Ownership of personal information?

Ownership of personal information?

ARTICLE

Ownership of personal information?

Author: Donrich Thaldar

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 142 Issue 1, p. 175-198
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v142/i1a10

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Donrich Thaldar
Ownership of personal information?
South African Law Journal, Volume 142 Issue 1, p. 175-142 https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v142/i1a10

Abstract

This article explores whether personal information can be owned and, if so, by whom. It begins with an overview of fluctuating judicial attitudes toward personal information ownership, highlighting the need for a thorough analysis of how the foundational tenets of ownership apply to personal information, particularly in digital form. The analysis clarifies that ownership is a concept rooted in property law, necessitating that questions of personal information ownership be answered within the ambit of property law, rather than informational privacy law. Building on this theoretical base, it becomes clear that while personal information in general does not meet the criteria for ownership, a specific digital instance of such information — that is, a computer file containing personal information — indeed meets the criteria and is therefore susceptible of ownership. When a new instance of information is generated, property law dictates that the first person to exercise control over it with the intent of ownership thereby becomes its owner. However, the data subject’s informational privacy rights impose limitations on the owner’s property rights. This interplay between informational privacy law and property law lays a crucial foundation for the legal governance of personal information in the digital age.

Re(de)fining defamation

Note

Re(de)fining defamation

Author: Emile Zitzke

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Associate Professor of Law, University of the Witwatersrand
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 141 Issue 4, p. 635-651
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v141/i4a1

Abstract

This note is about the definition of common-law defamation. The authoritative definition of common-law defamation (the wrongful and intentional publication of a defamatory statement concerning the plaintiff) is weighed against the five general elements of the common law of delict (conduct, damage, fault, wrong fulness, and causation) to determine to what extent the general and specific elements cohere. It is argued that the time has come to alter the definition of common-law defamation (slightly) to give a more accurate account of what courts do in defamation cases, which would also ensure greater unity between general and specific elements for liability.

Minister of Water and Sanitation v Msukaligwa Local Municipality: Is financial incapacity a valid excuse?

Note

Minister of Water and Sanitation v Msukaligwa Local Municipality: Is financial incapacity a valid excuse?

Author: Johandri Wright

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Post-Doctoral Fellow, SARChI Chair in Multilevel Government, Law and Development, Dullah Omar Institute, University of the Western Cape
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 141 Issue 4, p. 652-665
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v141/i4a2

Abstract

South African local government is failing to provide basic services. These services are important to realize many socio-economic rights. Municipalities often refer to their financial incapacity as an excuse for not delivering basic services. Minister of Water and Sanitation v Msukaligwa Local Municipality is an example of a judgment where the Municipality relied on its financial incapacity as a defence for not delivering water and sanitation services in accordance with national standards. The court rejected this defence. In terms of a structural interdict, the court ordered the Municipality to bring its service delivery in line with national standards under the relevant Minister’s supervision. This judgment is important for many reasons. This case note explores the contribution of this judgment to the law relating to financial incapacity as a justifiable defence for not delivering services where this impacts on the realization of socio-economic rights.

Lost in the fundamental contradiction: Revisiting Beadica

Note

Lost in the fundamental contradiction: Revisiting Beadica

Author: Jaco Barnard-Naudé

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor of Jurisprudence, Department of Private Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 141 Issue 4, p. 666-684
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v141/i4a3

Abstract

In this note, I revisit the concept of the fundamental contradiction that Kennedy proposed in 1979 as the ‘essence of every legal problem’. I argue that the Constitutional Court post-Barkhuizen has not taken the fundamental contradiction seriously, and, as a result, the decision in Beadica exhibits the fundamental contradiction in a glaringly transparent manner. In the course of the discussion, I also consider the literature on ‘good faith’ that has emerged in the aftermath of Beadica and the attempts, it would be seem, to wrench some sort of coherence out of it. I suggest that it is only when the Constitutional Court becomes more sensitive to the actual progressive demands of transformation in the contractual realm, instead of being preoccupied with an elaboration of the continuation of a liberal status quo (as it is in Beadica), that it will be able to transcend forcefully out of the fundamental contradiction. For as long as courts hark back to the jurisprudence of yesteryear, they will remain caught in the fundamental contradiction to the point that they will render our jurisprudence devoid of meaning and coherence.