A Critical Review of South Africa’s Forestry Legislation in Promoting Participatory Forest Management

A Critical Review of South Africa’s Forestry Legislation in Promoting Participatory Forest Management

Authors Alexander Paterson

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor of Law, Institute of Marine and Environmental Law, Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 135 Number 1, May 2018, p. 121 – 158

Abstract

South Africa’s forest land, which covers 37 per cent of the country’s surface, is recognised as being under significant threat. This forest land plays a crucial ecological and socio-economic role in supporting the livelihoods of the country’s rural population through the supply of many timber and non-timber forest products. Concerted efforts are accordingly necessary to conserve and manage sustainably this forest land. One key concept to emerge from contemporary global forestry discourse is participatory forest management (‘PFM’). It highlights the important role played by rural communities in promoting sustainable forest management. South Africa sought, through the introduction of the National Forests Act 84 of 1998, to promote, enable and regulate PFM through the conclusion of community forestry agreements (‘CFAs’) between forestry authorities and communities. No CFAs have been concluded to date, and the demise of the forest land continues. This article explores this anomaly, specifically whether it can be attributed to frailties inherent in the legal framework governing CFAs. It begins by reviewing the origins, forms and factors which theorists have identified as influencing the success of PFM initiatives to distil a theoretical legal matrix against which to coherently critique the South African regime. It then shifts to a critical analysis of South Africa’s relevant legal framework, highlighting several options for reforming key elements relating to ownership/rights, scope, process, institutional arrangements, management, use and benefits, and oversight mechanisms.

The Doctrine of Contemporaneous Share Ownership and Aspects of Locus Standi in the New Derivative Action

The Doctrine of Contemporaneous Share Ownership and Aspects of Locus Standi in the New Derivative Action

Authors Maleka Femida Cassim

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Associate Professor, Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 135 Number 1, May 2018, p. 101 – 120

Abstract

Bearing in mind that the purpose of the derivative action is to empower minority shareholders and other stakeholders to protect the legal interests of the company when those charged with its management wrongfully fail to do so, the class of applicants is vital to the efficacy of the statutory derivative action. This article discusses various aspects of locus standi to institute a derivative action under s 165 of the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008. These include the doctrine of contemporaneous ownership of shares, the continuing interest principle, the multiple derivative action, and the classes of applicants who are given standing to bring derivative actions, the last of which notably embraces trade unions. A comparative approach is adopted that takes into account the leading common-law jurisdictions, including Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, New Zealand and the United States of America, as well as the laws of Nigeria, Ghana and Botswana.

The Realization of Children’s Rights to Participate in Selected Medical Decisions in South Africa

The Realization of Children’s Rights to Participate in Selected Medical Decisions in South Africa

Authors Hanneretha Kruger

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor of Private Law, University of South Africa
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 135 Number 1, May 2018, p. 73 – 100

Abstract

Article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, read with other relevant provisions of the Convention, allows for three levels of participation by children in medical decision-making: the right of all children to be informed (level 1), the right of all children capable of forming their own views to express those views (level 2), and the right of children capable of forming their own views to have the expressed views given due weight in accordance with their age and maturity (level 3). (The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child contains a similar provision in art 7.) This article examines the realization of this right in the context of selected medical decisions in South Africa. Consent to medical treatment and operations and termination of pregnancy are considered. The level of participation afforded to children in each of these cases is determined and recommendations are made for further enhancing the realization of art 12 in the context of medical decision-making in South Africa.

An Alternative Approach to Informed Consent

An Alternative Approach to Informed Consent

Authors Anton Loggerenberg

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Advocate of the High Court of South Africa
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 135 Number 1, May 2018, p. 55 – 72

Abstract

In this article I argue that the time-honoured approach to informed consent in South African medical law is unsound and fails to explain why liability is imposed as a consequence of a healthcare practitioner’s failure to obtain informed consent. I challenge this approach on the basis that a medical intervention performed with a patient’s express consent cannot amount to an assault merely because the healthcare practitioner omitted to disclose a material risk to the patient. Having regard to recent case law, an alternative approach is considered based on an omission which amounts to an actual wrong committed by a healthcare practitioner.

Further Reflections on Wrongfulness in the Law of Delict

Further Reflections on Wrongfulness in the Law of Delict

Authors Anton Fagan

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: W P Schreiner Professor of Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 135 Number 1, May 2018, p. 18 – 54

Abstract

This article revisits the author’s article ‘Rethinking wrongfulness in the law of delict’, which was published in this journal in 2005. The author argues that the analysis in the original articles was misleading in two respects. On the one hand, it under-played the extent to which the determination of whether negligent harm-causing conduct was wrongful is regulated by law. On the other hand, it over-emphasised the degree to which that determination depends on the reasonableness of imposing liability. This article aims to correct these flaws. The article discusses the many legal rules which have to be applied in order to determine whether negligent harm-causing conduct was wrongful, before going on to discuss the deeper-lying considerations by which the wrongfulness of negligent harm-causing conduct is to be determined whenever it cannot be determined by application of the law alone, but must be determined also by the exercise of judicial discretion.

Whose Decisis Must We Stare?

Whose Decisis Must We Stare?

Authors Malcolm Wallis

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 135 Number 1, May 2018, p. 5 – 17

Abstract

The article explores the consequences for the application of the doctrine of precedent of the Constitution Seventeenth Amendment Act of 2012 and the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013. It suggests that the effect of creating a single high court must be to require a reconsideration of the rules hitherto applied in relation to stare decisis, and formulates an alternative approach that is both consistent with the constitutional structure of the courts and provides the necessary flexibility to enable courts to engage in debates concerning the interpretation of novel legislation and the development of the common law.

Revel Without a Cause – Delictual Liability After Lee?

Revel Without a Cause – Delictual Liability After Lee?

Author Malcolm Wallis

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Judge of the Supreme Court of Appeal
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 136 Number 1, May 2019, p. 165 – 190

Abstract

The inability of science to give reasonably definitive answers to many questions of the aetiology of disease and to identify the source of infection poses intractable problems for courts in dealing with questions of causation. These problems came to the fore in Lee v Minister of Correctional Services 2013 (2) SA 144 (CC). The article analyses the various judgments and concludes that, while the decision ultimately leaves the law unchanged it has generated uncertainty about the proper approach to causation. It highlights the impact that possible changes in approach have to the underlying principles of the law of delict and the onus of proof and the difficulties that have arisen in the United Kingdom as a result of judgments creating an exception to conventional principles of causation in relation to industrial diseases.