Regspraak: Huweliksgoedereregtelike bedeling lukraak terugwerkend gewysig én die betrokkenes se handelingsbevoegdheid só verminder?

Regspraak: Huweliksgoedereregtelike bedeling lukraak terugwerkend gewysig én die betrokkenes se handelingsbevoegdheid só verminder?

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2023, p. 140-156
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2023/i1a9

Abstract

Legal certainty will be severely jeopardised should it be possible at whim to proclaim the applicable matrimonial property regime governing spouses’ assets and liabilities to have been changed retroactively. The legislature prescribed clearly defined prerequisites to be met before any change regarding a couple’s matrimonial property regime can be sanctioned by the high court and then only for the future, but never with retrospective force. Under the dualistic systems that apply in South Africa since 1652 it has always been recognised that individuals living according to customary or indigenous law may by default govern their matrimonial property regimes and the law of husband  and wife according to the applicable norms of indigenous law. By default these marriages were out of community of property although a couple could agree to change the default position and have their consensus in this regard registered.  The couple M was married according to customary law in the erstwhile Eastern Cape in 1980 and the marriage was never registered. The default position should accordingly govern the matrimonial property regime of the couple resulting in no community of property and no accrual system. The husband’s legal capacity and competencies were consequently not restricted by the qualifications contained in section 15 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 because that chapter of the act was not applicable to a customary marriage concluded in 1980 and which is by default out of community of property. When the husband as registered sole owner in 2010 entered into a valid sale agreement to transfer his immovable property on the Cape Flats to the first respondent nothing hampered or restricted the parties’ capacity to enter into the applicable obligatory or real agreements. The property was subsequently validly transferred in the Deeds Register to the purchaser. The plaintiff’s claim as widow of the seller who since passed away, to have the property “retransferred” into her name because the sale and transfer was allegedly in contravention of section 15 of Act 88 of 1984, is unconvincing although the court held otherwise. The crux of the matter is not whether the first respondent should be safeguarded against the consequences of an alleged invalid agreement by the husband who acted without the involvement of his wife in 2010 by a reliance on section 15(9)(a) of that act. The emphasis should have been on how the alleged amendment of section 7(2) of Act 120 of 1998 in June 2021 could be deemed to apply retrospectively after the sale and transfer had validly been concluded for eleven years before the poorly formulated amendment of the act became law in June 2021. A contract of sale that was validly concluded cannot retrospectively become invalid because the legislature changed the requirements for the type of contract more than a decade later.  The court’s point of departure for its judgment is, however, that the deceased was married in community of property: “The Recognition of Customary Marriages Amendment Act 1 of 2021, which came into operation on 1 June 2021, among others, amended section 7 of the RCMA that all marriages, which were entered into before or after the enactment of the RCMA, are regarded as in community of property unless such consequences are specifically excluded by the spouses in an antenuptial contract” (par 20). This, notwithstanding the clear legal position regarding the default matrimonial property regime for all indigenous marriages concluded before the commencement of Act 120 of 1998: out of community of property. The legislature was supposed to adhere to the decision of the constitutional court in 2017 in Ramuhovhi v President of the Republic of South Africa (2018 2 SA 1 (CC)) to amend section 7(1) of Act 120 of 1998 with regard to polygamous marriages and not to alter the legal position regarding monogamous marriages that were governed without any found negative consequences by section 7(2) of that act. Although the legislature neglected to explicitly declare that this amendment of section 7(2) should have no impact retrospectively, the implications of this poorly conceived judgment will necessitate a re-opening of all the millions of estates of people who have been married according to a customary marriage since 1652 because all those marriages will now be deemed to have been in community of property with the consequential implications for the distribution of all assets of the spouses involved with the dissolution of the marriages after the demise of the dying spouse. The legislature would have caused less harm if it read with comprehension the clear order of the constitutional court: “In terms of s 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, this order does not invalidate a winding up of a deceased estate that has been finalised or the transfer of marital property that has been effected.

Regspraak: Vicarious liability once again – a seemingly uncontentious case marred by judicial errors

Regspraak: Vicarious liability once again – a seemingly uncontentious case marred by judicial errors

Author: J Scott

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of South Africa
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2023, p. 157-170
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2023/i1a10

