Onvervulde verwagting uit vermeend gesamentlik wederkerige testament – moontlike vorderinge vir die ontgogelde?

AANTEKENINGE

Onvervulde verwagting uit vermeend gesamentlik wederkerige testament – moontlike vorderinge vir die ontgogelde?

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 2, 2026, p. 344-354
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i2a8

Abstract

After the statutory abolition in South African law of succession of claims to a legitimate portion, no person has any legal claim to a hereditary benefit from another’s estate after the latter’s death. Freedom of testation means, among other things, that every person competent to execute a valid will may do so and in the process amend or revoke any previously executed documents, provided that the requirements of execution of a will have been complied with. The fact that the testator once executed a supposedly joint and mutual will with his spouse under which the surviving spouse would be the exclusive beneficiary of the “joint estate” does not deprive any of the testators concerned of the capacity to subsequently even secretly execute a new will and, by revoking the previous will, also dispose of his assets quite differently from the erstwhile disposition indicated in the joint will. The disillusioned surviving spouse will not hold any claim against the appointed executor of the deceased’s estate founded on the law of succession.
Under the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990 the surviving spouse may have a claim against the estate of the first dying spouse for future maintenance if all the requirements of the act can be met. Such a claim should be timeously lodged with the executor after the latter’s advertisement calling upon all persons having claims against the estate to lodge such claims with the executor within the advertised period for lodging (usually 30 days). However, the intention of the legislature is not that, under the guise of this claim for future maintenance, a redistribution of the testator’s assets may take place despite the latter’s express disposition. Any claim for future maintenance ranks after all other existing claims against the estate and just before the application of the norms of the law of succession that determine the distribution of the remaining assets in the estate. Section 31(b) of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965 determines that if any person fails to lodge his claim against any deceased estate before the expiry of the period specified under section 29(1), he shall not be entitled in respect of his claim to demand restitution from any other claimant of any moneys paid to such other claimant at any time or before he lodged his claim, as the case may be, in pursuance of a valid claim against the estate.
In Bellingan v Bellingan ((CA110/2024) 2025 ZAECMKHC 101 (4 Dec 2025)) the court upheld the appeal against a blatantly wrong decision of the district court in Humansdorp that honoured the presumed claim of the applicant against the stepson as beneficiary in his late father’s will notwithstanding the fact that the alleged claim was not founded on any valid agreement reached between the parties. The applicant alleged that she agreed not to contest the will of the late Mr JVH Bellingan or to lodge a claim against the said estate of her late husband in exchange for certain benefits she claimed the appellant should provide for her maintenance for a limited period of five years.
Because no agreement was reached, there is no valid pactum de non petendo and in principle the respondent may be enticed to consider lodging a claim against the estate in the light of this judgment. It is submitted, however, that the chances of her succeeding with any claim for maintenance against the estate are very slim if the executor had in the meantime finalised the administration of that estate to the satisfaction of the master. Nothing in the judgment points to any timeously lodged claim founded on Act 27 of 1990 that meets the requirements of sections 29 and 31 of the Administration of Estates Act. The widow may justly be disillusioned – she trusted both that her late husband would not secretly amend his will contained in the joint document and that his son would be a gentleman – but a contested gentlemen’s agreement is seldom enforceable on its own. Although she may have had a claim for future maintenance against the estate, she waited too long to lodge that claim. The law helps the vigilant, not the slumbering or gullible.

