Regspraak: The availability of the actio legis aquiliae and the actio iniuriarum between spouses

by | Jun 8, 2021 | TSAR, TSAR 2021 I3

Regspraak: The availability of the actio legis aquiliae and the actio iniuriarum between spouses

Author: J Neethling

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of the Free State
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 3, 2021, p. 602-611
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2021/i3a10

Abstract

Daar is geen klinkklare antwoord in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg op die vraag of gades mekaar met die actio legis Aquiliae en die actio iniuriarum kan aanspreek nie. Vir doeleindes hiervan word onderskei tussen huwelike buite en binne gemeenskap van goed. Net eersgenoemde is hier van direkte belang en die positiefregtelike posisie sien soos volg daaruit: ’n Gade getroud buite gemeenskap van goed mag in beginsel stante matrimonio vrylik enige van dié twee deliksaksies teen die ander gade instel. In TG v WC was die partye, getroud buite gemeenskap van goed, besig om te skei. Hulle is getroud na ’n verhouding waarin die verweerder te kenne gegee het dat hy die eiseres lief het en altyd saam met haar wil wees. Kort na huweliksluiting het hul verhouding egter verbrokkel toe die verweerder haar begin verneder en gevra het om die huis te verlaat. Die eiseres het toe uitgevind dat op die tydstip wat die verweerder haar gevra het om te trou, hy reeds gemeen het dat hul verhouding onherstelbaar verbrokkel het, maar dit nie vir haar gesê het nie. Sodoende het hy haar deur sy bedrieglike wanvoorstelling beweeg om die huwelik te sluit. Gebaseer op dié feite, het die eiseres die verweerder op twee skuldoorsake aangespreek; eerstens die Aquiliese aksie om skadevergoeding te eis vir die suiwer ekonomiese verlies wat sy gely het (haar onkoste weens die huwelik) as gevolg van die verweerder se opsetlike wanvoorstelling; en tweedens die actio iniuriarum om solatium te verhaal weens die aantasting van haar eer en goeie naam. Die verweerder teken eksepsie teen beide eise aan op grond daarvan dat geeneen ’n skuldoorsaak daarstel nie. Die hof beslis dat die eiseres se eerste eis nie gedingsvatbaar is nie omdat dit strydig met openbare en regsbeleid sou wees. Ten onregte. Dit is gevestigde reg dat ’n opsetlike wanvoorstelling wat tot kontraksluiting lei, contra bonos mores en bygevolg onregmatig is en daarom ’n deliktuele skuldoorsaak uitmaak. Die hof moes dus die eksepsie teen hierdie eis van die hand gewys het. Daarenteen het die hof tereg bevestig, soos deesdae algemeen aanvaar word, dat die actio iniuriarum tot die beskikking van gades getroud buite gemeenskap van goed is en dat daar dus geen hindernis vir ’n vrou is om haar man weens iniuria aan te spreek nie. Die eksepsie teen hierdie eis word dus tereg afgewys.

Regspraak: Concern about the (seemingly) unlimited discretion to discharge an accused after close of the state’s case

by | Jun 8, 2021 | TSAR, TSAR 2021 I3

Regspraak: Concern about the (seemingly) unlimited discretion to discharge an accused after close of the state’s case

Author: M Watney

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 3, 2021, p. 611-626
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2021/i3a11

