ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 133 Issue 3, 2016, p. 692 – 697
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ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 133 Issue 3, 2016, p. 688 – 692
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ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, North-West University (Potchefstroom Campus)
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 133 Issue 3, 2016, p. 664 – 687
While there is growing consensus about the place and value of virtual property, both inside and outside of virtual worlds, the question of how to justify the acceptance of these new objects of property law needs to be addressed. In this article three normative justifications for the recognition of real world property is applied to virtual property as found inside virtual worlds. The first refers to John Locke’s labour theory, the second to Jeremy Bentham and the utilitarian theory, and the third is the personality theory as described by Jane Radin. By applying these theories to virtual property, it becomes clear that one would be justified in accepting that objects of virtual property, and in this article, specifically virtual property objects as found inside virtual worlds, should be recognised as objects of property in the real world.
ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, University of Johannesburg
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 133 Issue 3, 2016, p. 629 – 663
In Arun Property Development (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town City the Constitutional Court had to rule on the meaning of s 28 of the Land Use Planning Ordinance (‘LUPO’). Moseneke DCJ held that this provision results in a vesting in the local authority of excess land unrelated to the normal needs of a planned development. Such vesting, so it was held, requires compensation under s 25(2) of the Constitution if the provision is to survive constitutional scrutiny. This finding is unconvincing. First, in light of the presumption that enacted laws are not unjust, inequitable and unreasonable, the court misconstrued the presumption that the legislature does not intend to expropriate property without compensation in the absence of express words or plain implication. In this regard the court also failed to take cognisance of the distinction between deprivation and expropriation, the doctrine of exactions, and the requirements for expropriation in our law. These considerations reveal that provisions like s 28 are not aimed at vesting excess land in a local authority, which would have dispensed with the dispute at hand. For purposes of deciding constitutional property disputes, courts should adhere to the established principles of constitutional property law, which inform the mentioned presumption, when interpreting legislation to establish whether it takes away property. Care should be taken against over-emphasising whether it is possible to read an implicit obligation to pay compensation into a statute if the statute (apparently) results in a taking away of property, since compensation merely follows upon a valid expropriation and is not a justification for it.
ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Post-doctoral Fellow (Mandela Institute), School of Law, University of Witwatersrand
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 133 Issue 3, 2016, p. 600 – 628
When genetically modified organisms (‘GMOs’) were first commercialised in South Africa towards the end of the 1990s, there was no specific labelling obligation for such products apart from general requirements on labelling and advertising of foodstuffs. As from 2004, regulations on the labelling of food obtained through genetic modification came into existence when the Department of Health required GMOs to be labelled if they are significantly different from their traditional counterparts. The local labelling framework for GMOs evolved to a stricter regime under the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008. Although South Africa is currently one of the ten biggest world producers of genetically modified (‘GM’) crops, GM labels for food on the local market are scarce. This article examines the South African labelling regime for GM food and feed in the light of the right of consumers to disclosure of information under its consumer protection law. It seeks to shed light on the practical difficulties which may arise regarding the implementation of this labelling regime, and the need for the strengthening and monitoring of labelling obligations.
ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Judge of the Eastern Cape Division of the High Court
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 133 Issue 3, 2016, p. 569 – 599
This article is concerned with whether private bodies that administer sporting codes on a national level exercise public or private power in the exercise of their bureaucratic or regulatory functions. This is an issue of importance as the answer to this question determines the nature and extent of the legal control over the actions of what have become powerful, often monopolistic, organisations able to take decisions that may have devastating effects on those who are subject to their powers. In order to explore this issue, it is necessary to begin with an historical overview of the development of these bodies and to discuss the place of sport in the wider society. Once that has been done, I shall address whether private bodies are able to exercise public power and, if so, in what circumstances; how the courts have traditionally dealt with sporting bodies and their exercises of power; and, finally, whether that approach still holds good in the context of the legislative and socio-political framework within which sport is regulated in South Africa.