Abstract

This article examines the right to the free exercise of religion from a comparative perspective in the context of Islamic marriage and divorce in England and South Africa. In particular, the article considers how Islamic marriage may be interpreted and recognised in a coherent manner in rights-based systems of law and how these two legal systems ensure that the rights of religious women are fully respected and acknowledged. The similarity in the growth of non-legal, quasi-judicial bodies (sharia councils in England and ulama in South Africa) is analysed, along with their effect on rulings on Islamic divorces and other matters. The article suggests that both legal systems may learn from the other and suggests ways in which this comparative method of legal analysis can be employed to achieve legal reform and the legal recognition of these marriages. In this regard, the article deals with various models, based on either the assimilation and unification of marriage laws (as proposed in South Africa) or integration and pluralism. The article examines these models not only from a pragmatic perspective, but also from a rights perspective. It suggests that the assimilation model, based on a Western, Judeo-Christian paradigm of marriage, would not only be inconsistent with the ethos of legal pluralism promoted by the South African Constitution and the English Human Rights Act, but, more importantly, would not protect the rights of Muslim women adequately. Therefore, the article concludes that, in line with recent South African High Court jurisprudence, the legislative recognition of Muslim marriage and divorce law is urgently required in both jurisdictions.

Abstract

On 16 July 2019, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) rejected an application by Russian human rights activist, Nikolay Alekseyev, on the basis that he had published personally offensive and threatening material online, directed towards the ECtHR. This was in the matter of Zhdanov and Others v Russia Applications Nos 12200/08, 35949/11 and 58282/12. Even though the published material fell afoul of the European Convention in that it amounted to an abuse of the court process, nothing offensive was contained in the applicant’s own submissions before the court. In like fashion to the ECtHR’s admissibility requirements, the African Charter contains a much more pointed exclusionary clause which renders inadmissible any communication that contains disparaging or insulting language. The difference between the two systems is that the European system relies on an open-ended concept of ‘abuse of the right of individual petition’, whilst the African system specifically proscribes insulting language. In this article, I analyse the approach of the ECtHR in the Zhdanov matter, and contrast it with the approach of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (the African Commission) under Article 56(3) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. I further interrogate whether there were any instances where, in similar fashion to the Zhdanov matter, the African Commission declared a communication inadmissible on account of insulting language occurring externally, and not contained within the submission itself. Alive to the fact that the concept of ‘abuse’ in the European system is wide, the article is limited to cases in which the abuse of the right of individual petition under the European Convention manifests in disparaging or insulting language.

Abstract

A gain-based remedy for breach of contract is aimed at taking away the profits acquired through breach of contract. Traditionally, contractual damages can be claimed only if the breach caused the plaintiff patrimonial loss. There is an assumption that breach of contract causes a loss to the plaintiff, and as a result the defendant should compensate the plaintiff. However, in the past, courts have been confronted with cases where the opposite of this assumption is true. This is in instances where a defendant breaches a contract and gains profit as a result of that breach, whereas the plaintiff suffers little or no patrimonial loss. Unfortunately, in these circumstances the plaintiff may be left with no remedy or legal recourse for the breach, while the defendant may keep the profits generated as a result of the breach. However, in English law the courts have recognised a gain-based remedy in the circumstances outlined above, allowing the disgorgement of such ill-gotten profits. But a similar remedy has not yet gained recognition in the South African law of contract. The purpose of this article is to explore how South African law can draw some valuable lessons from English law in developing and recognising a gain-based remedy for breach of contract in order to deal with the profits generated through breach of contract.

Abstract

South Africa and India both struggle with a high crime rate and case backlogs in the mainstream courts. Both countries have a pluralistic system where state law consists of formal law and customary law. Both have mainstream and traditional courts following dispute resolution based on traditional values and principles. The panchayat system in India is comparable to traditional authorities in South Africa. The panchayat system performs judicial-like functions, and traditional courts operate at informal (nyaya panchayat) and formal (gram nyayalayas) levels in the rural areas. The lok adalat system is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism employed by the Indian government to address the high crime rate and court backlogs. Statistics reveal that these alternative justice mechanisms based on traditional values and principles have successfully cleared some backlogs. South Africa is in the process of adopting legislation on traditional courts, and it is envisaged that the Traditional Courts Bill [B1-2017] will soon be transformed into law. In reconsidering traditional courts’ role in the South African criminal justice system, it is worthwhile to explore what the Indian government has been doing in this regard. The main aim is to analyse the Indian approach to criminal justice regarding dispute resolution examples based on traditional laws, namely the panchayat system (nyaya panchayats and gram nyayalayas) and also lok adalats in a comparative context.

Abstract

Despite the recent enactment of the Zimbabwean Constitution which provides for the right to basic education, complaints, reminiscent of a failed basic education system, have marred the education system in Zimbabwe. Notwithstanding glaring violations of the right to basic education by the government, no person has taken the government to court for failure to comply with its section 75(1)(a) constitutional obligations, and neither has the government conceded any failures or wrongdoings. Two ultimate questions arise: Does the state know what compliance with section 75(1)(a) entails? And do the citizens know the scope and content of their rights as provided for by section 75(1)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe? Whilst it is progressive that the Education Act of Zimbabwe as amended in 2020 has addressed some aspects relating to section 75(1)(a) of the Constitution, it has still not provided an international law compliant scope and content of the right to basic education neither have any clarifications been provided by the courts. Using an international law approach, this article suggests what the scope and content of section 75(1)(a) might be.

