Abstract

Section 211(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that no recognition of customary norms may be upheld if such norms are in conflict with either the constitution or any other law that deals specifically with customary law: “The courts must apply customary law when that law is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with customary law.” The current Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 deals explicitly with the recognition of customary marriages which are concluded in accordance with customary law (s 1). Customary law is defined as the “customs and usages traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of the culture of those peoples”. It follows from a further reading of section 1 that a customary marriage is reserved for those indigenous African peoples who observe such customs and usages.

It is provided in section 10(4) that “[d]espite subsection (1), no spouse of a marriage entered into under the Marriage Act, 1961, is, during the subsistence of such marriage, competent to enter into any other marriage”. This must be read with the definitions contained in section 1: “‘customary law’ means the customs and usages traditionally observed among the indigenous African peoples of South Africa and which form part of the culture of those peoples; ‘customary marriage’ means a marriage concluded in accordance with customary law”. Without the requisite legal competency, no legal subject can enter into any relationship to which the law may attach any consequences. Nobody can enter into a customary marriage if any of the presumed future spouses is already in a civil marriage according to the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, not even if the two parties are married to each other.

According to the custom of various indigenous nations, if a man enters into a valid customary marriage with a woman who had never been married before but who is the mother of children born out of wedlock (spurii), the metaphor applies that he “who takes the cow also acquires the calf”. He will as part and parcel of the lobola ceremony be seen as the adopting stepfather of his wife’s children, with all the accompanying consequences. He will automatically be responsible for the future maintenance of those children as his adoptive children and they will acquire all rights and privileges that are bestowed on a child, including the right to inheritance and the right to his family name. As a consequence of this new relationship, all legal ties with the biological father of the adopted child are severed and the biological father will no longer be responsible for the maintenance of his offspring.

In January 2019 an erstwhile law professor from UNISA who still retained his German citizenship, was gravely ill and cared for on life-support at a hospital in the Pretoria district. While in hospital, he tied the marriage knot with Miss Vilakazi, a Zulu woman with whom he had been in a relationship for the past five years. Miss Vilakazi was a spinster, but she had a Zulu daughter who was born out of wedlock more than eight years previously out of a relationship with an erstwhile Zulu lover. This child had been in the care of her maternal grandmother in Natal and, according to Zulu customary norms, was considered part of the house of her maternal grandfather, Vilakazi. She consequently carried the name Vilakazi as her registered surname on her official birth certificate. The marriage, which was conducted on 29 January 2019 in the hospital in Pretoria, was concluded with adherence to all the requirements of Act 25 of 1961. The civil marriage was duly registered as such. The late professor passed away in the hospital barely three weeks later on 19 February 2019.

Less than 24 hours before the demise of the professor a purported customary marriage was concluded, apparently on behalf of the professor with the recently married Mrs Schulze by proxy by a friend of his in the Newcastle district in Natal after having paid R60 000 as ilobolo. The ceremony was concluded with the ceremonial slaughtering of the prescribed goat. However, during this ceremony the groom was not present but on life support in a Pretoria hospital and not necessarily compos mentis – the court was told that he was represented by a friend. Zulu customary law, however, does not recognise a marriage concluded by proxy with a substitude bridegroom as was known in Roman-Dutch law as “a wedding with the glove”. Neither the Marriage Act nor the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act, however, recognises a second marriage after the conclusion of a civil marriage by any of the purported newly weds – even if both “spouses” had been present in person.

The mother of the late Professor Schulze, after his demise in South Africa, amended her last will in Germany and appointed her lifelong partner as sole beneficiary of her significant estate. She passed away in Germany in October 2019.

In November 2019 the recently married Mrs Schulze, on behalf of her minor daughter, successfully approached the high court in Pietermaritzburg, where Zaca AJ issued an order compelling the South African department of home affairs to issue the daughter with a new birth certificate that reflects the late Professor Schulze as her father.

Notwithstanding the unease of the officials at home affairs with this court order, the minister of home affairs, Mr Motsoaledi, personally intervened in August 2020 and the new birth certificate was issued as requested. Relying on this newly issued birth certificate, the applicant claims an amount of not less than R8 million in Germany from the estate of the late mother of Professor Schulze. For this purpose, the applicant relies on a principle in German law, the Pflichtteilsanspruch, according to which any descendant of the deceased has a right to a prescribed portion, a so-called legitimate portion of the estate, if not mentioned or sufficiently bestowed in the last will. This raises a number of seriously flawed legal arguments that are analysed in this article.

