The Removal of Directors by a Company’s Board of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Should it be a Mandatory or an Alterable Provision?

The Removal of Directors by a Company’s Board of Directors under the Companies Act 71 of 2008: Should it be a Mandatory or an Alterable Provision?

Author Rehana Cassim

ISSN: 2522-3062
Affiliations: BA (cum laude), LLB (cum laude), LLM (cum laude) (University of the Witwatersrand); LLD (University of South Africa). Associate Professor, Department of Mercantile Law, School of Law, University of South Africa; Attorney and Notary Public of the High Court of South Africa.
Source: Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, The, Volume 52 Issue 3, p. 389 – 409

Abstract

The Companies Act 71 of 2008 introduced into South African law a provision which for the first time permits a company’s board of directors to remove a director from office in certain circumstances. This provision is contained in section 71(3). Compared to the equivalent provisions in some leading foreign jurisdictions, section 71(3) of the Companies Act is unique in two important respects. First, a board’s power to remove board members is an unalterable and a mandatory power. Second, a board’s removal rights do not follow appointment rights. Consequently, a board is empowered to remove from office any director, regardless of whether shareholders or any other person had appointed that director to office. This article questions whether a board’s power to remove directors from office under the Companies Act ought, instead, to be an alterable provision. With a view to protecting the minority shareholder representatives on the board of directors, it questions whether section 71(3) should distinguish between directors appointed by a board and directors elected by shareholders. The comparable provisions on the removal of directors by a board of directors in corporate legislation in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America are examined. Some recommendations are made to modify section 71(3) of the Companies Act to improve the new power conferred on boards of directors to remove fellow board members.

Human Dignity and other Relevant Concepts in International and South African Human Rights Law: A Search for Content

Human Dignity and other Relevant Concepts in International and South African Human Rights Law: A Search for Content

Authors Gerrit Ferreira & Anél Ferreira-Snyman

ISSN: 2522-3062
Affiliations: B Iuris (PUCHO), LLB (PUCHO), LLM (RAU), LLD (UNISA), LLD (PUCHO), Professor of Law Extraordinary, NWU, Potchefstroom Campus; B Iuris (PUCHO), LLB (PUCHO), LLM (PUCHO), LLD (UJ), Professor of Law, UNISA.
Source: Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, The, Volume 52 Issue 3, p. 410 – 442

Abstract

As a result of the human rights atrocities committed during the Second World War, the human dignity of individuals has become the central concern in many international and regional instruments and domestic constitutions. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 is no exception and places a particular emphasis on the concept of human dignity. In view of the continuing popularisation of the concept, this contribution discusses the current application of human dignity and related concepts within international, regional and South African human rights law in an attempt to get a clearer grasp of its contents. Although human dignity is not explicitly protected in all international and regional instruments and domestic constitutions, its protection is either implicit in the protection of other specific human rights, or explicitly forms part of the protection of such rights. It therefore seems that every individual human right protects some aspect of human dignity. Furthermore, the application of the concept of human dignity seems to relate to other existing concepts in both international and South African law. First, the question as to whether the protection of human dignity in international law may be equated with concepts such as jus cogens and non-derogable rights is analysed. Second, the issues regarding the relation between human dignity and the concepts of ubuntu, boni mores and the public interest are discussed. It is concluded that human dignity is a fluid, vague and ever-changing concept and that as a result of cultural and religious differences it would be virtually impossible to formulate a generic (one-size-fits-all) definition of human dignity that would be acceptable to all cultural and religious groups. It is therefore suggested that the application of human dignity by the courts should be limited to that of a constitutional value that underpins all fundamental rights, rather than elevating it to an all-encompassing right that functions, in practice, independent from all other fundamental rights. The latter would result in an attenuation of the human rights regime in international, regional and domestic law.

Case Note: Litigating about where to Litigate: Vedanta Resources Plc v Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20

Case Note: Litigating about where to Litigate: Vedanta Resources Plc v Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20

Author Elsabe Schoeman

ISSN: 2522-3062
Affiliations: BLC (University of Pretoria); LLB LLD (University of South Africa). Dean: Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria.
Source: Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, The, Volume 52 Issue 3, p. 445 – 457

Abstract

None.

Rupturing International Law to Realise the Right to Development

Rupturing International Law to Realise the Right to Development

Author Isaac Shai

ISSN: 2522-3062
Affiliations: BA (University of the Witwatersrand); LLB (University of the Witwatersrand); LLM (University of South Africa); LLD (University of Pretoria). Postdoctoral Fellow, Thabo Mbeki African Leadership Institute.
Source: Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern Africa, The, Volume 51 Issue 2, p. 151 – 168

Abstract

The realisation of the right to development is contingent on the appropriation of the excesses generated by the counter-imperial dimension of international law and on the strategic rupturing of international law. Embedded in this approach is the implicit acceptance that the right to development is a derivative of international law and that international law has an imperial dimension. There is in this sense a golden thread that uninterruptedly connects colonialism, international law and the notion of development. This is buttressed by the fact that international law was the mode within which calls for decolonisation were couched. In addition, post-colonial states advanced arguments for decolonisation using the medium of development under the auspices of international law. In this sense, decolonisation was effected using the language of development. In order to avert re-inscribing the very imperial dimension of international law that must be disrupted, the notion of the right to development ought to treat the excesses generated by international law as political opportunities rather than legal ones. In this sense, law becomes a political strategy as opposed to a legal strategy.