Abstract

 Ingevolge artikel 15B(3)(a)(i)(aa) van die Wet op Deeltitels mag die registrateur nie oordrag van ’n deeltiteleenheid registreer nie tensy ’n transportbesorger bevestig dat die regspersoon gesertifiseer het dat alle gelde verskuldig ten opsigte van die bedoelde eenheid betaal is of dat sekerheidstelling vir betaling tot bevrediging van die regspersoon verskaf is. By die eksekusieverkoping in die Marsh Rose-saak het die koper, Steinmuller, onderneem om sekerheidstelling te verskaf dat alle gelde verskuldig aan die regspersoon deur die vorige eienaar deur hom betaal sal word. Toe Steinmuller en die regspersoon nie kon ooreenkom oor die bedrag van die sekerheidstelling nie, nader Steinmuller die hof a quo vir ’n toepaslike bevel en die hof beslis dat Steinmuller R250 000 in die trustrekening van sy prokureur moet betaal as onherroeplike sekerheidstelling vir betaling van die geld verskuldig aan die regspersoon. Op appèl na die volbank van die hooggeregshof in Johannesburg, bevestig die meerderheidsuitspraak dat die hof moet besluit of die regter a quo bevoeg was om te bepaal dat skuld wat aan Steinmuller gedelegeer is, slegs agterstallige heffings insluit. Volgens die minderheiduitspraak moet die bedrag wat as sekerheidstelling aangebied word nie slegs agterstallige heffings nie, maar álle gelde verskuldig deur die vorige eienaar insluit. Volgens die minderheidsuitspraak berus hierdie standpunt op ’n algemene aanspraak op sekerheidstelling en die feit dat die regspersoon geregtig is op alle gelde vir sy finansiële voortbestaan. Daar word aangetoon dat hierdie aanspraak slegs betrekking het op gevalle waar die eienaar van die eenheid insolvent is en alle gelde ingevolge artikel 89(1) van die Wet op Insolvensie as deel van die koste van tegeldemaking aan die regspersoon uitbetaal moet word, voordat oordrag kan geskied.  Die meerderheidsuitspraak is korrek dat slegs die verskuldigde skuld van die vorige eienaar aan Steinmuller gedelegeer is. Wat regskoste betref beslis die meerderheidsuitspraak dat slegs regskoste wat getakseer is deur die regspersoon of waarop die partye ingevolge reël 25(4) van Aanhangsel 1 van die Regulasies op die Wet op die Bestuur van Deeltitelskemas ooreengekom het, afgedwing kan word. Die meerderheidsuitspraak beslis verder dat rente op agterstallige heffings en nie-betaalde regskoste slegs verskuldig is indien dit bevestig word deur ’n skriftelike trusteebesluit ingevolge reël 21(3)(c) van Aanhangsel 1 van die Regulasies op die Wet op die Bestuur van Deeltitelskemas. Ten slotte word aangevoer dat die regspersoon in plaas van die hofaansoek, die goedkoper en spoediger proses ingevolge artikel 39(1)(c) van die Wet op die Ombuddiens vir Gemeenskapskemas kon gevolg het. Volgens daardie proses sou die beregter moes bepaal of die skuld gedelegeer aan Steinmuller verkeerdelik bepaal is of onredelik was en indien wel, dit tot die korrekte bedrag aanpas.

Abstract

Legal certainty will be severely jeopardised should it be possible at whim to proclaim the applicable matrimonial property regime governing spouses’ assets and liabilities to have been changed retroactively. The legislature prescribed clearly defined prerequisites to be met before any change regarding a couple’s matrimonial property regime can be sanctioned by the high court and then only for the future, but never with retrospective force. Under the dualistic systems that apply in South Africa since 1652 it has always been recognised that individuals living according to customary or indigenous law may by default govern their matrimonial property regimes and the law of husband  and wife according to the applicable norms of indigenous law. By default these marriages were out of community of property although a couple could agree to change the default position and have their consensus in this regard registered.  The couple M was married according to customary law in the erstwhile Eastern Cape in 1980 and the marriage was never registered. The default position should accordingly govern the matrimonial property regime of the couple resulting in no community of property and no accrual system. The husband’s legal capacity and competencies were consequently not restricted by the qualifications contained in section 15 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 because that chapter of the act was not applicable to a customary marriage concluded in 1980 and which is by default out of community of property. When the husband as registered sole owner in 2010 entered into a valid sale agreement to transfer his immovable property on the Cape Flats to the first respondent nothing hampered or restricted the parties’ capacity to enter into the applicable obligatory or real agreements. The property was subsequently validly transferred in the Deeds Register to the purchaser. The plaintiff’s claim as widow of the seller who since passed away, to have the property “retransferred” into her name because the sale and transfer was allegedly in contravention of section 15 of Act 88 of 1984, is unconvincing although the court held otherwise. The crux of the matter is not whether the first respondent should be safeguarded against the consequences of an alleged invalid agreement by the husband who acted without the involvement of his wife in 2010 by a reliance on section 15(9)(a) of that act. The emphasis should have been on how the alleged amendment of section 7(2) of Act 120 of 1998 in June 2021 could be deemed to apply retrospectively after the sale and transfer had validly been concluded for eleven years before the poorly formulated amendment of the act became law in June 2021. A contract of sale that was validly concluded cannot retrospectively become invalid because the legislature changed the requirements for the type of contract more than a decade later.  The court’s point of departure for its judgment is, however, that the deceased was married in community of property: “The Recognition of Customary Marriages Amendment Act 1 of 2021, which came into operation on 1 June 2021, among others, amended section 7 of the RCMA that all marriages, which were entered into before or after the enactment of the RCMA, are regarded as in community of property unless such consequences are specifically excluded by the spouses in an antenuptial contract” (par 20). This, notwithstanding the clear legal position regarding the default matrimonial property regime for all indigenous marriages concluded before the commencement of Act 120 of 1998: out of community of property. The legislature was supposed to adhere to the decision of the constitutional court in 2017 in Ramuhovhi v President of the Republic of South Africa (2018 2 SA 1 (CC)) to amend section 7(1) of Act 120 of 1998 with regard to polygamous marriages and not to alter the legal position regarding monogamous marriages that were governed without any found negative consequences by section 7(2) of that act. Although the legislature neglected to explicitly declare that this amendment of section 7(2) should have no impact retrospectively, the implications of this poorly conceived judgment will necessitate a re-opening of all the millions of estates of people who have been married according to a customary marriage since 1652 because all those marriages will now be deemed to have been in community of property with the consequential implications for the distribution of all assets of the spouses involved with the dissolution of the marriages after the demise of the dying spouse. The legislature would have caused less harm if it read with comprehension the clear order of the constitutional court: “In terms of s 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, this order does not invalidate a winding up of a deceased estate that has been finalised or the transfer of marital property that has been effected.”