It is submitted that the perceived lobola marriage ceremony conducted on behalf of the late professor on 18 February 2019 in Newcastle, less than 24 hours before his demise, is void because of the explicit constitutional provision and the relevant section 10(4) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, which excludes any competency to enter into a customary marriage if any of the parties involved is already married. At the date of the perceived lobola ceremony, Mrs Schulze had already been civilly married to Professor Schulze for more than three weeks and thus both spouses lacked the necessary competency to enter into a valid customary marriage. Whether a valid customary marriage could have been concluded at all with a man who did not live according to the customs and usages of the Zulu, is also highly questionable.

Because the perceived lobola marriage is a nullity, no legal consequences can flow from this nullity and the so-called customary adoption of the daughter (“the calf with the cow”) is a nullity too. At no stage was any of the requirements for a valid adoption as governed by the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 adhered to. The minister of home affairs should have immediately given notice of appeal after the unconvincing judgment of Zaca AJ was handed down in January 2020. As the responsible minister, he should guard the upholding of the constitution and the applicable legal provisions unambiguously contained in the relevant section 10(4) of Act 120 of 1998. It is a pity that the so-called adherence to the principles of the “rule of law” is not even paid lip service in this case. Bennett, as a renowned expert on customary law, correctly pointed out that the legal orders are not unconnected. It may never be assumed that the people concerned are unaware of how to manipulate the resources offered them by legal pluralism (A Sourcebook of African Customary Law for Southern Africa (1991) 50).

Abstract

Die wetgewer poog om met die Wysigingswetsontwerp op Outeursreg ingrypende veranderinge in die Wet op Outeursreg aan te bring, waarby die instelling van billike gebruik (“fair use”) ingesluit word. Hierdie voorgestelde wysiging blyk nie die resultaat te wees van enige erkende hersieningsproses nie, en vereis ’n deeglike ontleding van die gevolge daarvan. Hierdie radikale afwyking van ons huidige benadering ten opsigte van die uitsonderings in outeursreg is deur sommige bekende tegnologie maatskappye ondersteun, nie net in Suid-Afrika nie, maar ook in ander regsgebiede soos die Verenigde Koninkryk, Australië en Nieu-Seeland. Die artikel spreek ernstige kommer uit oor die implikasies van die instelling van billike gebruik in die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. Sodra verby die retoriek van die beweerde meerderwaardigheid van billike gebruik beweeg word, is die prentjie wat ontstaan verontrustend. Alhoewel daar entoesiastiese ondersteuning blyk te wees vir die instelling van billike gebruik vanuit sekere oorde, is die geskiedenis daarvan om regsekerheid te vestig in die regsgebied van sy statutêre oorsprong, die Verenigde State, minder bemoedigend. Billike gebruik vereis ’n litigasieproses tussen die verskillende partye om die toelaatbare uitsonderings op outeursreg te bepaal. Daar is geen noodwendige rede waarom billike gebruik meer responsief is op tegnologiese verandering as wetgewende hervorming nie.

Daar is beduidende verskille in ons regstelsel en die litigasieproses wanneer dit vergelyk word met dié van die Verenigde State. Versuim om die verskille te erken, kan tot onvoorspelbare en onbedoelde gevolge lei. Uitsonderings op die outeursreg behels aspekte van openbare beleid. Dit moet nie deur regters beslis word ooreenkomstig ’n agenda wat daargestel is deur private litigante nie. In ’n demokratiese samelewing moet openbare beleidskwessies deur die parlement bepaal word en dit mag openbare deelname insluit.

Billike gebruik, of enige vorm van oop uitsonderings, kan daartoe lei dat Suid-Afrika sy verdragsverpligtinge kragtens die Bernkonvensie, die TRIPs-ooreenkoms en in die besonder die sogenaamde “drie-stap-toets” mag oortree. Dit is ook duidelik dat die houding van die Europese Unie en die Verenigde State teenoor die groot tegnologie maatskappye minder uiteenlopend is, en dat wetgewende maatreëls ingestel word, of oorweeg word, om die uitbuiting van die regte van outeursreghebbendes te beperk. Voorstanders vir die instelling van billike gebruik het nog geen regverdiging verskaf waarom Suid-Afrika dit só moet gedra oor sy internasionale verpligtinge nie.