Abstract

 LRM v The Mnquma Local Municipality handel oor ’n geval waar ’n sekuriteitsbeampte, Tukani, in diens van die Mnquma-distriksmunisipaliteit, gedurende die nagtelike ure ’n vriend van hom te hulp gesnel het toe laasgenoemde deur ’n aanvaller met ’n mes bedreig is. Ten einde die aanvaller af te skrik, het Tukani eers twee skote met sy dienspistool in die lug afgevuur, maar toe die aanvaller geensins daardeur afgeskrik is nie, het hy ’n derde skoot gemik na die padoppervlakte langs die aanvaller se voete. Die koeël het egter opgeslaan vanaf die harde oppervlak en die muur van ’n voorafvervaardigde huis aan die oorkant van die pad deurboor, waar dit die slapende N in sy kop getref het. N het ernstige breinskade opgedoen. Sy vader (LRM) het namens N en in eie naam ’n deliktuele eis teen die munisipaliteit as Tukani se werkgewer ingestel. N se moeder (DJM) en suster (MM) wat teenwoordig was tydens die gebeure en die verwonding van N gadegeslaan en beleef het, het vorderinge weens erge trauma en senuskok teen die munisipaliteit ingestel. Die hof het op sterkte van die bewoording van dokumentasie wat Tukani se dienskontrak uitgemaak het tot die gevolgtrekking geraak dat die handeling wat hy verrig het binne die bestek van sy diensverhouding uitgevoer is. Versigtigheidshalwe het die hof egter beslis dat indien dit nie die geval sou wees nie, Tukani se handeling in voldoende noue verband met sy werkgewer se onderneming gestaan het om laasgenoemde middellik aanspreeklik te kon stel. Verder het die hof aandag bestee aan wat dit as “onregmatigheid” (“unlawfulness”) bestempel het. Ongelukkig is hierdie gedeelte van die uitspraak uiters onsamehangend, byvoorbeeld deurdat die hof die locus classicus van uitsprake wat met nalatigheid verband hou – te wete Kruger v Coetzee – voorgehou het as sou dit op onregmatigheid betrekking hê, welke bevinding as ’n growwe flater bestempel kan word.  Die logiese gevolgtrekking wat ’n mens kan maak uit die hof se behandeling van “onregmatigheid” – te wete ’n onvolledige oorsig van die nalatigheids- en kousaliteitsvereistes vir deliktuele aanspreeklikheid – is dat hierdie delikselemente verwar is met die begrip “delik”, ’n uitkoms waarvoor daar géén gesag bestaan nie en trouens as totaal onaanvaarbaar beskou kan word. Dele van dié bondige uitspraak, byvoorbeeld waar die hof tot ’n positiewe bevinding van feitelike en juridiese kousaliteit geraak het, kom neer op blote feitebevindings (decisiones) waarvoor daar geen verduideliking (ratio decidendi in tegniese sin) verskaf is nie. Dit is opmerklik dat die hof geen bevinding van onregmatigheid van Tukani se optrede gemaak het nie, ofskoon toepassing van die normaal tersake reëls sou aandui dat sy handeling wél onregmatig was weens die feit dat sy positiewe gedrag wat nadeel veroorsaak het ingevolge gevestigde reg prima facie onregmatig was en die taak aan die verweerder oorgelaat is om sodanige vermoede te weerlê, wat kennelik nie gebeur het nie. Daar kan instemming betuig word met die hof se uiteindelike bevinding dat die verweerder middellik aanspreeklik is.  In sy uitspraak het regter Smith ook versuim om ’n onderskeid te tref tussen die aard van die verskillende vorderinge wat teen die verweerder ingestel is, te wete N se eis op grond van liggaamlike beserings, LRM se eis weens die verswaring van sy onderhoudsplig teenoor N as gevolg van Tukani se handeling en, les bes, DJM en MM se vorderinge weens die veroorsaking van trauma en senuskok.  Ofskoon hierdie uitspraak as rapporteerbaar en van belang vir ander regters aangemerk is, is dit hoogs twyfelagtig dat dit enige nuttige doel sal dien as gesag vir die oplossing van probleme rakende middellike aanspreeklikheid, of die bepaling van deliktuele aanspreeklikheid deur oorweging van die aan- of afwesigheid van die erkende delikselemente.

Notes: Confusion in the removal of directors by shareholders under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Miller v Natmed Defence (Pty) Ltd

Notes: Confusion in the removal of directors by shareholders under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Miller v Natmed Defence (Pty) Ltd

Authors: Rehana Cassim

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor, Department of Mercantile Law, University of South Africa
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 139 Issue 4, p. 741-756
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v139/i4a1

Abstract

This note critically analyses the judgment in Miller v Natmed Defence (Pty) Ltd 2022 (2) SA 554 (GJ), in which the court ruled on the validity of the removal of a director by the company’s sole shareholder. Three issues were in contention: whether a shareholder must furnish the director with reasons for the proposed resolution to remove a director from office under s 71 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008; whether a shorter notice period for the shareholders’ meeting was legally acceptable; and whether the meeting that was held telephonically was valid. The court ruled that the director’s removal from office was valid and dismissed his request to be reinstated as a director. This note critically analyses the judgment and argues that the court misinterpreted some aspects of s 71 of the Act.