Abstract

 LRM v The Mnquma Local Municipality handel oor ’n geval waar ’n sekuriteitsbeampte, Tukani, in diens van die Mnquma-distriksmunisipaliteit, gedurende die nagtelike ure ’n vriend van hom te hulp gesnel het toe laasgenoemde deur ’n aanvaller met ’n mes bedreig is. Ten einde die aanvaller af te skrik, het Tukani eers twee skote met sy dienspistool in die lug afgevuur, maar toe die aanvaller geensins daardeur afgeskrik is nie, het hy ’n derde skoot gemik na die padoppervlakte langs die aanvaller se voete. Die koeël het egter opgeslaan vanaf die harde oppervlak en die muur van ’n voorafvervaardigde huis aan die oorkant van die pad deurboor, waar dit die slapende N in sy kop getref het. N het ernstige breinskade opgedoen. Sy vader (LRM) het namens N en in eie naam ’n deliktuele eis teen die munisipaliteit as Tukani se werkgewer ingestel. N se moeder (DJM) en suster (MM) wat teenwoordig was tydens die gebeure en die verwonding van N gadegeslaan en beleef het, het vorderinge weens erge trauma en senuskok teen die munisipaliteit ingestel. Die hof het op sterkte van die bewoording van dokumentasie wat Tukani se dienskontrak uitgemaak het tot die gevolgtrekking geraak dat die handeling wat hy verrig het binne die bestek van sy diensverhouding uitgevoer is. Versigtigheidshalwe het die hof egter beslis dat indien dit nie die geval sou wees nie, Tukani se handeling in voldoende noue verband met sy werkgewer se onderneming gestaan het om laasgenoemde middellik aanspreeklik te kon stel. Verder het die hof aandag bestee aan wat dit as “onregmatigheid” (“unlawfulness”) bestempel het. Ongelukkig is hierdie gedeelte van die uitspraak uiters onsamehangend, byvoorbeeld deurdat die hof die locus classicus van uitsprake wat met nalatigheid verband hou – te wete Kruger v Coetzee – voorgehou het as sou dit op onregmatigheid betrekking hê, welke bevinding as ’n growwe flater bestempel kan word.  Die logiese gevolgtrekking wat ’n mens kan maak uit die hof se behandeling van “onregmatigheid” – te wete ’n onvolledige oorsig van die nalatigheids- en kousaliteitsvereistes vir deliktuele aanspreeklikheid – is dat hierdie delikselemente verwar is met die begrip “delik”, ’n uitkoms waarvoor daar géén gesag bestaan nie en trouens as totaal onaanvaarbaar beskou kan word. Dele van dié bondige uitspraak, byvoorbeeld waar die hof tot ’n positiewe bevinding van feitelike en juridiese kousaliteit geraak het, kom neer op blote feitebevindings (decisiones) waarvoor daar geen verduideliking (ratio decidendi in tegniese sin) verskaf is nie. Dit is opmerklik dat die hof geen bevinding van onregmatigheid van Tukani se optrede gemaak het nie, ofskoon toepassing van die normaal tersake reëls sou aandui dat sy handeling wél onregmatig was weens die feit dat sy positiewe gedrag wat nadeel veroorsaak het ingevolge gevestigde reg prima facie onregmatig was en die taak aan die verweerder oorgelaat is om sodanige vermoede te weerlê, wat kennelik nie gebeur het nie. Daar kan instemming betuig word met die hof se uiteindelike bevinding dat die verweerder middellik aanspreeklik is.  In sy uitspraak het regter Smith ook versuim om ’n onderskeid te tref tussen die aard van die verskillende vorderinge wat teen die verweerder ingestel is, te wete N se eis op grond van liggaamlike beserings, LRM se eis weens die verswaring van sy onderhoudsplig teenoor N as gevolg van Tukani se handeling en, les bes, DJM en MM se vorderinge weens die veroorsaking van trauma en senuskok.  Ofskoon hierdie uitspraak as rapporteerbaar en van belang vir ander regters aangemerk is, is dit hoogs twyfelagtig dat dit enige nuttige doel sal dien as gesag vir die oplossing van probleme rakende middellike aanspreeklikheid, of die bepaling van deliktuele aanspreeklikheid deur oorweging van die aan- of afwesigheid van die erkende delikselemente.

