Subverting the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act in judicial review

Subverting the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act in judicial review

Authors Radley Henrico

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Affiliated with the University of Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 2, 2018, p. 288 – 307

Abstract

ONDERGRAWING VAN DIE WET OP DIE BEVORDERING VAN ADMINISTRATIEWE GEREGTIGHEID OP REGTERLIKE HERSIENING: DIE BRON VAN WESENLIKE ONSEKERHEID IN DIE SUID-AFRIKAANSE ADMINISTRATIEFREG Hierdie artikel behels ‘n bespreking van die probleem wat voortspruit uit die versuim van die howe om op konsekwente wyse nasionale wetgewing toe te pas soos vervat in die Wet op die Bevordering van Administratiewe Geregtigheid 3 van 2000, wat uitvoering gee aan die grondwetlike reg tot regverdige administratiewe optrede. Die artikel ondersoek die ontwikkeling van die wettigheidsbeginsel as ‘n voorbeeld van ‘n aspek van die regstaat wat daarin geslaag het om aanspreeklikheid ten opsigte van die uitoefening van mag af te dwing in gevalle waar sodanige aanspreeklikheid nie ingevolge Wet 3 van 2000 sou ontstaan het nie. Die gebrekkige definisies en ingewikkelde omskrywings in die wet het daartoe gelei dat sekere regters die wetgewing bloot buite rekening laat of ignoreer en hulself direk verlaat op die grond-wetlike remedie van die wettigheidsbeginsel. Gevolglik word sekere sake beslis op grond van die wet en ander weer op grond van die buigsamer wettigheidsbeginsel. Hierdie lukrake en teenstrydige benadering is nadelig in twee opsigte. Eerstens skep dit twee strominge binne die regspraak in die administratiefreg, naamlik enersyds sake waarin die administratiewe optrede hersien word aan die hand van die wet en andersyds sake wat juis weer direk op die wettigheidsbeginsel gebaseer word. Tweedens is dit strydig met die subsidi\xc3\xaariteitsre\xc3\xabl aangesien regters nasionale wetgewing eenkant toe skuif en uitsprake direk baseer op die wettigheidsbeginsel. Die gevolg van beide optredes is dat regsonsekerheid geskep word oor die metode waarvolgens administratiewe optrede hersien word — regsonsekerheid vir applikante en prosedeerders maar ook vir regspraktisyns. NO DUTY TO PROSECUTE IN EVERY POTENTIAL CASE "’It has never been the rule of this country, I hope it never will be, that criminal offences must automatically be the subject of prosecution’. \xe2\x80\xa6 He pointed out that the Attorney General and the Director of Public Prosecutions only intervene to direct a prosecution when they consider it in the public interest to do so and he cited a statement made by Lord Simon in 1925 when he said: ‘there is no greater nonsense talked about the Attorney General’s duty than the suggestion that in all cases the Attorney General ought to decide to prosecute merely because he thinks there is what the lawyers call a case. It is not true and no one who has held the office of Attorney General supposes it is’" per Viscount Dilhorne Smedleys Ltd v Breed 1974 2 All ER 21 (HL) 33.

Borg én tegelyk medehoofskuldenaar is ‘n contradictio in terminis en onversoenbaar

Borg én tegelyk medehoofskuldenaar is ‘n contradictio in terminis en onversoenbaar

Authors JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Affiliated with the University of Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 2, 2018, p. 256 – 287