Abstract

With the gazetting of the Regulations of the Child Care and Protection Act 3 of 2015, on 30 January 2019, a crucial regulatory piece of children’s rights in Namibia has finally been operationalised. However, the Act insufficiently addresses new emerging online offences against children such as the possession and distribution of child sexual abuse material, and hence leaves a considerable gap in the protection of children’s rights. As the Namibian Constitution follows a monist approach to international law, this article argues that the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography can be directly applied to complement the national legal framework to prosecute cases of possessing and disseminating child sexual abuse material, while upholding fair-trial principles.

Abstract

The Commentaries to the OECD’s Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital are at times consulted by South African courts when double taxation agreements are interpreted. The question considered in this article is the nature of the interaction, if any, between these Commentaries and section 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 233 requires a court to prefer a reasonable interpretation of legislation that is consistent with international law over other interpretations that are not consistent with international law.

The contribution analyses various aspects of the wording of section 233, including the meaning of the phrase ‘international law’. It points out the various roles that transnational sources may play with regard to section 233, for example these sources may either constitute the ‘international law’ to which section 233 refers, or they may be aids to the interpretation of those sources that constitute ‘international law’. The contribution considers which of these roles the Commentaries are most likely to play for purposes of section 233.

Abstract

On 2 August 2002, South Africa signed the Southern African Development Community (SADC) Protocol on Tribunal and the Rules of Procedure Thereof, thus effectively recognising and accepting the jurisdiction of the SADC Tribunal. Among the cases received by the SADC Tribunal was a complaint involving allegations of human rights violations by the government of Zimbabwe. It ruled that the government of Zimbabwe had violated human rights. Consequently, Zimbabwe mounted a politico-legal challenge against the existence of the Tribunal. This resulted in the review of the role and functions of the Tribunal in 2011 which resulted in the Tribunal being barred from receiving new cases or proceeding with the cases that were already before it. Furthermore, on 18 August 2014, the SADC Summit adopted and signed the 2014 Protocol on the Tribunal in the SADC which disturbingly limits personal jurisdiction by denying individual access to the envisaged Tribunal, thus reducing it to an inter-state judicial forum. This article critically looks at the decision of 18 August 2014, specifically the legal implications of the Republic of South Africa’s signing of the 2014 Protocol outside the permissible procedure contained in article 37 of the SADC Protocol on the Tribunal. It proposes that South Africa should correct this democratic deficit by introducing public participation in treaty-making processes in order to prevent a future situation where the executive unilaterally withdraws from an international treaty that is meant to protect human rights at a regional level. To achieve this, this article makes a comparative study between South Africa and the Kingdom of Thailand to learn of any best practices from the latter.

Abstract

That National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) play an important role in the protection and promotion of human rights is a well-known fact. This has been widely acknowledged by the United Nations (UN). Also well-known is the fact that several African countries have enacted new constitutions during the last two to three decades. One of the most salient features of those new constitutions is that they establish NHRIs, among other things. Given their unique role and mandate, these NHRIs can and do play an important role in the realisation of the sustainable development goals contained in the UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Adopting a case study approach, this article explores the role NHRIs have played in the promotion and protection of human rights in selected African countries and implications for sustainable development in those countries. The main argument is that there are several lessons African countries can learn from each other on how their NHRIs can more meaningfully play that role. Accordingly, best practice and comparative lessons are identified and it is recommended that NHRIs can contribute to sustainable development more meaningfully if they can make themselves more relevant, credible, legitimate, efficient and effective.

Abstract

The significance of health to national life has made successive governments in Nigeria and India design certain fundamental policies to regulate, control and guide healthcare service delivery. Since the incorporation of fundamental human rights into the two countries’ constitutions, the healthcare right has appeared as one of the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy. This requires governments to put in place policies geared towards implementing these obligations. However, regarding economic and social rights, the Nigerian judiciary has generally played a restrictive or a rather passive role in their enforcement. In contrast, Indian courts have employed a much more pragmatic approach to implementing economic and social rights. The problem with these rights is that judicial intervention resulting from a violation of the healthcare right remains a challenge because section 6(6)(c) and article 35 of the Nigerian and Indian constitutions, respectively, make economic and social rights non-justiciable. The article makes a comparative analysis of the practice in Indian and other jurisdictions in order to justify the possibility of embracing the enforceability of the rights, having regard to the link between economic and social rights and civil and political rights in Nigeria. By drawing on judicial synergy, this article suggests a legislative intercession to bring health rights within the enforceable rights by taking advantage of section 13 and item 60 of the Nigerian Exclusive Legislative List. In addition, the author recommends that the relevant international conventions signed by the country should be domesticated.