Regspraak: A cautionary tale of litigation, liability and ethical responsibilities in the legal profession

by | Oct 23, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2022 I4

Regspraak: A cautionary tale of litigation, liability and ethical responsibilities in the legal profession

Author: M Van Eck

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 4, 2022, p. 798-808
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2022/i4a10

Abstract

 Die regsberoep word deur etiese en professionele beginsels onderlê. Een van die beginsels wat in hierdie bespreking uitgelig word, is die van handhawing en beskerming van die publiek se persepsie van die regsberoep, onder andere om ’n goeie en eerbare beroep te wees. Dit kan negatief beïnvloed word indien litigasie tussen regspraktisyns as ’n vorm van binnegevegte beskou word en kan moontlik ’n interne krisis binne die professie skep. Alhoewel Solomon v Junkeeparsad (2022 3 SA 526 (GJ)) maar een voorbeeld van litigasie tussen regspraktisyns is, beklemtoon die saak, hoewel indirek, die konseptuele vraag of litigasie tussen regspraktisyns as ’n vorm van binnegevegte beskou kan word. Dit sal skadelik wees vir die persepsie van die regsprofessie indien sodanige litigasie ’n nuwe norm geword het en nou aanvaarbaar is binne die ontwikkelende professie in die moderne samelewing. In die aanspreek van hierdie vraag hou die outeur rekening met die feit dat in Suid-Afrika, soos in Australië en ander regsbestelle gebaseer op die Engelse “common law”, sprake is van onderskeidelike professies van die balie en die sybalie. Dié geskeie balies beïnvloed moontlik die regsverhouding tussen kliënte, prokureurs en advokate. Dit bepaal ook die bron van aanspreeklikheid vir die betaling van ’n advokaat se fooi. Alhoewel die bron van ’n prokureur se aanspreeklikheid in die verlede oor die algemeen as kontraktueel beskou is (in beide die Suid-Afrikaanse en die Australiese regspraktyk), rus ’n verpligting op prokureurs in Suid-Afrika om ’n advokaat se fooi te betaal wat nou weerspieël word in die gedragskode (soos vasgestel ingevolge artikel 35 van die Regspraktykwet 28 van 2014). ’n Prokureur het sowel ’n professionele as etiese plig om die verskuldigde betaling van derde partye se fooie (insluitend die van advokate) onverwyld te maak. ’n Versuim om hierdie plig stiptelik na te kom, reflekteer op swak bestuur van die prokureur se regspraktyk. Alhoewel ’n advokaat wel ’n reg het om regstappe in te stel teen iedere prestasieskuldenaar ook waar professionele fooie uitstaande is, rus daar ’n kollektiewe en etiese verantwoordelikheid op die lede van die regsprofessie om die beeld en reputasie van die professie te beskerm. Met hierdie aantekening dui die outeur daarop dat dit dalk tyd is om alternatiewe geskilbeslegtingsprosesse te vind om dispute tussen regspraktisyns, as lede van die regsberoep, aan te spreek.

Regspraak: Regsontdaning kragtens ’n akte van dading, soos ’n huweliksvoorwaardekontrak, beliggaam ’n ooreenkoms gebaseer op wilsooreenstemming en dít word beheers deur die beginsel pacta sunt servanda – mits die afstanddoener dan handelingsbevoeg is

by | Oct 23, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2022 I4

Regspraak: Regsontdaning kragtens ’n akte van dading, soos ’n huweliksvoorwaardekontrak, beliggaam ’n ooreenkoms gebaseer op wilsooreenstemming en dít word beheers deur die beginsel pacta sunt servanda – mits die afstanddoener dan handelingsbevoeg is

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 4, 2022, p. 809-828
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2022/i4a11