Abstract

Die Suid-Afrikaanse regsberoep is tradisioneel opgedeel in twee verskillende takke van die praktyk, naamlik die van prokureurs en van advokate. Elk van hierdie takke fokus op spesifieke praktykareas en benodig unieke vaardighede om die spesifieke deel van die regsberoep suksesvol te kan navigeer. Tog het ’n derde tak van die regsberoep ontstaan uit die behoeftes van moderne kliënte, waarin regspraktisyns in diens geneem word om binne hul kliënte se organisasiestrukture hul eie regsrolle te vervul en regsdienste te lewer. Sulke interne rolle kan vervul word deur regspraktisyns wat nie praktiserend is nie, maar tog ’n mate van regsdienste lewer vir ’n werkgewerskliënt (salaris-regspraktisyns). Die interne rol kan ook vervul word deur individue wat ’n regsgraad het, maar nie toegelaat of geregistreer is as ’n prokureur of advokaat nie, maar wat nogtans in diens geneem is deur ’n werkgewerskliënt om regsdienste te lewer (ongereguleerde salaris-regspraktisyns).

Voor die inwerkingtreding van die Wet op die Regspraktyk 28 van 2014 was die posisie van die derde tak van die regsberoep grotendeels ongereguleerd. Hierdie posisie het verander deurdat die Wet op die Regspraktyk, met die bekendstelling van deel 7 van die gedragskode, die eerste stap geneem het om die regspraktisyns in diens van hul werkgewerskliënte te erken en in beperkte mate te reguleer. Desondanks kan die interne rol uiteraard die professionele onafhanklikheid van die salaris-regspraktisyns en die ongereguleerde salaris-regspraktisyns in gevaar stel.

In hierdie artikel word die verskille en ooreenkomste ondersoek van die regsdienste wat deur al drie die takke van die regsberoep verrig word om vas te stel of die professionele onafhanklikheid van sulke interne rolle binne die derde tak van die regsberoep nadelig kan wees en wat daaraan gedoen kan word. Sodoende word die huidige wetgewende landskap van die Wet op die Regspraktyk ondersoek en tekortkominge uitgelig in verband met die regulering van die derde tak van die regsberoep. Die gevolgtrekking word bereik dat geen gedeelte van die regsberoep aan private organisasies oorgelaat behoort te word om te reguleer soos tans die geval is met die derde tak van die regsberoep nie. Die versuim om alle takke van die regsberoep volledig te reguleer, kan die reputasie en openbare persepsie van die regsberoep nadelig beïnvloed omdat die regsberoep dan slegs gedeeltelik gereguleer word.

Abstract

None.

Abstract

In hierdie artikel toon die outeur dat vir doeleindes van belastingadministrasie onder die Wet op Belastingadministrasie 28 van 2011, ’n belastingbetaler, afhangende van die besondere omstandighede, aanspraak kan maak op die gemeenregtelike voordele wat verband hou met die vertrouensverhouding tussen ’n kliënt en sy/haar regsverteenwoordiger. Verder toon die toepassing van die reëls van uitleg dat, in die Wet op Belastingadministrasie, die wetgewer by implikasie die konsep “regsprofessionele privilegie” breër geformuleer het as in die gemenereg. Daarom, in hierdie konteks, is die konsep nie beperk tot lede van die regsgemeenskap wie se beroep gewoonlik betrokke is by die regspraktyk en gee van regsadvies nie. Ingevolge die Wet op Belastingadministrasie is hierdie voorreg van toepassing op alle vertroulike kommunikasie tussen ’n belastingpligtige en ’n adviseur of diensverskaffer wat in ’n professionele hoedanigheid optree wat wettiglik belastingadvies of ander regsdienste lewer wat deur die Wet op Belastingadministrasie in die vooruitsig gestel word, ongeag of sodanige derde party ’n prokureur, rekenmeester of ander professionele persoon is.

