Collective bargaining in the gig economy: a comparative analysis

by | Jan 25, 2026 | TSAR, TSAR 2026 I1

ARTIKEL

Collective bargaining in the gig economy: a comparative analysis

Authors: Betina Fleming and Marthinus van Staden

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Director: Employee Relations; University of the Witwatersrand; Associate Professor; Wits School of Law
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2026, p. 117-142
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i1a7

Abstract

In hierdie artikel ondersoek die outeurs die evolusie en toepassing van kollektiewe bedingingsregte binne die gig-ekonomie deur middel van ’n vergelykende analise van vyf jurisdiksies: Brasilië, China, Indië, Kenia en Suid-Afrika. Die studie ondersoek hoe tradisionele arbeidsregsraamwerke, histories ontwerp rondom standaard diensverhoudinge, nie pas hou met die realiteite van platformgebaseerde werk en die uitdagings wat dit vir werkers wat kollektiewe verteenwoordiging soek, inhou.
Die studie begin deur die Internasionale Arbeidsorganisasie se normatiewe raamwerk te ondersoek, wat kollektiewe bedinging as fundamenteel vir die bereiking van ordentlike werk vestig. Ten spyte van die organisasie se inklusiewe visie wat hierdie regte uitbrei na alle werkers ongeag hul indiensnemingstatus, toon die analise beduidende implementeringsgapings in die ondersoekte jurisdiksies. Die sentrale struikelblok wat geïdentifiseer is, is die sistematiese wanklassifikasie van platformwerkers as onafhanklike kontrakteurs eerder as werknemers, wat hulle effektief uitsluit van tradisionele kollektiewe bedingingsmeganismes. Die artikel identifiseer verskeie algemene hindernisse vir kollektiewe organisering in die gig-ekonomie. Dit sluit in regsuitsluitings wat voortspruit uit verouderde indiensnemingsdefinisies, strukturele fragmentasie van die werksmag wat solidariteit belemmer, algoritmiese beheerstelsels wat toesig en werksonsekerheid skep en platformweerstand teen werkersorganisasie. Die gedesentraliseerde aard van platformwerk, gekombineer met werkers se vrese vir vergelding deur rekeningdeaktivering of verminderde werktoewysing, skep afskrikwekkende effekte op kollektiewe optrede. In al vyf lande, het platformwerkers merkwaardige innovasie getoon in die organisering van pogings, die gebruik van sosiale medianetwerke, die vorming van werkerskoöperasies en die deelname aan spontane kollektiewe aksies. Hierdie grondvlak-inisiatiewe bly egter regsonerkenbaar en struktureel kwesbaar. Dit funksioneer buite formele raamwerke vir arbeidsverhoudinge.
Die vergelykende analise toon dat, ten spyte van verskillende regs- en politieke kontekste, alle jurisdiksies nie daarin slaag om kollektiewe bedingingsregte voldoende uit te brei na platformwerkers nie. Dit skep ’n groeiende groep ekonomies afhanklike werkers wat regsonsigbaar bly en uitgesluit word van fundamentele arbeidsbeskerming. Daar word bevind dat die bereiking van betekenisvolle kollektiewe bedinging in die digitale ekonomie fundamentele regshervorming vereis. Arbeidsreg moet verder as tradisionele indiensnemingsbinariteite ontwikkel om funksionele benaderings te omhels wat diverse arbeidsreëlings erken. Sonder sodanige transformasie sal die fundamentele beginsels van vryheid van assosiasie en ordentlike werk vir platformwerkers onverwesenlik bly, wat demokratiese arbeidsverhoudinge in die digitale era ondermyn.

