Aspects of cancellation clauses for breach of contract: The impact of consumer legislation, and whether cancellation clauses should apply to partial repudiation or very minor breaches

ARTICLE

Aspects of cancellation clauses for breach of contract: The impact of consumer legislation, and whether cancellation clauses should apply to partial repudiation or very minor breaches

Author: Tjakie Naude

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor of Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 143 Issue 2, p. 397-420
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v143/i2a8

Abstract

Consumer legislation impacts upon suppliers’ freedom to draft cancellation clauses. The view that it is not necessary in the case of repudiation to follow a procedure for cancellation prescribed in an agreed cancellation clause should apply where the breaching party repudiated the entire agreement or all outstanding obligations. By contrast, it should not generally apply where the breaching party repudiated only a part of the agreement, because the argument that the breaching party repudiated the whole of the agreement, including the cancellation clause, does not apply to partial repudiation. An exception would be where the breaching party persists in the partial repudiation despite repeated demands to retract the repudiation. A cancellation clause that allows the aggrieved party to cancel the contract immediately, without requiring the breaching party to issue an ultimatum, should not apply to an insignificant breach. Whether a breach is insignificant should depend on whether it is non-culpable and has little impact on the aggrieved party. If this rule is not regarded as acceptable for contracts generally, it should at least apply in the case of lease, as the tenant’s possessory rights are affected, with serious consequences for the tenant. There is support for these rules in foreign law.

‘As long as she lives a chaste life’: The constitutionality of the ‘dum casta’ clause in post-divorce South African spousal maintenance agreements

NOTE

‘As long as she lives a chaste life’: The constitutionality of the ‘dum casta’ clause in post-divorce South African spousal maintenance agreements

Authors: Brigitte Clark & Belinda van Heerden

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Associate Professor, School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal; Honorary Visiting Researcher, Oxford Brookes University; Retired Justice of the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 143 Issue 1, p. 1-13
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v143/i1a1

Abstract

In current South African matrimonial law, a dum casta clause may be inserted into a divorce agreement between the parties to provide that the duty to pay spousal maintenance after divorce will cease when the maintenance recipient (usually the wife) remarries, dies or lives together with another person in a relationship akin to marriage. This note examines the nature of dum casta clauses in agreements regarding post-divorce spousal maintenance, focusing on their purpose, background, context and constitutionality. We examine the clause through a constitutional lens and with reference to international law, the courts’ constitutional duty to develop the common law in line with the Bill of Rights, the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act, and from a public policy perspective. We conclude that this clause, if strictly interpreted, violates the constitutional rights of the maintenance recipient and that such clauses should be declared contrary to public policy.

Cassim NO v MEC, Department of Social Development, Free State: A missedopportunity to set the parameters on exclusionary criteria in school admission processes for children with disabilities

NOTE

Cassim NO v MEC, Department of Social Development, Free State: A missedopportunity to set the parameters on exclusionary criteria in school admission processes for children with disabilities

Authors: Willene Holness & Ruth Nyamadzawo

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Associate Professor, School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal; Post-doctoral Fellow, School of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 143 Issue 1, p. 14-36
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v143/i1a2

Abstract

Children with disabilities frequently experience significant problems when seeking admission to educational and alternative care settings, sometimes with conditions being attached to their admission. Cassim NO v MEC, Department of Social Development, Free State 2021 (1) SA 184 (FB) demonstrated that the conditional admission of a child with multiple disabilities and experiencing substance-abuse challenges to a special school is unconstitutional, even during a global humanitarian crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic. The court determined that the school’s exclusionary admission criteria were discriminatory, breaching her rights to education and to access care. Although the decision did not address in detail the negative implications of delayed school enrolment, the case emphasised the urgent need for legislative reform concerning admission procedures for children with high-level support requirements to enhance inclusive education.

Disability discrimination or incapacity dismissal? A commentary on Gugwini v National Consumer Commissioner

NOTE

Disability discrimination or incapacity dismissal? A commentary on Gugwini v National Consumer Commissioner

Author: Lindani Mkhwanazi

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Lecturer, Department of Commercial Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 143 Issue 1, p. 37-49
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v143/i1a3

Abstract

This note examines the distinctions between dismissing an employee due to a disability, on the one hand, and incapacity resulting from ill health or injury, on the other hand. Only the latter is permitted and considered fair by the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. The note provides a critical analysis of Gugwini v National Consumer Commissioner (2023) 44 ILJ 2237 (LC) by examining the Labour Court’s decision and its failure to consider how visually impaired employees may be reasonably accommodated in the workplace.

You cannot contract out of the National Credit Act in a supplementary agreement: A consideration of Absa Bank Ltd v Serfontein

NOTE

You cannot contract out of the National Credit Act in a supplementary agreement: A consideration of Absa Bank Ltd v Serfontein

Author: Ciresh Singh

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Associate Professor, University of South Africa
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 143 Issue 1, p. 50-67
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v143/i1a4

Abstract

The implementation of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 has undoubtedly created greater consumer protection in South Africa. Unfortunately, the Act is not always clear, and undesirable drafting has resulted in inconsistent interpretation and application. One glaring lacuna in the Act is its failure to define the term ‘supplementary agreement’, leaving it uncertain what types of documents fall within the scope of a supplementary agreement, and whether the Act fully governs such agreements. Another flaw in the National Credit Act is that it is not clear whether contracting parties to a credit agreement can agree to contract out of — ie exclude the applicability of — the provisions of the National Credit Act in a supplementary agreement. This flaw has potentially created room for unscrupulous credit providers to evade the applicability of certain provisions of the Act, or the entire Act, by entering into a supplementary agreement with a consumer. The recent case of Absa Bank Ltd v Serfontein 2025 (3) SA 345 (SCA) addressed some of these issues and highlighted the need to remedy these gaps.