Artikel 42A(1) van die Wet op Belastingadministrasie 28 van 2011 bepaal dat enige “persoon” protes tydens ’n navraag ingevolge artikel 52 mag aanteken en tydens ’n soek- en beslagleggingsoperasie wat deur artikel 61 in die vooruitsig gestel word eweneens daarteen kan protesteer. Die voorreg, wat bestaan uit regsprofessionele privilegie en litigasievoorreg, is daarop gemik om die privaatheid van belastingpligtige inligting vervat in enige vertroulike kommunikasie te beskerm en te bewaar. Aangesien hierdie bepalings geen gewag maak oor die omvang en reikwydte van regslui se voorreg in hierdie verband nie, interpreteer die outeur in hierdie artikel die formulering in die wetsartikels ooreenkomstig die gevestigde uitlegreëls. Deur ’n tekstuele modusinterpretasie te gebruik, toon die outeur dat artikels 42A en 64 nie die reg op bevoorregting skep nie. Dit erken eerder ’n voorafbestaande substantiewe reg om openbaarmaking van inligting wat uit die gemenereg afgelei word, te weier. Hierdie gemeenregtelike norm is, soos vereis deur artikel 39(3) van die Grondwet van die Republiek van Suid- Afrika, 1996 in ooreenstemming met die handves van regte wat in hoofstuk 2 daarvan verskans is. Die aanvaarding van ’n doelmatige uitlegnorm toon dat ’n belastingpligtige geregtig is op die voordele wat voortspruit uit regslui se privilegie. Dit is die geval nie slegs in die eng omskrewe omstandighede genoem in artikel 42A(1) van die Wet op Belastingadministrasie nie, maar ook tydens enige ander inligtingsindeksionele proses wat deur hierdie wet gereguleer word (soos tydens ’n oudit, inspeksie, strafregtelike ondersoek en tydens ’n appèl in die belastingraad en belastinghof).

Deur kontekstuele en waardegebaseerde uitlegmetodes te gebruik, voer die outeur in hierdie artikel aan dat die wetgewer by die nodige implikasie die begrip van regslui se privilegie in artikel 42A met artikel 64 van die Belastingadministrasiewet ruimer as by die gemenereg gemaak het. Gevolglik word beweer dat, vir doeleindes van hierdie statuut, regslui se voorreg nie net geëis kan word om vertroulike kommunikasie tussen ’n belastingpligtige, as kliënt, en ’n gekwalifiseerde “regspraktisyn” (naamlik ’n prokureur of advokaat) behoorlik toegelaat en ingeskryf ingevolge die Wet op Regspraktyk 28 van 2014 nie, maar ook om ’n skild te verskaf met betrekking tot vertroulike kommunikasie tussen ’n belastingpligtige en enige rekenmeester, geoktrooieerde rekenmeester, ouditeur, belastingkonsultant en ander persoon wat in ’n professionele hoedanigheid optree as ’n geregistreerde belastingpraktisyn wat voldoen aan artikel 240(1)(i) en (ii) van die Wet op Belastingadministrasie wat advies verskaf oor enige aangeleentheid wat deur artikel 240(1)(a) daarvan gedek word.

Abstract

This overview covers the following:

1. Equality
2. Dignity
3. Personal freedom and security
4. Freedom of expression
5. Freedom of association
6. Political rights
7. Citizenship
8. Labour relations
9. Property
10. Social security
11. Children’s rights
12. Education
13. Access to courts
14. General provisions regarding the bill of rights

Abstract

Breach of promise by a betrothed is not met with the same sanctions as breach of contract. The disappointed previously engaged party cannot approach the court for an order against the other party for specific performance. The erstwhile future spouse cannot be compelled to enter into the envisaged marriage relationship notwithstanding the doubt that surfaced about the everlasting joyous nature of this union. For the same reason, no claim for positive interest as damages will be honoured by a court. The deserted betrothed cannot claim half of the estate of the other party because she was under the impression that the marriage would have been in community of property. The unavailability of these categories of remedies indicates that the foundation of an engagement agreement should not be seen as a contract between the parties to enter into a legal relationship which will entitle them to reciprocal claims for performance. It must rather be classified as a factual relationship between two parties that is recognised in law and therefore carries consequences. A betrothed cannot simultaneously be engaged to more than one prospective future spouse in a legal system that only recognises a monogamous marriage.

The unsavoury conduct of the guilty party who breached the promise to marry on the proverbial steps of the church, is, however, often the cause of damage and hardship for the innocent party and may also cause prejudice to her family when they have indebted themselves for the prospective marriage. The disappointed previous fiancée may have incurred significant costs for the bridal lay-out, the wedding feast and the intended honeymoon, but it may also include the loss of a previous job opportunity or the burdening of the claimant with the cost of a new dwelling that would not otherwise have been encountered.