’n Bedenklike uitspraak oor vergoeding weens die veroorsaking van psigiese letsel as gevolg van emosionele skok

REGSPRAAK

’n Bedenklike uitspraak oor vergoeding weens die veroorsaking van psigiese letsel as gevolg van emosionele skok

Author: Johan Scott

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universteit van Suid-Afrika
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 2, 2026, p. 373-391
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i2a10

Abstract

This judgment attracted considerable media attention, because for the first time in South Africa sentimental damages were awarded for psychological lesion caused to a dog owner who had been deeply shocked by observing lacerations to his pet, caused by the negligence of a veterinarian practice. The plaintiff-owner instituted a contractual claim for malperformance against the defendant, for consequential damages on the basis that the defendant’s negligent conduct had rendered his dog unfit for competing in dog shows which could benefit him financially and compelled him to visit her for a prolonged period while undergoing treatment, as well as for general damages for emotional shock. In the alternative he claimed for the psychological harm caused by his emotional shock on the basis of delict. Finally, he applied for a declaratory order to have the defendant declared unfit to be in charge of any animal for a period of 12 months due to contravention of the Animal Protection Act 71 of 1962. The plaintiff was awarded consequential damages, as well as sentimental damages on the basis of breach of contract. The court found it unnecessary to pursue the delictual route, while it refused to issue the declaratory order prayed for.
The court’s decision on refusing the contractual action for malperformance, its award of consequential damages and its refusal to issue the declaratory order were well-founded. Its award of sentimental damages for the psychological harm suffered by the plaintiff on the basis of contract flies in the face of established contractual principles, as contractual claims are intended to place a creditor as much as possible in the same position regarding his or her property that he or she would have been if the contract had been performed. It would appear that some support for this part of the judgment can be found in a few American judgments. The court’s erroneous judgment on this point ruled out any decision on the merits of a delictual claim for sentimental damages due to suffering psychological lesion due to nervous shock. A further unacceptable aspect of the judgment was its failure to require expert evidence on the plaintiff’s psychological harm.
An assessment is made of the chances of success of a claim for sentimental damages on the basis of delict, accepting that the plaintiff had been successful in proving clear psychological harm. Reference is made to case law which appears to be adverse to a claim such as the present, as well as to certain South African authors who are well disposed to allowing a claim such as the present on the authority of an obiter dictum from the judgment of Masiba v Constantia Insurance Co Ltd (1982). A brief survey of American law shows that the majority of states do not allow claims of this kind for harm caused to companion animals, whereas the present state of English law also does not appear to favour such claims. The judgment fails to conform to any of the recognised precepts of judgment writing, in particular in omitting any reference to authority. The court in fact issued an order which is neither final, nor able of execution. It stands as a stark display of how the court’s patent sympathy with the plaintiff’s unhappiness affected its judgment in discarding basic contract law precepts, as well as established evidence and procedural rules in order to reach a judgment in conformity with mere empathy.

The academic-judicial disconnect in cross-border employment jurisdiction

REGSPRAAK

The academic-judicial disconnect in cross-border employment jurisdiction

Author: Marthinus Van Staden

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of the Witwatersrand
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 2, 2026, p. 392-409
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i2a11