Abstract

THE FORMULATION "SURETY AND CO-PRINCIPAL DEBTOR" CONTAINS A CONTRADICTIO IN TERMINIS WITH CONSEQUENCES In many a suretyship agreement the formulation is found that a person binds himself "as surety and co-principal debtor". It is submitted that, notwithstanding the commonly held belief that the legal construction described by this formulation entails nothing more than a mere suretyship, far-reaching consequences are attached to the formulation and that the legal content of it is far removed from that of a normal suretyship. It is inherent to the nature of suretyship as an accessory relationship that nobody can stand surety for his own primary liability as debtor. This is the position regardless of whether the person is described as the sole debtor or as co-principal debtor. This contradiction is discussed with reference to the historical sources of the divergent constructions entailed in this conglomerate formulation as well as references to some of the comparable legal systems founded on the same underlying legal principles as the South African common law. While a suretyship agreement per definition always entails an accessory relationship and in principle the surety’s liability is only a subsidiary liability (although this latter principle may be altered by agreement), the liability of a co-principal debtor is neither accessory nor subsidiary. In the case of co-principal debtors there is only one liability ie the performance due to the creditor under that agreement, albeit by more than one debtor. If fulfilled, that claim to performance is settled and cannot be ceded to the person who paid. In contrast, the surety when called upon to perform is settling his own accessory liability and not that of the principal debtor and is consequently subrogated to the rights of the creditor, ie he thus has the same rights as those of the creditor and he can sue the principal debtor to exercise those rights and may claim the still outstanding performance from the principal debtor. Where extinctive prescription is at stake, the outcome differs significantly depending on whether the accessory and subsidiary liability of a surety is additionally secured by a mortgage bond over the surety’s immovable property or if it is a single debt that is extinguished by prescription after the lapse of the default three-year prescription period. Taking the above into account and reflecting on the formulation of Boshoff J in Business Buying & Investment Co Ltd v Linaae, where he stated that "[a] person who signs as surety and co-principal debtor is both a surety and debtor. As far as the creditor is concerned he is a co-debtor; his obligation is co-equal in extent with that of the principal debtor and is thus of the same scope and nature as that of the principal debtor …. He does not, however, lose his character of surety and is, for example, entitled to the beneficium cedendarum actionum and to found a defence against the claim of the creditor on any act done by the latter which prejudices the surety in the exercise of that beneficium …. As far as the debtor is concerned he is a surety and has a right of recourse against him" (1959 (3) SA 93 (T) 95H-96A), the reasoning remains convincing. However, the well-known decisions of the court of appeal in Neon and Cold Cathode Illuminations (Pty) Ltd v Ephron (1978 (1) SA 463 (A) 471D), where it was stated that "[a]lthough respondent bound himself, not only as surety, but also as co-principal debtor with Benam, that did not render him liable to appellant in any capacity other than that of a surety who has renounced the benefits ordinarily available to a surety against the creditor", and in Kilroe-Daley v Barclays National Bank Ltd (1984 (4) SA 609 (A) 623G), where it was stated that "[i]t follows from what has been said above that a surety and co-principal debtor does not undertake a separate independent liability as a principal debtor; the addition of the words, ‘co-principal debtor’, does not transform his contract into any contract other than one of suretyship … The appellant executed a mortgage bond. In so doing she did not enter into a contract separate from her contract of suretyship; she merely furnished security for her indebtedness", still do not detract from the reasoning of Boshoff J quoted above. This reasoning was reconfirmed in Millman NNO v Masterbond Participation Bond Trust Managers (Pty) Ltd (Under Curatorship) (1997 (1) SA 113 (C) 122E-F): "As appears from a later passage in Union Government v Van der Merwe (supra at 322) which has already been quoted above, the learned Judge points out that a surety who signs as co-principal debtor incurs a greater obligation than that of a surety simpliciter: it is ‘co-equal in extent with that of the principal debtor: or otherwise expressed, that his obligation shall be of the same scope and nature as that of the principal debtor’." See also the formulation in Consolidated Textile Mills Ltd v Weiniger (1961 (3) SA 335 (O) 338C): "As a co-principal debtor the defendant’s liability is co-equal in extent with that of the principal debtor … and the defendant can be sued for any debt incurred by the company to plaintiff in respect of goods supplied, as soon as that debt becomes due. It will not even be necessary to excuss the company before suing the defendant, and subsequent liquidation of the company can in no way affect this right to sue." It is thus clear that the reasoning of some of the lower court decisions are more in line with legal principles than that of the court of appeal and clearly the court of appeal’s reasoning has not found its way into all subsequent decisions of the lower courts. It is thus submitted that legal certainty will be enhanced if the apex court unambiguously clarifies the consequences attached to the oft-used inherently contradictory formulation of contracts of suretyship and urges the credit community to refrain from using the ambiguous terminology in contracts that tends to obscure the true liability of such a co-principal debtor. If this is not done, it may be prudent for the legislature to consider codifying this aspect of the law of personal security along the lines of the latest codification by the Belgian legislature.

Money laundering, terrorist financing and financial sanctions

Money laundering, terrorist financing and financial sanctions

Authors Charl Hugo, Wynand Spruyt

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Affiliated with the University of Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 2, 2018, p. 227 – 255

Abstract

GELDWASSERY, DIE FINANSIERING VAN TERRORISME EN FINANSI\xc3\x8bLE SANKSIES: SUID-AFRIKA SE ANTWOORD BY WYSE VAN DIE WYSIGINGSWET OP DIE FINANSI\xc3\x8bLE INTELLIGENSIESENTRUM 1 VAN 2017 In hierdie artikel word die ingrypende impak van die Wysigingswet op die Finansi\xc3\xable Intelligensiesentrum 1 van 2017 op die stryd teen geldwassery en finansiering van terrorisme aan die orde gestel. Die outeurs skets in die eerste plek die geskiedenis (en toekoms) van die inwerkingstelling van die verskillende aspekte van die wet (en gepaardgaande regulasies) asook die internasionale agtergrond daarvan (die aanbevelings van die sogenaamde "Financial Action Task Force"). Die belangrikste veranderings wat ingevoer is, en staan te word, word bespreek. Die kern hiervan is die verskuiwing vanaf ‘n re\xc3\xablgebaseerde na ‘n risiko-gebaseerde benadering tot die identifikasie en verifi\xc3\xabring van kli\xc3\xabnte in die stryd teen geldwassery en die finansiering van terrorisme (wat ‘n beter verspreiding van die beperkte middele beskikbaar vir hierdie stryd bemagtig). Hierdie benadering vereis onder andere verhoogde kli\xc3\xabnt-omsigtigheidsmaatre\xc3\xabls ten opsigte van persone in vooraanstaande posisies (sowel binnelands as buitelands), asook ten opsigte van regspersone en trusts veral met betrekking tot die uiteindelik geregtigde natuurlike persoon agter die betrokke entiteit, asook die opstel van ‘n risikobestuurs- en nakomingsprogram deur alle verantwoordingspligtige instellings. Aan die ander kant magtig die risiko-gebaseerde benadering ligter maatre\xc3\xabls ten opsigte van lae risiko kli\xc3\xabnte — wat die belangrike nasionale strewe na finansi\xc3\xable insluiting ondersteun. Ten slotte word aandag geskenk aan die bepalings van die wet wat die administrasie van finansi\xc3\xable sanksies wat in die konteks van die stryd teen terrorisme deur die Veiligheidsraad van die Verenigde Nasies opgel\xc3\xaa is, op die intelligensiesentrum afwentel. Die outeurs beklemtoon deurgaans die waarde daarvan om kennis te neem van soortgelyke regulering in ander lande wat, soos hier te lande, ook effek probeer gee aan die aanbevelings van die "Financial Action Task Force".