Notes: The intersection between insolvency and tax avoidance

Notes: The intersection between insolvency and tax avoidance

Authors: Thabo Legwaila & Carika Fritz

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor of Law, University of Johannesburg; Associate Professor of Law, University of the Witwatersrand
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 139 Issue 4, p. 757-767
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v139/i4a2

Abstract

In the realm of taxation, the South African Revenue Service has the power to set aside (or alter) certain transactions to curb impermissible tax avoidance or to give effect to the substance of a transaction over its form. Equally, in the insolvency realm, the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 provides for certain instances where a transaction can be set aside if it falls within the ambit of impeachable dispositions. In this note, we consider the intersection between insolvency and tax avoidance with specific reference to the overlap between voidable preferences and impermissible tax avoidance arrangements, on the one hand, and substance over form and dispositions not made for value, on the other hand. This analysis highlights the significance of the timeline of events. We argue that SARS would only be able to benefit from both the avoidance mechanism and the setting side of the impeachable disposition when the tax avoidance remedy precedes the sequestration or liquidation order and the subsequent setting aside of the impeachable disposition.

Notes: Who is a ‘parent’ for the purposes of the Intestate Succession Act? Wilsnach NO v TM

Notes: Who is a ‘parent’ for the purposes of the Intestate Succession Act? Wilsnach NO v TM

Author: Michael Cameron Wood-Bodley

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Senior Research Associate, School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 139 Issue 4, p. 768-790
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v139/i4a3

Abstract

In Wilsnach NO v TM 2021 (3) SA 568 (GP) the court radically reinterpreted the meaning of the term ‘parent’ for the purposes of intestate succession, thereby excluding an unmarried father from inheriting from his deceased child as a ‘parent’, and permitting the child’s grandmother to inherit as if she were the child’s ‘parent’. The court achieved this outcome by finding that the provisions of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 must inform our understanding of who a ‘parent’ is for the purposes of the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987. The note critically evaluates this judgment in the light of the historical development of the rules of intestate succession and the history of the legislation, identifies problematic issues arising from the judgment, and suggests an alternative way in which the father’s perceived unsuitability as an heir may have been achieved.

‘Miserable, laborious, and short’: The lives of animals

‘Miserable, laborious, and short’: The lives of animals

Author: D M Pretorius

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Partner, Bowmans
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 139 Issue 4, p. 791-836
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v139/i4a4

Abstract

Animal welfare legislation in South Africa is deficient, especially in relation to farm animals reared for ingestion by human beings. That being so, this article analyses aspects of public international law, administrative law, constitutional law and interpretation of statutes that may contribute towards affording more legal protection to such animals. An overview of recent case law highlights that the Constitutional Court has mandated a shift away from the traditional laissez-faire legal attitude to human use of animals towards one that requires enhanced protection of their interests. To that end, extensive legislative reform is necessary to rectify the deficiencies of the present system.

An introduction to proof in South Africa

An introduction to proof in South Africa

Author: Tshepo Bogosi Mosaka

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Lecturer, Department of Public Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 139 Issue 4, p. 837-861
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v139/i4a5

Abstract

The evaluation of evidence is a process about which not much is written, nor is it regulated as much as the comparable processes of admissibility and forms of presenting evidence are in South African evidence scholarship. This article follows the example set by Paizes by arguing for the introduction of a general theory of ‘proof’, which is used interchangeably with ‘evaluation’ in the article. After briefly introducing the existing doctrine, which consists mainly of a handful of the rules and guidelines that South African courts typically use to evaluate evidence, the article offers six justifications for the introduction of a general theory of proof in South African evidence scholarship. The third part of the article gives a methodological account of what is meant by a general theory of evidential proof in South African evidence scholarship. Part IV of the article comprises a discussion of the two foundational conditions required for a South African theory of proof.

Let the people speak! Resisting the erosion of the right to public participation in the wake of The Federation of Fly Fishers v The Minister of Environmental Affairs

Let the people speak! Resisting the erosion of the right to public participation in the wake of The Federation of Fly Fishers v The Minister of Environmental Affairs

Author: Jenny Hall

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, University of South Africa
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 139 Issue 4, p. 862-886
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v139/i4a6

Abstract

The need for public participation in environmental decisions is accepted in both international and South African law. In the run up to, and just after, the transition to democracy, South Africa was exemplary in many instances in ensuring that participation occurred in a meaningful and broad-based way. In recent years, however, some may question whether the underlying rationale for public participation is still as valued by government, or whether it is being diluted to a mechanistic procedural requirement reminiscent of the past. Disputes about the way in which requirements to give effect to public participation are being implemented have recently surfaced in the courts in respect of several environmental issues. There has been strong public opposition to municipal service delivery regarding waste and water, seismic testing off the South African coast, and law-making activities regarding trout. This article considers the court’s oversight of public participation processes in respect of one of those issues — recent decisions on the introduction of executive regulations. It does so by tracing the particular dynamics regarding the need for public participation in South Africa and assessing the way in which the court has adjudicated public participation disputes in the law-making context. It finds that the court appears to be willing to play its oversight role in a way which is true to the underlying ethos of democratic decision-making in the environmental context, albeit that further opportunities for the court to consider the full range of matters involving participation should be welcomed.