Making family law judgments more accessible to the affected children through judicial letters

by | Jan 25, 2026 | TSAR, TSAR 2026 I1

AANTEKENINGE

Making family law judgments more accessible to the affected children through judicial letters

Author: M Carnelley

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: North-West University
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2026, p. 143-156
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i1a8

Abstract

Waarnemende regter Du Plessis het in IG v JV (30290 /21) 2023 ZAGPPHC 691 (8 Julie 2023), vir die eerste keer in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg, ʼn brief aan die betrokke kinders geskryf om te verduidelik waarom sy bevind het dat dit in hul beste belang is om nie in Suid-Afrika by hulle vader te bly nie maar om saam met hulle moeder te verhuis na België, al was dit teen hulle uitdruklike wense. In die aantekening word die potensiële opsie bespreek van direkte terugvoer deur die regter aan kinders in familieregtelike geskille en veral met betrekking tot ouerlike sorg- en kontakbesluite, selfs waar die kinders nie ’n party tot die geding is nie. Die bespreking word deur die vereistes van onder meer die Verenigde Nasies se Konvensie vir die Regte van die Kind gelei soos dit toepassing gevind het in die nasionale wetgewing en uitsprake in Suid-Afrika, Nederland, Engeland, Skotland en Nieu-Seeland.
Hierdie aantekening fokus nie op die reg van die kind om gehoor te word nie, maar in die besonder op die reg van die kind tot kommunikering van die besluit van die besluitnemer self. Die toepassing van hierdie aspek is nog onderontwikkeld en die outeur bespreek die beskikbare uitsprake ten einde ’n grondslag te lê vir toekomstige oorweging van die uitbreiding van hierdie ontwikkeling. Direkte kommunikasie met kinders is belangrik ten einde hulle aanvaarding van hofbesluite te bevorder veral as dit gepaard gaan met ’n empatiese verduideliking daarvan in ’n breër regs- en feitekonteks en in ’n taal wat die kind verstaan. Hoewel hierdie moontlikheid nie toepaslik sal wees in alle geskille nie, word dit onder meer aanbeveel waar daar nie aan die uitdruklike wense soos duidelik gekommunikeer deur die kind toegegee word nie of waar die kind ’n ongesonde mate van ouerlike druk ondervind of waar die verhouding van die ouers só bitter is dat hulle ongeskik is om die uitspraak aan die kind op ’n gebalanseerde manier oor te dra.
’n Paar riglyne word aan die hand gedoen vir regters wanneer hulle oorweeg om ’n brief aan die belanghebbende kinders te skryf. Die aantekening sluit af met regter Du Plessis se brief as ’n voorbeeld van ’n kinder-vriendelike uitspraak.

Is ’n eksekuteur van ’n bestorwe boedel gevrywaar teen ’n mandament van spolie?

by | Jan 25, 2026 | TSAR, TSAR 2026 I1

AANTEKENINGE

Is ’n eksekuteur van ’n bestorwe boedel gevrywaar teen ’n mandament van spolie?

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2026, p. 157-172
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i1a9

