Abstract

The Open-ended Intergovernmental Working Group (OEIGWG) on Private Military and Security Companies represents a critical juncture in international law, where regulatory failure has become institutionalised through systematic bad faith negotiation. Since 2017, the Working Group has produced four successive draft instruments, yet it remains deadlocked, not due to technical disagreement but due to calculated obstruction by powerful states protecting a US$240 billion industry. This article advances three interconnected arguments substantiated through track changes analysis of the Third Revised Draft (March 2024) and Fourth Revised Draft (March 2025): (1) state opposition correlates directly with national PMSC market dominance, with home states (USA, UK, China, South Africa, Turkey, Russia) controlling 70% of the global market systematically objecting to substantive accountability provisions; (2) the sophistication of obstructionist tactics, from definitional narrowing to jurisdictional fragmentation, reveals regulatory capture through documented revolving door dynamics between government officials and corporate interests; (3) the distinction between home states (where PMSCs are registered) and host states (where they operate) explains voting patterns, with host states predominantly in the Global South consistently championing binding frameworks while bearing the human cost of PMSC violations spanning Mali, Central African Republic, Mozambique and Sudan. Voluntary frameworks, including the Montreux Document and the International Code of Conduct Association, have systematically failed to prevent violations or ensure accountability. The evidence presented, comprising economic data correlating market share with negotiating positions, comparative analysis of state positions on analogous regulatory frameworks, documented PMSC violations enabled by accountability gaps, and academic consensus on state motivations, demonstrates that complexity and sovereignty concerns cannot explain the systematic pattern of Western obstruction spanning eight years. The choice before the international community is binary and urgent: binding regulation prioritising human rights over corporate profits, or continued accommodation of systematic violations. This article argues for the exposure of hidden agendas, alternative regulatory pathways through regional frameworks and domestic legislation with extraterritorial reach, and prioritisation of victim compensation over state protection of corporate interests.