Abstract

Die bepalings van artikel 174 van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 verleen aan die verhoorhof ’n diskresie om pas na afloop van die staatsaak ’n einde aan die verrigtinge te bring deur ontslag (en dus vryspraak) aan die beskuldigde te verleen. Dié bepaling kan sy ontstaan terugvoer na die bestaan van jurieverhore en die bevoegdheid destyds aan regters verleen om sake aan die jurie te onttrek ten einde te verhoed dat onhoudbare skuldigbevindings deur die jurie volg op geheel gebrekkige getuienis. Die artikel is in gewysigde vorm, maar prinsipieel identies op die Suid-Afrikaanse wetboek behou, selfs ná afskaffing van jurieverhore en die oogmerk is hedendaags om ’n vroeë einde te bring aan ’n strafvervolging wat ooglopend en onherroeplik die spoor byster geraak het.
Die toepaslike toets het mettertyd ontwikkel en aan die hand van grondwetlike beginsels behels dit tans dat die verhoorhof ondersoek instel of daar getuienis beskikbaar is waarop ’n redelike mens die beskuldigde sou kon skuldig bevind. Oor die rol wat die geloofwaardigheid van staatsgetuies op hierdie stadium behoort te vervul, het die beslissings in die hofverslae dit oor die jare van bakboord na stuurboord gestuur. Duidelik egter is dat die huidige benadering gesaghebbend (en so ook in vergelykbare regstelsels) vasgelê is dat geloofwaardigheid alleen ’n rol speel in dáárdie gevalle waar die getuienis só onbetroubaar en ongeloofwaardig swak is dat geen redelike hof daarop peil kan trek nie. Teen hierdie agtergrond was regter-president Hlophe as die senior hooggeregshofregter in die land geroepe om die ontslag van die beskuldigde parlementslid Bongo, wat op ’n hoofaanklag (met gepaste alternatiewe) van oortreding van artikel 4(1)(b) van die Wet op die Voorkoming en Bestryding van Korrupte Bedrywighede 12 van 2004 tereg gestaan het, te oorweeg. Bongo is daarvan aangekla dat hy ’n geldelike voordeel aangebied het aan ’n parlementêre beampte om as getuienisaanbieder ’n ondersoek na Eskom deur die portefeuljekomitee van openbare ondernemings in die wiele te ry. Verskeie staatsgetuies het getuig ter ondersteuning van die hoofgetuie wat as enkelgetuie die kern van die korrupsiebewerings te berde moes bring.
Ten spyte van geen noemenswaardige weersprekings in die hoofgetuie se getuienis of van die ander getuies onderling nie, bevind die hof die hoofgetuie se getuienis as enkelgetuie op die wesensaspekte van die saak so ongeloofwaardig en die weersprekings tussen getuies só kardinaal dat dit die staatsaak buite hoop stel en die beskuldigde derhalwe op ontslag geregtig is. In verdere opmerkings oor die vertolking van die korrupsiewet slaan die regter-president ’n koers in strydig met onlangse vertolkings van die hoogste hof van appèl oor die juiste bepalings.
Die outeur skenk aandag aan die aangewese weg tot bereddering van die blatante en skynbaar geknutselde mistastings aan die hand van artikel 319 van die Strafproseswet waarvolgens die staat alleen regsvrae aan die hoogste hof van appèl kan voorhou vir beslissing. Die onderskeid tussen regsen feitevrae lewer egter dikwels probleme op en boonop word die bepalings van artikel 319 streng uitgelê deur die howe ten einde appèlle van staatsweë te ontmoedig. By oorweging van die uitspraak identifiseer die outeur twee regsvrae vir sodanige voorbehoud. Vantevore het die regskommissie na behoorlike ondersoek aanbeveel dat die appèlbevoegdheid van die staat uitgebrei word om ook feitevrae in te sluit en in sommige hooggeregshofuitsprake is daardie aanbeveling pertinent ondersteun. Van dié aanbeveling het dadels gekom, maar daar word aanbeveel dat dringend heroorweging daaraan geskenk word ten einde gemeenskapskadelike uitsprake deur regsprekers wat vanweë onkunde óf moedswil hul aan die reg én getuienis nie veel steur nie, op appèl te korrigeer.

Understanding one’s rights when arrested and detained: An assessment of language barriers that affect comprehension

by | Jun 6, 2021 | SACJ, SACJ V34 I1 2021

Understanding one’s rights when arrested and detained: An assessment of language barriers that affect comprehension

Author Terrence R Carney

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: BA HonsBA (UP) PGCE (Unisa) MA (UP) PhD (UFS) TESOL (Wits), Associate Professor, College of Human Sciences, University of South Africa
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 34 Issue 1, p. 1 – 30
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v34/i1a1

 

Abstract

Difficult text formulations, on the one hand, as well as poor linguistic skills and comprehension on the other, can severely hamper the communication effort of basic human rights during the judicial process. The rights entrenched in s 35 of the Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996), as they apply to individuals who are arrested, detained and accused, and read out by a member of the local South African Police Service (SAPS), are written in a legal register that can be too difficult for additional language speakers to understand. This begs the question of whether arrested, detained and accused individuals are fully aware of their rights and whether they can exercise these rights if they do not understand the language that expresses them. This article appraises the potential comprehensibility of the notice of rights (SAPS 14A), as provided to arrested, detained and accused individuals by the SAPS. The researcher’s assessments indicate that the text is pitched at an English readability level suited to university graduates and could be too difficult for South Africans with limited schooling and linguistic abilities to comprehend. A revision of SAPS 14A is offered as an illustration of a possible improvement to increase readability and, subsequently, better access to the mentioned rights.