Abstract

Shortly after the demise of the deceased on 13 June 2025 the first respondent in Tlou v Mtsweni (2025/182777) 2025 ZALMPPHC 198 (20 October 2025) as designated executor presented the applicant T, a sister of the deceased, with a handwritten note commissioned by the fourth respondent as police officer purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased. In terms of the said document, the first respondent stood to inherit the tavern of the deceased as well as all the furniture in the said tavern. Part of the furniture that was used in the tavern included fridges that belonged to SA Breweries. Against the will of the applicant and notwithstanding her protest, the first respondent removed such furniture from the possession of the applicant. She had kept the belongings of her deceased brother in safekeeping at her (their) parents’ premises until significant uncertainties regarding the validity of the handwritten note as the alleged last will of the deceased could be clarified in court.
The court dismissed the application by T for the spoliation order against M with costs because, according to the court, an executor is entitled to remove any property that forms part of the estate of the deceased on authority of the Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965. The court held that of relevance to these proceedings, is the averment by the first respondent that he is empowered to collect the assets of the estate by virtue of his appointment as executor. According to the first respondent it is therefore his duty to collect assets belonging to the deceased estate and any alleged dispossession is thus lawful and justified. The acting judge submitted that, insofar as the refrigerators were in the control of the deceased and held at the tavern premises, nobody had the right to simply remove these refrigerators without the knowledge and consent of the executor – notwithstanding the fact that they never belonged to the deceased. The court held that the applicant removed the furniture from the tavern unlawfully and without the executor’s consent and retained the refrigerators at her or her parents’ premises.
The judgment does not disclose whether the said removal by the applicant took place before or after the respondent was issued with the letters of executorship by the master of the high court. It would seem to be problematic to await the issuing of the letters of executorship to acquire the executor’s consent if in the meantime the property may be prone to pilfering by thieves from the abandoned tavern. T acted exemplarily, as a negotiorum gestor may be expected to act in preservation of the assets of the deceased. An agent of necessity holds the things as possessor and not as a mere detentor, because per definition she was not mandated by another as principal to act as the latter’s detentor.
The court held that the applicant was incorrect in her submission that the executor must have some form of court order or authority before assets can be forcefully removed or collected by him. The authority of the executor is according to the court “cemented” in the provisions of section 26. That section, however, does not empower the executor to spoliate anything covered by the emphasised qualification governing the executor’s powers: “Immediately after letters of executorship have been granted to him an executor shall take into his custody or under his control all the property, books and documents in the estate and not in the possession of any person who claims to be entitled to retain it under any contract, right of retention or attachment” (s 26(1) – emphasis added).
The applicant’s contention is that the first respondent’s appointment as executor does not empower him to take the law into his own hands without recourse to the court or the master. Not even an owner can hide behind his ownership as justification for an act of spoliation, and an executor is at most acting as the personal representative of the deceased and is not clothed with more powers than the deceased as owner had. The court held that this contention is rebutted by the purported trite provisions of the Administration of Estates Act, which direct that the executor must take immediate possession of such property belonging to the deceased estate or in the possession or under the control of the deceased [sic].
It is submitted that, because the refrigerators belonged to SA Breweries, the executor had no entitlement to lay claim to the possession of such assets, as they had never formed part of the estate of the deceased. It is further submitted that no executor is clothed with the power to spoliate assets from the peaceful possession of a third party as possessor. Notwithstanding the conviction of the acting judge in this case, the Administration of Estates Act does not entitle the executor to self-righteously dispossess anybody. This judgment should not be elevated as a unique precedent on the perceived newfound limitations to a spoliation order under the principle of stare decisis.
It is doubtful whether it was justified to award a cost order against the applicant considering that she was relying on the judicial order to protect her against a spoliator after she took the assets of her deceased brother into her safekeeping as agent of necessity to prevent his estate being pilfered until the clarification of the validity of the will and the appointment of the executor. Not protecting the negotiorum gestor in this instance and burdening her with a cost order including the costs of counsel on scale B does not strengthen reliance on the rule of law.

Perfektering van ’n algemene notariële verband verleen géén vervreemdingsbevoegdhede aan die verbandreghebbende hetsy in daardie hoedanigheid óf as pandreghebbende nie – behalwe in dié hof

by | Jan 25, 2026 | TSAR, TSAR 2026 I1

REGSPRAAK

Perfektering van ’n algemene notariële verband verleen géén vervreemdingsbevoegdhede aan die verbandreghebbende hetsy in daardie hoedanigheid óf as pandreghebbende nie – behalwe in dié hof

Authors: JC Sonnekus en EC Schlemmer

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg; Universiteit van Pretoria
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2026, p. 173-185
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i1a10

