The Unreported War: Tackling Denialism and Social Stigma towards Victims of Armed Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

The Unreported War: Tackling Denialism and Social Stigma towards Victims of Armed Conflict-Related Sexual and Gender-Based Violence

Author: Ropafadzo Maphosa

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM (cum laude), Researcher at the South African Institute for Advanced Constitutional, Public, Human Rights and International Law, a centre of the University of Johannesburg
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 32 Issue 1, 2021, p. 155 – 168
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/v32/i1a7

Abstract

In addressing the United Nations Security Council at its 7938th meeting, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, Adama Dieng, said that the social stigma attached to sexual violence is integral to the logic of using sexual violence as a tactic, a method of war or even torture. The perpetrators of sexual crimes understand that sexual violence attacks one’s individual and collective identity and ostracises survivors, thus untying the strings of family and kinship that hold the very fabric of communities together. As a result, survivors of gender-based and sexual violence often find it difficult to cope with its social repercussions. This article will pursue a detailed discussion pertaining to the severe stigma suffered by survivors of conflict-related sexual violence and how this issue is not adequately addressed in international law. The risk faced by survivors is threefold: first by the action of the perpetrator, then by the reaction of society through stereotypical and patriarchal attitudes, and finally by the courts, which often are not only unresponsive but also perpetuate negative social norms and rape myths leading to double persecution. Due to a lack of evidence and other factors, such as patriarchy and social inequalities, the stigma associated with conflict-related sexual violence is manifested in court rooms through various rape myths about its survivors. Sexual violence is a gendered phenomenon, in that it is often linked to, and stems from, harmful social and traditional practices relating to perceptions of gender and power dynamics surrounding them. In times of conflict, prevalent power dynamics, and the practices linked to them, can be further exacerbated leading to a higher prevalence of sexual violence. Therefore, the core argument advanced in this article is the necessity of combatting stigma and rape myths, and to promote the reporting of sexual crimes by and access to justice for survivors.

The Collective Responsibility of Organised Armed Groups for Sexual and Gender-Based Violence during a Non-International Armed Conflict

The Collective Responsibility of Organised Armed Groups for Sexual and Gender-Based Violence during a Non-International Armed Conflict

Authors: Martha M Bradley & Aniel de Beer

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB, LLM, LLD (UP), LLM (UCT), Lecturer, Department of Public Law, University of Pretoria. External Expert: Department of International and European Law, Centre for International Humanitarian and Operational Law, Palacký University, Olomouc, Czech Republic; BProc, MBA, LLM, LLD (UP), LLB (Stell), extraordinary lecturer, Department of Public Law, University of Pretoria. External Expert: Department of International and European Law, Centre for International Humanitarian and Operational Law, Palacký University, Olomouc, Czech Republic
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 32 Issue 1, 2021, p. 129 – 154
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/v32/i1a6

Abstract

This contribution considers a possible legal framework for holding organised armed groups (“OAGs”) collectively responsible for acts of sexual and gender-based violence (“SGBV”) during non-international armed conflicts. It argues that a framework providing for collective as opposed to individual criminal responsibility of OAGs is essential. Certain sections of the Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“Articles on State Responsibility” or “ASR”) are used as a blueprint for achieving such a framework. In this regard, the concepts of international legal responsibility of OAGs, internationally wrongful acts and attribution are analysed in the context of crimes committed by OAGs. In conclusion, the article proposes future research in order to advance the prospect of collective claims and collective compensation for victims of SGBV.

The Case for a Law against the Online Distribution of Non-Consensual Intimate Images in Uganda

The Case for a Law against the Online Distribution of Non-Consensual Intimate Images in Uganda

Authors: Ronald Kakungulu-Mayambala, Rukundo Solomon, Victor Phillip Makmot & Diana Rutabingwa

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB (Hons) (Mak), Dip LP (LDC), LLM (Fordham), SJD (Arizona), Associate Professor, School of Law, Makerere University; LLB (Hons) (UDSM), Dip LP (LDC), Associate Researcher, Mawazo Policy Research Centre; LLB (Hons) (Mak), Dip LP (LDC) Associate, Kirunda & Wesige Advocates; LLB (TUoN), LLM (Lond), MSC (Ebor), Senior Governance and Human Rights Advisor, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 32 Issue 1, 2021, p. 93 – 128
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/v32/i1a5

Abstract

The distribution of sexually graphic or intimate images of individuals on the internet without their consent is on the rise in Uganda. Several female celebrities and lesser-known individuals have fallen victim to this phenomenon in recent years. This article examines the civil and criminal remedies currently available to the victims. The article argues that these remedies are insufficient to deal with the challenge posed by the non-consensual distribution of these intimate images in the online environment and argues for the creation of a new law that specifically addresses this issue.

