, accepting that the plaintiff had been successful in proving clear psychological harm. Reference is made to case law which appears to be adverse to a claim such as the present, as well as to certain South African authors who are well disposed to allowing a claim such as the present on the authority of an obiter dictum from the judgment of Masiba v Constantia Insurance Co Ltd (1982). A brief survey of American law shows that the majority of states do not allow claims of this kind for harm caused to companion animals, whereas the present state of English law also does not appear to favour such claims. The judgment fails to conform to any of the recognised precepts of judgment writing, in particular in omitting any reference to authority. The court in fact issued an order which is neither final, nor able of execution. It stands as a stark display of how the court’s patent sympathy with the plaintiff’s unhappiness affected its judgment in discarding basic contract law precepts, as well as established evidence and procedural rules in order to reach a judgment in conformity with mere empathy.

Abstract

Suid-Afrikaanse howe volg ’n rigiede territoriale benadering om jurisdiksie in oorgrens arbeidsgeskille te bepaal, gesentreer op die “plek van die onderneming” waar werknemers werk. Hierdie raamwerk, wat in Astral Operations Ltd v Parry gevestig is en onlangs in Sorrell v Petroplan Sub-Saharan Africa (Pty) Ltd en Ephraim v DRG Outsourcing (Pty) Ltd herbevestig is, is afgelei van regspresedente wat beslis is ingevolge die herroepe Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge 28 van 1956 – wetgewing met fundamenteel verskillende bewoording, doeleindes en grondwetlike konteks as die huidige Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge 66 van 1995. Die benadering reduseer komplekse internasionale diensverhoudinge tot binêre karakteriserings: oorsese bedrywighede is óf “afsonderlik en geskei” van binnelandse ondernemings (wat jurisdiksie ontken) óf “onlosmaaklik verbind” (wat jurisdiksie toelaat). Ten spyte van volgehoue akademiese kritiek, het howe versuim om met gesofistikeerde alternatiewe te werk. Rinaldi waarsku dat howe jurisdiksie met die keuse van reg verwar terwyl hulle onvanpaste presedente invoer en grondwetlike imperatiewe ignoreer. Calitz en Garbers bepleit begeleide diskresie met inagneming van verskeie nie-hiërargiese verbindende faktore. Fredericks stel hiërargiese verbindingsfaktore voor met die lex loci-oplossing as vermoedelik bepalend. Mundlak bevorder radikale deterritorialisering gefokus op ekonomiese afhanklikheid. Elke raamwerk bied gereedskap wat spesifiek ontwikkel is vir oorgrens regskwessies, maar howe gaan voort asof hierdie studies nie bestaan nie. Die onlangse Naidoo- en Ephraim-uitsprake bevestig voortgesette geregtelike nakoming van territoriale rigiditeit, met die Ephraim-saak wat Suid-Afrikaanse werknemers wat deur ’n Suid-Afrikaanse entiteit gewerf en vergoed is, beskerming ontken het bloot omdat hulle dienste aan buitelandse kliënte gelewer het. Hierdie beslissings laat formule-karakterisering toe sonder om grondwetlike dimensies of verbindingsfaktoranalise te betrek. Hierdie akademies-geregtelike ontkoppeling laat Suid-Afrikaanse werknemers wat in die buiteland werk met onsekere beskerming, maak potensiële regulatoriese omseiling moontlik en weerspreek die grondwetlike fondamente van arbeidsreg. Totdat howe samehangende raamwerke vir die internasionale privaatreg ontwikkel wat die onderskeidende karakter van die arbeidsreg erken, sal Suid-Afrikaanse werkers in die buiteland onvoldoende beskerming in die gesig staar juis wanneer hulle dit die nodigste het. Die skeiding tussen regterlike praktyk en akademiese vakkundigheid vereis dringende aandag. Howe moet óf betekenisvol met beskikbare verbindende faktore-metodologieë omgaan, óf die parlement moet ingryp deur middel van wetswysigings wat die territoriale omvang van Wet 66 van 1995 verduidelik. Die grondwetlike waarborg van billike arbeidspraktyke vir “almal” vereis interpretatiewe benaderings wat die realiteite van globalisering erken eerder as om formalistiese toetse wat afgelei is van gediskrediteerde apartheidsera-raamwerke, te laat voortduur. Die legitimiteit van Suid-Afrikaanse arbeidsreg hang af van die ontwikkeling van beginselvaste reaksies op die kompleksiteite van transnasionale indiensneming.

Abstract

The liability of Z as purchaser under numerous credit-sale agreements was ostensibly secured by a surety agreement concluded with six sureties more than a year before the first instalment sale was concluded by Z with M. That surety agreement provided:

“We the undersigned … do hereby interpose and bind myself /ourselves jointly and severally as surety for and co-principal debtor in solidum with SA Zero Waste Pty (Ltd) (‘the debtor’) for the due and punctual payment by the Debtor to Mercedes-Benz Financial Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd (‘the Creditor’) of all sums of money which the Debtor may now and from time to time hereafter owe or be indebted to the Creditor, its successors, order and assigns from whatsoever cause arising whether such indebtedness be incurred by the Debtor solely, jointly or in partnership with any other person, firm or company, and further for the due, punctual and faithful performance by the Debtor of any obligation of whatsoever nature, whether actual or contingent and whether in contract or in delict, which he may now or in the future owe to the Creditor” (judgment bundle 206– emphasis added).

It is submitted that notwithstanding the alleged practice of accepting “continuing suretyships” to cover unspecified and uncertain future claims by the creditor against the principal debtor, such a contract is in contravention of the accessory principle that governs all forms of real and personal security agreements. Suretyship is an accessory obligation – it is accessory to the transaction that creates the obligation of the principal debtor.

M subsequently ceded all its rights and obligations (sic) founded on its credit agreements with Z to D without informing Z of the cession. More than four months later, M entered into an agreement of voluntary surrender and termination of the initial agreements with Z as debtor whereby all vehicles purchased were returned by Z to M. The parties agreed that Z would be liable to M for any outstanding liability not covered by the revenue of the sale of the vehicles to third parties. Thereafter Z was finally liquidated. Almost two years later D claimed performance from the six sureties for the amount still outstanding.

It is submitted that the judgments discussed leave some serious questions unresolved. It is doubted whether M as cedent could have the competency to enter into a cancellation agreement with Z cancelling the claim that had been ceded to D more than four months earlier – nemo plus iuris. Also discussed is the extent to which the sureties who were not party to the cancellation agreement can be held liable as sureties for a claim that apparently cannot be founded on the cancelled original agreements given that it originated only some five years after the surety agreement was concluded. M’s claim, founded on the cancellation agreement, was not secured by a new surety agreement at all.

The supreme court of appeal should carefully reconsider the validity of so-called continuing suretyships where, as in this instance, the agreement provides for liability ad infinitum founded on whatever contract or delict that may come about in clear contravention of the accessory principle.