Abstract

The discussion examines the legal consequences of the perfection of a general notarial bond within South African law and critically assesses the judgment of Du Plessis AJ in Spar Group Ltd v Volemo Trading Enterprise (Pty) Ltd t/a Njhaka Njhaka Build It (2025 ZALMPPHC 194). South African authority, notably Cooper NO v Die Meester and Contract Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Chesterfin (Pty) Ltd, firmly establishes that a general notarial bond does not confer a real right in the property described in the bond until it is perfected. Upon perfection – whether through consensual delivery or an order compelling specific performance – the bondholder acquires the status of a pledgee, with a limited real security right over the specific movable property of the debtor that has come into its possession.
Before perfection, the bondholder is merely a preferent creditor in respect of the debtor’s free residue as contemplated in section 102 of the Insolvency Act, and not a secured creditor. Perfection does not, however, vest in the pledgee any powers of ownership, management, or unilateral realisation. South African law prohibits parate executie in respect of notarial bonds and disallows any arrangement amounting to a pactum commissorium. A pledgee may therefore neither appropriate the pledged assets nor dispose of them for its own account without the intervention of a court. The only functionary legally empowered to realise and distribute an insolvent’s assets is the liquidator or trustee, acting in the interests of the body of creditors and subject to the concursus creditorum.
The focus then turns to the Spar Group’s credit arrangements with Volemo (in casu), secured by several general notarial “covering” bonds. It is doubted whether these instruments complied with section 51 of the Deeds Registries Act, particularly the requirement of a stated maximum amount where future indebtedness is to be secured.
The discussion of the court’s perfection order describes it as “unprecedented”. The order authorised the Spar Group not merely to take possession of Volemo’s movable assets, but to take control of the business, regulate the movement of stock (including stock possibly owned by third-party suppliers), operate the debtor’s bank accounts, collect book debts, transfer licences and permits, and dispose of assets while purportedly passing “valid title”. These powers far exceed those of a pledgee and directly conflict with the nemo plus iuris principle. No authority was cited for such far-reaching relief, (because none exists). The court appeared to rely on the fact that the debtor did not oppose the application, but it is contended that a failure to oppose cannot enlarge a creditor’s substantive rights nor derogate from the protections afforded to other creditors under the Insolvency Act, including the statutory provisions on impeachable dispositions.
The judgment is regarded as fundamentally flawed in doctrine and dangerously out of step with established principles of South African real security law. Yet, unless overturned on appeal, it remains binding on lower courts – a disquieting outcome given the serious legal errors it contains.

Expanding consequences for ethical mishaps in the use of artificial intelligence in legal practice

by | Jan 25, 2026 | TSAR, TSAR 2026 I1

REGSPRAAK

Expanding consequences for ethical mishaps in the use of artificial intelligence in legal practice

Author: MM Van Eck

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of Witwatersrand
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2026, p. 185-197
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i1a11

Abstract

Die etiese gebruik van kunsmatige intelligensie in die regspraktyk bly ’n uitdaging. Dit word geïllustreer deur die groot aantal sake wat in 2025 oor etiese mislukking in die regsberoep aangemeld is in jurisdiksies soos die van die Verenigde State van Amerika, Kanada, Australië, Suid-Afrika, Engeland en Wallis. Hierdie bespreking fokus dus op die mees onlangse Engelse uitspraak, Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey en Al-Haroun v Qatar National Bank (2025 EWHC 1383 (Admin)), met die klem op hoe die gedrag van regspraktisyns in hul gebruik van kunsmatige intelligensie-instrumente die regspleging negatief kan beïnvloed. Alhoewel verskeie moontlike gevolge bestaan waar regspraktisyns hul etiese en professionele standaarde verontagsaam in die gebruik van kunsmatige intelligensieinstrumente, is die impak van sodanige gedrag op die regspleging ’n meer onlangse ontwikkeling van die howe se uitkyk op sodanige etiese en professionele standaarde van regspraktisyns. As hierdie beginsels in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks uitgebrei word, kan die regspleging gevind word in een van drie gevalle, naamlik meineed volgens die gemenereg, minagting van die hof, en regsverydeling. Die outeur argumenteer in hierdie bespreking dat regspraktisyns nie bloot kan voortgaan om kunsmatige intelligensie vir navorsing te gebruik sonder die behoorlike nakoming van eties en professionele pligte nie, want dit sou nie net ’n negatiewe impak op hulself, hul kliënte en die howe hê nie – maar het ook ’n wyer en verreikende impak op die regspleging asook die regsberoep. In hierdie verband word geargumenteer dat die behoorlike gebruik van kunsmatige intelligensie-instrumente een van die etiese dilemmas in die hedendaagse regsomgewing geword het, en dringende en onmiddellike aandag vereis, insluitend regulasies van die Regspraktyksraad om leiding aan regspraktisyns te bied, maar ook dat die howe ’n duidelike uiteensetting van riglyne vir die voorlegging van dokumente waarvoor kunsmatige intelligensie gebruik is, moet verskaf. Dit is slegs deur so ’n gekombineerde poging, en deur opleiding, leierskap en konsekwente gevolge vir die versaking van etiese en professionele pligte, dat die huidige etiese mislukkings wat verband hou met die misbruik van kunsmatige intelligensie-instrumente in die regsberoep reggestel kan word.