Abstract

Suid-Afrikaanse howe volg ’n rigiede territoriale benadering om jurisdiksie in oorgrens arbeidsgeskille te bepaal, gesentreer op die “plek van die onderneming” waar werknemers werk. Hierdie raamwerk, wat in Astral Operations Ltd v Parry gevestig is en onlangs in Sorrell v Petroplan Sub-Saharan Africa (Pty) Ltd en Ephraim v DRG Outsourcing (Pty) Ltd herbevestig is, is afgelei van regspresedente wat beslis is ingevolge die herroepe Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge 28 van 1956 – wetgewing met fundamenteel verskillende bewoording, doeleindes en grondwetlike konteks as die huidige Wet op Arbeidsverhoudinge 66 van 1995. Die benadering reduseer komplekse internasionale diensverhoudinge tot binêre karakteriserings: oorsese bedrywighede is óf “afsonderlik en geskei” van binnelandse ondernemings (wat jurisdiksie ontken) óf “onlosmaaklik verbind” (wat jurisdiksie toelaat). Ten spyte van volgehoue akademiese kritiek, het howe versuim om met gesofistikeerde alternatiewe te werk. Rinaldi waarsku dat howe jurisdiksie met die keuse van reg verwar terwyl hulle onvanpaste presedente invoer en grondwetlike imperatiewe ignoreer. Calitz en Garbers bepleit begeleide diskresie met inagneming van verskeie nie-hiërargiese verbindende faktore. Fredericks stel hiërargiese verbindingsfaktore voor met die lex loci-oplossing as vermoedelik bepalend. Mundlak bevorder radikale deterritorialisering gefokus op ekonomiese afhanklikheid. Elke raamwerk bied gereedskap wat spesifiek ontwikkel is vir oorgrens regskwessies, maar howe gaan voort asof hierdie studies nie bestaan nie. Die onlangse Naidoo- en Ephraim-uitsprake bevestig voortgesette geregtelike nakoming van territoriale rigiditeit, met die Ephraim-saak wat Suid-Afrikaanse werknemers wat deur ’n Suid-Afrikaanse entiteit gewerf en vergoed is, beskerming ontken het bloot omdat hulle dienste aan buitelandse kliënte gelewer het. Hierdie beslissings laat formule-karakterisering toe sonder om grondwetlike dimensies of verbindingsfaktoranalise te betrek. Hierdie akademies-geregtelike ontkoppeling laat Suid-Afrikaanse werknemers wat in die buiteland werk met onsekere beskerming, maak potensiële regulatoriese omseiling moontlik en weerspreek die grondwetlike fondamente van arbeidsreg. Totdat howe samehangende raamwerke vir die internasionale privaatreg ontwikkel wat die onderskeidende karakter van die arbeidsreg erken, sal Suid-Afrikaanse werkers in die buiteland onvoldoende beskerming in die gesig staar juis wanneer hulle dit die nodigste het. Die skeiding tussen regterlike praktyk en akademiese vakkundigheid vereis dringende aandag. Howe moet óf betekenisvol met beskikbare verbindende faktore-metodologieë omgaan, óf die parlement moet ingryp deur middel van wetswysigings wat die territoriale omvang van Wet 66 van 1995 verduidelik. Die grondwetlike waarborg van billike arbeidspraktyke vir “almal” vereis interpretatiewe benaderings wat die realiteite van globalisering erken eerder as om formalistiese toetse wat afgelei is van gediskrediteerde apartheidsera-raamwerke, te laat voortduur. Die legitimiteit van Suid-Afrikaanse arbeidsreg hang af van die ontwikkeling van beginselvaste reaksies op die kompleksiteite van transnasionale indiensneming.

Sessie van ’n borg-versekerde vorderingsreg – kansellasie daarna deur die sedent van die verbintenis as bron van die vorderingsreg – tog suksesvolle vordering op gekanselleerde ooreenkoms – merkwaardig

REGSPRAAK

Sessie van ’n borg-versekerde vorderingsreg – kansellasie daarna deur die sedent van die verbintenis as bron van die vorderingsreg – tog suksesvolle vordering op gekanselleerde ooreenkoms – merkwaardig

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 2, 2026, p. 410-429
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i2a12

Abstract

The liability of Z as purchaser under numerous credit-sale agreements was ostensibly secured by a surety agreement concluded with six sureties more than a year before the first instalment sale was concluded by Z with M. That surety agreement provided:

“We the undersigned … do hereby interpose and bind myself /ourselves jointly and severally as surety for and co-principal debtor in solidum with SA Zero Waste Pty (Ltd) (‘the debtor’) for the due and punctual payment by the Debtor to Mercedes-Benz Financial Services South Africa (Pty) Ltd (‘the Creditor’) of all sums of money which the Debtor may now and from time to time hereafter owe or be indebted to the Creditor, its successors, order and assigns from whatsoever cause arising whether such indebtedness be incurred by the Debtor solely, jointly or in partnership with any other person, firm or company, and further for the due, punctual and faithful performance by the Debtor of any obligation of whatsoever nature, whether actual or contingent and whether in contract or in delict, which he may now or in the future owe to the Creditor” (judgment bundle 206– emphasis added).