Common law recognised the need to reimburse the innocent party for such losses and also for the personal injury suffered if the breach occurred shortly before the marriage was supposed to be concluded or the conduct of the guilty party was especially harsh and impolite. Harbouring bad manners comes at a cost.

In this contribution the historical development of the applicable claims is discussed by way of comparison with other legal systems in order to define the underlying foundation of the claims as recognised in South African law. In principle, claims founded on the actio legis Aquiliae as well as the actio iniuriarum should be available, provided the various requirements for the remedy can be met.

It is questioned whether there is any truth in the premise that the continued recognition of such a delictual claim will endanger the value of marriage as a binding institution in modern society and that this excuse justifies the demise of the sanctions against such a delict in some modern societies. The well-known proverb ubi ius ibi remedium also indicates that as long as the delictual conduct of the unreliable suitor is recognised as unacceptable conduct, private law should provide a suitable remedy to the injured subject. It is presumed that parties who decided mutually to become betrothed represent to each other and to third parties that they intend to enter into marriage as a lifelong relationship and that all concerned may act according to this representation of their mutual intent. Should any of the parties experience a serious change of heart and repudiate the agreement, the other may claim for any damage suffered as a result of the breach with the actio legis Aquiliae. In addition, the contumely conduct entitles the aggrieved party to claim solatium for the injury to her personality rights. Although the claims founded in the breach of promise are often referred to as contractual claims, the case law displays many examples where the claimant for the wasted damages caused by the delictual behaviour happened to be the parents or guardian of the party left in the lurch, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant did not enter into a contract with them as the future in-laws. This points to the fact that the remedy is a delictual and not a contractual remedy and founded in the breach of trust.

Abstract

Café Chameleon se Guardrisk polis het besigheidsverlies gedek as dit die gevolg is van ’n aanmeldbare siekte wat voorgekom het binne ’n radius van 50 kilometer vanaf sy restourant in Kaapstad. So ’n siekte, Covid-19, het voorgeval. ’n Epidemie het ontwikkel en die regering het ’n staat van algemene inperking afgekondig. Ten gevolge van die inperking het Café Chameleon wesenlike dog ongekwantifiseerde besigheidsverliese gely.

’n Verklarende bevel is ten gunste van Café Chameleon in die Kaap uitgereik. Guardrisk Insurance het appelleer maar die hoogste hof van appèl het die appèl eenparig van die hand gewys. Die hof het die kontraktuele risikobepalings aan die hand van die sogenaamde objektiewe benadering uitgelê en bevind dat die gebeurtenis waarteen verseker is, verlies as gevolg van ’n inperking insluit. Ingevolge die tans geldende objektiewe benadering word daar nie gepoog om die kontraktante se werklike bedoeling vas te stel nie. Die vraag is bloot hoe ’n redelike man in die skoene van die kontraktante hul woorde en gedrag sou verstaan het. Volgens sommige beslissings gaan dit wel nog om ’n konstruktiewe bedoeling. Die aard, ooreenkomste en verskille tussen die objektiewe benadering en die tradisionele subjektiewe benadering word in die bespreking uitgelig. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat die huidige interpretasie benadering eintlik ’n hibriede benadering is. Die objektiewe benadering hang in werklikheid saam met die vertrouensteorie vir kontraktuele aanspreeklikheid en word getemper deur byvoorbeeld die verweer van redelike dwaling. Wat vasstaan, is dat interpretasie ’n fyn kuns is en dat selfs die meer objektiewe benadering nie noodwendig feilloos is nie. Trouens, die hof se uitleg van die versekerde gebeurtenis aan die hand van die objektiewe benadering word bevraagteken.

’n Alternatiewe voorstel is dat die voorkoms van Covid-19 binne ’n sekere radius van die versekerde se besigheid aanvaar word as die versekerde gebeurtenis omdat so ’n uitleg in die algemeen meer betroubare resultate lewer. In die betrokke omstandighede sou dit egter nie ’n verskil aan die uitkoms van die geding gemaak het nie.