’n Stap in die regte rigting ten opsigte van onuitgevoerde kontrakte in ondernemingsredding?

by | Jan 25, 2026 | TSAR, TSAR 2026 I1

REGSPRAAK

’n Stap in die regte rigting ten opsigte van onuitgevoerde kontrakte in ondernemingsredding?

Author: Jacobus Jan Louw Nieuwoudt

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Stadio Higher Education
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2026, p. 197-206
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i1a12

Abstract

For a long time, executory contracts in business rescue have been a contentious legal issue, particularly regarding how the section 133 moratorium and the concept of lawful possession of property affect their treatment before the courts. The moratorium was introduced to protect the company during the rehabilitation process of business rescue proceedings and confers protection against legal proceedings and enforcement action so that the business rescue practitioner could manage the company’s affairs and enable the company to function again as a going concern.
Until the decision in Capitec Bank Limited v Ubuntu Family Health Centre Grayston (Pty) Ltd the prevailing legal position was that cancellation of a contract would cause the company no longer to be in lawful possession of the relevant property. Section 133 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides that the moratorium protecting the company during business rescue proceedings applies only to property that is in the lawful possession of the company. The protection therefore does not extend to property that the company possesses unlawfully or without valid title.
Unfortunately, section 133 of the Companies Act has in certain cases had adverse implications for companies. If a counterparty was entitled to cancel a contract due to breach, that party could institute enforcement actions and reclaim its property – thereby effectively circumventing the protection envisaged by section 133.
The Capitec decision has shed new light on this area of law and points to an expected change in how the courts will interpret “lawful possession”. According to this judgment, cancellation of an executory contract may no longer result in the company being in unlawful possession of the property. This discussion is one of the first to analyse the high court’s redefinition of “lawful possession” under section 133 of the Companies Act, signalling a shift in South African business rescue law. The case note also examines in depth the implications of this landmark decision.
Earlier case law equated the cancellation of a contract with unlawful possession, thereby limiting protection by the moratorium. The court now confirms that possession is unlawful only if criminal unlawful possession is prevalent and no longer civil unlawful possession. This strengthens the moratorium, enabling business rescue practitioners to use company assets effectively while formulating a rescue plan. The decision aligns South Africa more closely with the debtor-friendly model used in the United States of America, rather than the creditor-oriented approaches of Germany and Australia and creates a more balanced framework that gives distressed companies a fair chance to rehabilitate.
The decision makes an important contribution to business rescue law, extending its reach to instalment and potentially lease agreements. However, courts must carefully balance debtor protection with contractual certainty. In Capitec Bank Limited v Ubuntu Family Health Centre Grayston (Pty) Ltd (2023/127918) 2025 ZAGPJHC 304 (19 March 2025) leave to appeal the decision to the supreme court of appeal was granted. The outcome of that appeal was still being awaited at the time of finalisation of this note.