It is submitted that notwithstanding the alleged practice of accepting “continuing suretyships” to cover unspecified and uncertain future claims by the creditor against the principal debtor, such a contract is in contravention of the accessory principle that governs all forms of real and personal security agreements. Suretyship is an accessory obligation – it is accessory to the transaction that creates the obligation of the principal debtor.

M subsequently ceded all its rights and obligations (sic) founded on its credit agreements with Z to D without informing Z of the cession. More than four months later, M entered into an agreement of voluntary surrender and termination of the initial agreements with Z as debtor whereby all vehicles purchased were returned by Z to M. The parties agreed that Z would be liable to M for any outstanding liability not covered by the revenue of the sale of the vehicles to third parties. Thereafter Z was finally liquidated. Almost two years later D claimed performance from the six sureties for the amount still outstanding.

It is submitted that the judgments discussed leave some serious questions unresolved. It is doubted whether M as cedent could have the competency to enter into a cancellation agreement with Z cancelling the claim that had been ceded to D more than four months earlier – nemo plus iuris. Also discussed is the extent to which the sureties who were not party to the cancellation agreement can be held liable as sureties for a claim that apparently cannot be founded on the cancelled original agreements given that it originated only some five years after the surety agreement was concluded. M’s claim, founded on the cancellation agreement, was not secured by a new surety agreement at all.

The supreme court of appeal should carefully reconsider the validity of so-called continuing suretyships where, as in this instance, the agreement provides for liability ad infinitum founded on whatever contract or delict that may come about in clear contravention of the accessory principle.

Corroboration of confessions: a comparative view of the approaches in Australia, South Africa and other common-law jurisdictions

ARTIKEL

Corroboration of confessions: a comparative view of the approaches in Australia, South Africa and other common-law jurisdictions

Author: Wouter le R de Vos

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Visiting professor, University of Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2026, p. 1-20
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i1a1