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The recognition of and respect for the party autonomy of every legal subject of majority not limited by any personal cognitive handicap is part and parcel of the foundation of an orderly legal community governed by the rule of law. “Making rules of law discretionary or subject to value judgments may be destructive of the rule of law” (Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2010 4 SA 468 (SCA) 481E).
The discretionary power of a divorce court under section 7(3) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 stems from before the current constitutional dispensation. Almost thirty years after the acceptance of the constitutional values of the current system, it was hoped that as time went by, the transitional exception dating to 1984 that exhibits clear elements of arbitrariness would be relied on with declining frequency. There is only a limited number of marriages still in existence concluded before November 1984 with an ante-nuptial contract providing for the proverbial “cold exclusion of all benefits” that could potentially at this late stage in the spouses’ lives be expected to end in the divorce court justifying a reliance on this section. The act limits the discretionary power to explicit conditions: it can be considered only where the divorce concerned a marriage concluded before the commencement of Act 88 of 1984 with an ante-nuptial contract that excluded accrual sharing and any form of asset sharing and in the absence of any agreement at any time between the erstwhile spouses regarding the division of their assets. Provided these conditions are met, the court can order that such assets, or such part of the assets of the other party as the court may deem just, be transferred to the first-mentioned party (s 7(3)).
In all these circumstances a valid ante-nuptial contract exists to which both parties agreed in the presence of a notary public and the applicant in reality never acquired any claim to the other party’s assets. The applicant in addition represented to the other spouse, the notary public and the public at large a claim would never be made to any of the respondent’s assets. “Reasonableness and fairness are not freestanding requirements for the exercise of a contractual right. … Acceptance of the notion that judges can refuse to enforce a contractual provision merely because it offends their personal sense of fairness and equity will give rise to legal and commercial uncertainty” (Potgieter v Potgieter NO 2012 1 SA 637 (SCA) 650F-H).
In Greyling v Minister of Home Affairs ((40023/21) 2022 ZAGPPHC 311 (11 May 2022)) the court regarded the upholding of the claim of the applicant contrary to the explicit misrepresentation by the applicant that she is in agreement with the terms contained in the notarially registered ante-nuptial contract of 1989 governing the marriage, potentially fair. The court ordered the first condition in section 7(3) of Act 70 of 1979, limiting its application to pre-November 1984 marriages, unconstitutional.
This judgment may be popular and in line with what the woman in the street might regard as fair, presumably abandoning the principle of pacta sunt servanda as well as the principles underlying estoppel, but does not bode well for the upholding of the rule of law. “The court does not as yet sit, as under a palm tree, to exercise a general discretion to do what the man in the street, on a general overview of the case, might regard as fair” (Springette v Defoe 1992 2 FLR 388 391).

It is argued that legal certainty will not be enhanced should the constitutional court confirm this judgment. An alleged reliance on principles or policy exclusively based on common law jurisdictions as justification for the recognition of such a discretionary power under these circumstances, without any consideration of the position under civil law systems which indeed share common roots with specifically the South African private law system is once more an example of the demise of our jurisprudence where legal professionals seem to be unable to do proper, relevant and reliable comparative legal research.
Since the husband in the Greyling case did not even oppose the claim of his spouse (all prior to a divorce application) and chose to abide by the court’s decision, it is indeed strange that the court refrained from referring to and recognising that the parties could at any stage since 1989, have relied on section 21(1) of Act 88 of 1984 to have effected a change in their matrimonial property regime. It reeks of misuse of the court process for the court, under these circumstances, to hold as unconstitutional that part of section 7(3) as being the only possible remedy for the claimant against the perceived injustice she would be suffering on divorcing her husband because of their matrimonial property regime, is mind-blowing. The only benefit of not relying on section 21(1) would be to not be bound by the requirements contained in section 21(1)(a-c) – there are sound reasons for the proposed change; sufficient notice of the proposed change has been given to all the creditors of the spouses; and no other person will be prejudiced by the proposed change – and that would constitute misuse. Section 36(1)(e) of the constitution provides that the rights in the bill of rights may be limited but only in terms of a law of general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom (party autonomy), taking into account all relevant factors, including less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. It is clearly not the case in instances like these.