Citizenship by Naturalisation: Are Regulations 3(2)(b) and (c) to the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1985 Invalid?

Citizenship by Naturalisation: Are Regulations 3(2)(b) and (c) to the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1985 Invalid?

Author: Fareed Moosa

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BProc (UWC), LLB (UWC), LLM (UCT), LLD (UWC), Professor and Head of Department: Mercantile and Labour Law, University of the Western Cape
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 32 Issue 1, 2021, p. 71 – 92
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/v32/i1a4

Abstract

This article argues that regulation 3(2)(b), read with regulation 3(2)(c), issued pursuant to section 23(f) of the South African Citizenship Act 88 of 1995 (“1995 Act”), is invalid and ought to be set aside on judicial review. It is argued that they are inconsistent with sections 5(1)(c), (2), (5) and (9)(a) of the 1995 Act. This article shows that, whereas regulation 3(2)(b) requires a foreigner seeking citizenship to be physically present in South Africa and not be absent from the Republic for more than 90 days in each of the five years preceding the date of application for citizenship, no such physical presence requirement is contained in section 5(1)(c), or in section 5 of the 1995 Act in general, if read holistically. Section 5(1)(c) merely requires that an aspirant citizen be ordinarily resident in South Africa for five continuous years immediately preceding the lodgement of an application for citizenship. In the context of section 5(1)(c), the term “ordinarily resident” is interpreted as not requiring a physical presence in South Africa for any period of time during a calendar year. Rather, it merely requires that a foreigner must have sufficiently strong ties to South Africa to support a finding that his real home is there. Therefore, it is hypothesised that the Minister of Home Affairs acted ultra vires the 1995 Act when he issued regulations 3(2)(b) and (c).

Execution against Residential Immovable Property in terms of High Court Rule 46A

Execution against Residential Immovable Property in terms of High Court Rule 46A

Author: Reghard Brits

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BComm (Law) LLB LLD, Associate Professor, Department of Mercantile Law, University of Pretoria
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 32 Issue 1, 2021, p. 47 – 70
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/v32/i1a3

Abstract

This article provides an overview of and commentary on High Court Rule 46A, which deals with the procedural rules for executing a judgment debt against residential immovable property. Rule 46A focusses on two main aspects: determining if it is justified to sell the debtor’s home in execution and, if a sale is ordered, setting a reserve price at which the property is to be auctioned. Therefore, this article analyses the provisions of rule 46A that pertain to these two components, which also serve as two layers of protection for a debtor facing the loss of his or her home.

Bringing Gender and Class into the Frame: An Intersectional Analysis of the Decoloniality-As-Race Critique of the Use of Law for Social Change

Bringing Gender and Class into the Frame: An Intersectional Analysis of the Decoloniality-As-Race Critique of the Use of Law for Social Change

Authors: Jackie Dugard & Angela María Sánchez

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA LLB BAHons LLM MPhil PhD, Associate Professor, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand; LLM student, Universidad de los Andes
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 32 Issue 1, 2021, p. 24 – 46
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/v32/i1a2

Abstract

During 2017, South African decoloniality theorist Tshepo Madlingozi argued, in relation to the ongoing socio-political and economic exclusion of the black majority in South Africa, that the post-1994 rights-based constitutional order represents more continuity than rupture, consolidating a triumph of social justice over liberation and a privileging of the democratisation paradigm over the decolonisation one. In Madlingozi’s critique of the “neo-apartheid” social justice order, race continues to be the most important dividing line, and human rights constitute a western “perpetuation of the coloniality of being”. This argument resonates with broader contemporary critiques of the weak, compromising and imperial nature of human rights. Against this backdrop, we examine the potential, as well as the limits, of using human rights as a tool for social change. Engaging an intersectional analysis informed by the seminal work of Kimberlé Crenshaw and Nancy Fraser, we find that the focus on decoloniality-as-race obscures other critical fault lines to the detriment of progressive change, and that a radical reading of human rights is capable of correcting this flaw. We argue that the incorporation of gender and class lenses provides a powerful tool to change both the narrative about the drivers of inequality among capitalist democracies and the role of socio-economic rights adjudication within them. Our article is also an invitation to rethink the domestic constitutional histories of the global south by acknowledging rights-based redistributive transformations within the context of market and development policies, and to push for the uptake of rights to empower social struggle and tackle structural disadvantage.