Sentenced by an algorithm — Bias and lack of accuracy in risk-assessment software in the United States criminal justice system

by | Jun 6, 2021 | SACJ, SACJ V34 I1 2021

Sentenced by an algorithm — Bias and lack of accuracy in risk-assessment software in the United States criminal justice system

Author Willem Gravett

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: BLC LLB (UP) LLM (Notre Dame) LLD (UP), Associate Professor in the Department of Procedural Law, University of Pretoria, Member of the New York State Bar
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 34 Issue 1, p. 31 – 54
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v34/i1a2

Abstract

Developments in artificial intelligence and machine learning have caused governments to start outsourcing authority in performing public functions to machines. Indeed, algorithmic decision-making is becoming ubiquitous, from assigning credit scores to people, to identifying the best candidates for an employment position, to ranking applicants for admission to university. Apart from the broader social, ethical and legal considerations, controversies have arisen regarding the inaccuracy of AI systems and their bias against vulnerable populations. The growing use of automated risk-assessment software in criminal sentencing is a cause for both optimism and scepticism. While these tools could potentially increase sentencing accuracy and reduce the risk of human error and bias by providing evidence-based reasons in place of ‘ad-hoc’ decisions by human beings beset with cognitive and implicit biases, they also have the potential to reinforce and exacerbate existing biases, and to undermine certain of the basic constitutional guarantees embedded in the justice system. A 2016 decision in the United States, S v Loomis, exemplifies the threat that the unchecked and unrestrained outsourcing of public power to AI systems might undermine human rights and the rule of law.

Demeanour, credibility and remorse in the criminal trial

by | Jun 6, 2021 | SACJ, SACJ V34 I1 2021

Demeanour, credibility and remorse in the criminal trial

Authors Adebola Olaborede & Lirieka Meintjes-van der Walt

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: LLB (Nigeria), LLM (Stellenbosch), LLD (Fort Hare), Lecturer, Nelson Mandela School of Law, University of Fort Hare; BJuris LLB (UPE) LLM (Rhodes) DJuris (Leiden), Adjunct Professor, Nelson Mandela School of Law, University of Fort Hare
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 34 Issue 1, p. 55 – 75
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v34/i1a3

Abstract

This article, referring to South Africa as well as to selected other common law jurisdictions, proceeds from the premise that it is a well-accepted practice for judges to consider demeanour in assessing the credibility of a witness and in assessing whether the accused shows remorse when decisions regarding sentences are taken. However, the article also takes cognisance of the fact that there is a lack of generally agreed-upon objective methods for the identification of remorse. The article was prompted by recent health precautions regarding the mandatory use of face masks, in order to protect people and to contain the spread of the coronavirus, which provides an opportunity to review demeanour in general and perceptions concerning facial demeanour or facial expressions in the courtroom, in particular. The article explores the validity and reliability of findings on remorse and of making credibility assessments based on demeanour evidence. Part 1 of the article is an introduction. Part 2 of the article provides a brief overview of credibility and demeanour evidence in the courtroom. Part 3 of the article examines remorse and demeanour evidence in criminal trials. Part 4 of the article considers demeanour evidence as a ‘tricky horse to ride’. Part 5 of the article provides a discussion of empirical research studies in the field of social psychology relevant to the reliability of finding credibility and remorse on the basis of demeanour evidence. Part 6 briefly discusses COVID-19 face-covering regulations and demeanour evidence in the criminal trial. The article emphasises that although non-verbal cues could be valuable to judges, such evidence may be unreliable and that courts have cautioned against demeanour evidence being afforded undue importance. The article concludes that even when facial expressions are available to the court, it would be in the interests of justice to exercise great care concerning demeanour in general and facial expressions in particular as a guide to assessing credibility and the existence of remorse.

Rape: An unreasonable belief in consent should not be a defence

by | Jun 6, 2021 | SACJ, SACJ V34 I1 2021

Rape: An unreasonable belief in consent should not be a defence

Author PJ Schwikkard

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: BA (Witwatersrand) LLB (Natal, Pietermaritzburg) LLM (Natal, Durban) LLD (Stellenbosch), Professor of Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 34 Issue 1, p. 76 – 102
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v34/i1a4

Abstract

Section 3 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007 defines rape in the following terms: ‘Any person (‘A’) who unlawfully and intentionally, commits an act of sexual penetration with a complainant (‘B’), without the consent of B, is guilty of the offence of rape.’ This paper focuses on one component of the definition, namely fault. It is argued that a mistaken but unreasonable belief in consent should not be recognised as a defence and that a normative approach could soften the focus on the behaviour of the complainant and send a clear signal that our commitment to constitutional values requires us to take due care in our interactions with others. The argument is made with full awareness that law reform is a very small cog in addressing the scourge of rape.