Abstract

Personal rights may be transferred by means of cession, and, in such an instance, the cedent (creditor) does not need the debtor’s permission, but once the debtor has been informed, the debt is redeemed only if he performs against the cessionary. If however, someone owes a debt, he (the debtor) can free himself of the obligation only if he redeems the debt, if he is released, or through the running of prescription. But sometimes it might be necessary that a restructuring of someone’s debts takes place or the debtor may want to be replaced with someone else who is willing to take over his obligation. This can be done only with the cooperation and agreement of the creditor. In such a case the debtor delegates his obligation to another person, who then becomes the new debtor of a new debt – the creditor relinquishes his right against the old debtor and accepts the new debtor and the new debt. The old debt no longer exists. It is also possible to rearrange the debt and create a new obligation which extinguishes the old debt – a novation takes place.

This contribution starts with a discussion of these general principles and particularly the role that they (should) play when one is dealing with a secured debt which the debtor wants to delegate or when novation comes into play. This leads into a discussion of Wilke NO v Griekwaland Wes Korporatief Ltd (1327/2019) 2020 ZASCA 182 (23 Dec 2020) and the judgments in the earlier courts in which the supreme court of appeal and the other courts did not consider the implications of delegation and novation on an underlying debt when that debt was secured. Delegation and novation extinguish the underlying debt and any security right fortifying that debt is thereby also extinguished because of the principle of accessority. If the creditor requires the new debt to be secured, a new security right needs to be established by meeting all the requirements for the establishment of such security whether it is a right of suretyship or a real security right. A creditor must carefully consider agreeing to a delegation or novation of a secured debt since the implication is that he loses his secured and preferential position, and, even with the creation of a new security right, he loses the ranking he initially held in the line of secured creditors when a right of mortgage, for example, is at stake – qui prior est tempore potior est iure (D 20 4 11pr).

Abstract

In Beadica 231 CC v Trustees, Oregon Trust het die konstitusionele hof bevestig dat die handves van regte indirek toegepas moet word op kontraktuele bepalings en die uitvoering daarvan. Volgens die hof is begrippe soos redelikheid, billikheid, goeie trou en grondwetlike waardes nie regsbegrippe nie maar abstrakte waardes wat gebruik word om die regsreël toe te pas dat kontrakte nie teen die openbare beleid mag wees nie. Daarmee wou die hof meningsverskille in die regspraak en -literatuur uit die weg ruim. Dit is onwaarskynlik dat die hof daarin geslaag het. Die werklike meningsverskille gaan oor hoeveel gewig in besondere gevalle geheg moet word aan kontrakteervryheid aan die een kant, en die handvesregte wat deur kontrakte en hulle uitvoer beperk word aan die ander kant. Deur bevindings in uitsprake sorgvuldig te motiveer met verwysing na die faktore in artikel 36(1) van die grondwet sal die standpunte duideliker gestel word en meer sinvolle debatte daaroor gevoer kan word. Dit verg ’n direkte toepassing van die handves van regte.

In AB v Pridwin Preparatory School het die konstitusionele hof beslis dat wanneer die ongeldigheid van optrede ingevolge ’n kontraktuele bepaling op die openbare-beleid-reël gebaseer word, die handves indirek daarop toegepas moet word, terwyl gevalle waarin die applikante hulle saak slegs op die skending van handvesregte baseer, nie-kontraktuele geskille is waarop die handves direk toegepas moet word. Die skending van handvesregte vind egter nooit in ’n lugleegte plaas nie, maar altyd binne die raamwerk van die een of ander regsterrein, in hierdie geval die kontraktereg, en die uitwerking van die uitoefening van die grondwetlike reg op kontrakteervryheid op ander handvesregte moet vasgestel word ongeag of indirekte of direkte toepassing van die handves plaasvind. Daar bestaan nie so iets soos gewone kontraktereg en daarnaas grondwetlike kontraktereg nie. Die hof se direkte toepassing het in elk geval op indirekte toepassing neergekom want die algemene beperkingsbepaling is nie toegepas nie. Die hof se uitleg van “in terms of law” in artikel 36(1), naamlik dat dit slegs geld vir beperkings “in” regsreëls, is die enigste rede wat die hof sedert 1995 aangevoer het waarom die hof die handves nie direk op kontraktuele bepalings en hulle uitvoering toepas nie. Die uitdrukking sluit geen beperking uit nie, maar verorden die formele legaliteitsbeginsel dat alle beperkings uitdruklik of stilswyend deur regsreëls gemagtig moet word. Die hof se benadering veroorsaak verwarring en onsekerheid soos duidelik blyk uit onder andere die verskillende uitsprake in Dladla v City of Johannesburg (2018 2 BCLR 119 (KH), 2018 2 SA 327 (KH)).