Abstract

’n Bekentenis kan omskryf word as ’n omvattende erkenning buite die hof gedoen deur ’n beskuldigde in ’n strafsaak waarin hy of sy onomwonde skuld beken ten opsigte van die ten laste gelegde misdaad. Aangesien ’n bekentenis al die elemente van die misdaad dek, word dit oor die algemeen as ’n voldoende grondslag vir ’n skuldigbevinding beskou. Daar is egter sekere voorbehoude wat in ag geneem moet word. Westerse demokratiese regstelsels verg eerstens dat ’n bekentenis op ’n behoorlike wyse bekom moes wees, wat meebring dat dit minstens vrywilliglik afgelê moes wees, ten einde toelaatbaar te wees. Tweedens vereis sommige jurisdiksies dat ’n bekentenis wat toelaatbaar bevind is, slegs as grondslag van ’n skuldigbevinding kan dien mits die inhoud daarvan andersins gestaaf word of, so nie, indien daar getuienis buite die bekentenis is wat bewys dat die ten laste gelegde misdaad só gepleeg is. Laasgenoemde vereiste staan bekend as die corpus delicti-reël, wat letterlik beteken die “liggaam van die misdaad”.
Die oogmerk met hierdie vereistes is om die gevaar uit te skakel of minstens te verminder dat ’n vals bekentenis as grondslag vir ’n skuldigbevinding gebruik word. Regspraak in Engeland en die Verenigde State van Amerika (VSA) het sedert die sewentiende eeu aangetoon dat mense soms vals bekentenisse maak. Daar is verskeie redes hiervoor, onder andere ’n verdagte wat verdere aggressiewe ondervraging deur die polisie wil vermy of wat ’n familielid of geliefde wil beskerm deur die aanspreeklikheid op hom of haar te neem en ’n persoon wat geestesonstabiel is en wat sodoende publisiteit soek. In hierdie artikel word ’n regsvergelykende studie gedoen van die posisie in Engeland, Skotland, die VSA, Australië en Suid-Afrika met betrekking tot die stawing van bekentenisse, insluitende die corpus delicti-reël.
Die stawingsvereiste en die corpus delicti-reël behoort ter sprake te kom tydens die evaluering van getuienis aan die einde van die verhoor, wanneer die hof oorweeg of die beskuldigde se bekentenis ’n voldoende grondslag vir ’n skuldigbevinding bied. Teen daardie tyd is die bekentenis reeds toelaatbaar bevind en is die toelatingsvereistes nie meer ter sake nie. Hierdie onderskeid tussen die toelaatbaarheid en evaluering van ’n bekentenis word in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg gehandhaaf, maar dit is nie die posisie in die ander jurisdiksies onder bespreking nie. Die konsepte “toelaatbaarheid” en “evaluering van bekentenisse” word dikwels saamgesmelt en die stawingskonsep word ook in die betekenis van die toelaatbaarheid van bekentenisse gebruik.
In Engeland is die fokus hoofsaaklik op die toelaatbaarheid van bekentenisse, wat informele erkennings insluit. In wese gaan dit oor die vrywilligheidsvereiste, maar die betroubaarheid van ’n verklaring speel ook ’n rol. Dit lei tot verwarring want betroubaarheid kom eintlik ter sprake by evaluering van bekentenisse.
In Skotland geld ’n algemene stawingsvereiste ten opsigte van misdade in die algemeen. Dit beteken dat die feite in geskil deur twee onafhanklike bronne van getuienis bewys moet word. Die vervolgingsgesag moet dus bewys dat die betrokke misdaad gepleeg is én dat die beskuldigde die oortreder was. Beide elemente moet dan deur twee onafhanklike bronne van getuienis gestaaf word. Indien die vervolging op ’n bekentenis steun, moet die bekentenis deur onafhanklike getuienis gestaaf word. Getuienis van die corpus delicti is nie opsigself voldoende om aan die stawingsvereiste te voldoen nie.
In die Verenigde State van Amerika is die posisie baie verwarrend. Sommige bronne behandel die corpus delicti-beginsel in die konteks van sowel die toelaatbaarheid as die evaluering van bekentenisse. Ander bronne verwys daarna as uitsluitlik ’n toelaatbaarheidsvereiste. Enkele bronne behandel dit as ’n vereiste rakende die evaluering van bekentenisse. Na my mening is daar weinig leiding te vind in die Amerikaanse bronne.
Die fokus in al die verskillende jurisdiksies in Australië val op die toelaatbaarheid van informele erkennings, wat bekentenisse insluit. Sedert die uitspraak van die hoë hof in McKinney v R is wetgewing in al die jurisdiksies aangeneem wat in die algemeen vereis dat erkennings en bekentenisse afgelê in polisie-aanhouding gestaaf moet word deur ’n audio-visuele of elektroniese opname. Die begrip stawing word dus hier in die betekenis van die toelaatbaarheid van bekentenisse gebruik. Nie een van die Australiese jurisdiksies vereis stawing van die inhoud van ’n bekentenis om as grondslag van ’n skuldigbevinding te kan dien nie. Die stawingsvereiste is dus gefokus op die omstandighede met die maak van ’n bekentenis en nie op die inhoud daarvan nie.
Teen die voorgaande agtergrond meen ek dat die Suid-Afrikaanse posisie op ’n goeie grondslag gevestig is. Daar word ’n duidelike onderskeid getref tussen enersyds die vereistes betreffende die toelaatbaarheid van bekentenisse en die stawing van sodanige verklarings andersyds. Wat laasgenoemde betref, word vereis dat ’n bekentenis in ’n wesenlike opsig bevestig moet word of, so nie, dat getuienis buite die bekentenis moet bewys dat die betrokke misdaad só gepleeg is. Die enigste kritiek daarteen is dat die onderskeid tussen informele erkennings en bekentenisse kunsmatig en onnodig is. Beide is inkriminerende verklarings en, met inagneming van die grondwetlike bepalings, behoort dieselfde vereistes betreffende toelaatbaarheid ten opsigte van albei te geld.