Abstract

 “At the dissolution of a marriage subject to the accrual system, … the spouse whose estate shows no accrual or a smaller accrual than the estate of the other spouse, … acquires a claim against the other spouse or his estate for an amount equal to half of the difference between the accrual of the respective estates of the spouses” (s 3(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 – emphasis added). This indicates that, but for explicit exceptions, before the dissolution of the marriage no patrimonial right regarding accrual sharing vests. The vesting of the patrimonial right follows by operation of law and does not depend on the subjective animus accipiendi of the benefitting spouse. For that reason the act provides that the same applies even where the benefitting spouse’s demise caused the dissolution of the marriage – dead people cannot form an intention to accept to which a court should adhere. In the JAN matter the wife in 2019 desperately wanted a speedy divorce and on numerous occasions explicitly declared that she wanted nothing out of the marriage and accordingly stated in the deed of settlement, after consultation with the applicable divorce attorney who explained that her marriage was governed by accrual sharing, that she would waive her claim to accrual sharing. The matrimonial property regime in the marriage that had broken down irretrievably was governed by a valid ante-nuptial contract that provided for accrual sharing to which the parties agreed after consultation with the notary before their marriage 23 years earlier. Three years after the divorce she approached the court in the current matter for the rescission of the divorce order in so far as it incorporated the deed of settlement in the court order. The court correctly held that no justification existed for such a rescission. Pacta sunt servanda governs not only the ante-nuptial contract but also the deed of settlement, especially since both documents resulted from consensus reached between the spouses after receiving guidance and advice from independent attorneys and notaries. The deed of settlement is also the subject of the order of the high court – leaving little room to claim that the alleged agreement was only the result of an unintended misrepresentation. In a society governed by the rule of law, all legal subjects should adhere to the binding principle that an agreement reached may not lightly be negated just because one of the parties in hindsight is no longer satisfied with the outcome of the agreement he/she misrepresented to the other party to agree to. These agreements cannot be interpreted similar to a tombola ticket at a church fete or some insurance cover where every participant always gets something out. The court correctly held that the “inherent jurisdiction of the High Court does not include the right to tamper with the principle of finality of judgments” (par 22). “There are two basic requirements to be met when a court considers a request to grant a judgment in accordance with the terms of a settlement agreement. The first, relevant for present purposes, is that the court must be satisfied that the parties to the agreement have freely and voluntarily concluded the agreement and that they are ad idem as to its terms. Once a court has made a consent judgment, it is functus officio and the matter becomes res judicata” (par 23). The same requirements apply to the ante-nuptial agreement. It is submitted that the addition by the applicant of her signature to the deed of settlement to which she agreed three months before the divorce order in the presence of the attorney, could not have had the legal effect of an immediate waiver of the patrimonial right because at that stage no patrimonial right to accrual sharing had yet vested in her estate. It would only vest if applicable, that is, if at the dissolution  of the marriage her estate shows the smaller accrual. Had her estate become insolvent after signing the deed of settlement but before the granting of the divorce order, the right to share in the accrual would be an asset in her estate after vesting at the dissolution of the marriage and it would be to the benefit of her creditors notwithstanding the previously signed deed of settlement. It is only during the subsistence of the marriage that the potential right/spes to accrual sharing is not transferable or liable to attachment, and it does not form part of the insolvent estate of a spouse (s 3(2) of Act 88 of 1984). The deed of settlement at most indicated her intention, unless retracted before the court order, to then waive her claim and the intention of her erstwhile husband to accept the benefit that her act of waiver offers him. As such it was conditional that at dissolution of the marriage the entitled party still has the power and intention to legally waive the acquired right. In this case nothing hampered with the condition and the court order finalised the matter. It may be that the resulting benefit for the husband carry some tax consequences since as erstwhile debtor he is acquitted of his debt and released of accrual sharing. This aspect was not considered.

Regspraak: The unilateral termination by a bank of the bank–client agreement between it and its client

by | Oct 22, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2022 I4

Regspraak: The unilateral termination by a bank of the bank–client agreement between it and its client

Authors: WG Schulze and SIEG Eiselen

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of South Africa
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 4, 2022, p. 828-838
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2022/i4a12

Abstract

Die reg van ’n bank om die bank-kliënt ooreenkoms eensydig te beëindig, is tans een van die brandpunte in die Suid-Afrikaanse bankreg. Die vernaamste gesag in hierdie verband is die beslissing in Bredenkamp v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd (2010 4 SA 468 (HHA)). In ’n onlangse beslissing van die Wes-Kaapse hooggeregshof in Survé v Nedbank Limited ((698/2022) 2022 ZAWCHC 19 (14 Febr 2022)), het die hof in ’n aantal obiter-opmerkings moontlik onsekerheid gesaai oor die algemene geldigheid van die beginsels soos uiteengesit in die Bredenkamp-saak. Hierdie bespreking ondersoek die geldigheid van hierdie obiter-opmerkings. In die loop van die bespreking word eerstens die algemene beginsels van die kontraktereg ten opsigte van die beëindiging van langtermynkontrakte bespreek. Daar word verduidelik dat ’n party ’n langtermynkontrak op drie moontlike wyses kan beëindig, naamlik (a) ooreenkomstig die bepalings van die kontrak, (b) op grond van wesenlike kontrakbreuk, en (c) laastens, by gebrek aan ’n kontraktuele bepaling, met redelike kennisgewing. Dit is slegs by hoogste uitsondering dat ’n kontrak geag sal word om vir ewig voort te duur. Daarna volg ’n bespreking van die toepassing van hierdie beginsels in die sfeer van die bankreg. ’n Aantal toonaangewende Suid-Afrikaanse beslissings word krities ondersoek ten einde die korrektheid van die obiter-opmerkings in die Survé-saak te beoordeel. Daar word in diepte ingegaan op die Bredenkamp-saak asook die beslissing in Barkhuizen v Napier (2007 5 SA 323 (KH)). Daarin het die  howe bevestig dat redelikheid of billikheid nie losstaande vereistes van die kontraktereg is nie, maar dat dit slegs as aspekte van openbare belang in ag geneem moet word. Daar word ook verwys na die bepalings van die Suid-Afrikaanse Gedragskode vir Banke wat uitdruklik vereis dat ’n bank redelike kennis moet gee van die beëindiging van die bank-kliënt ooreenkoms. Die hof het in die Bredenkamp-saak bevestig dat redelike kennis in alle gevalle vereis word waar kontrakbreuk nie ter sprake is nie. Daar word ook regsvergelykend gekyk na die posisie in die Duitse reg. Uit die regsvergelykende ondersoek is dit duidelik dat die beginsels wat in die Duitse en Europese reg toegepas word in ooreenstemming is met die benadering van die hof in die Bredenkamp-saak. Laastens word aangetoon dat die opmerkings in die Survé-saak ongegronde twyfel op die Bredenkamp-saak werp omdat daar te veel klem gelê is op die kwessie van redelikheid en billikheid.

Boekbespreking: JC Sonnekus and EC Schlemmer: Principles of Rights of Real and Personal Security in South African Law

by | Oct 22, 2022 | TSAR, TSAR 2022 I4

Boekbespreking: JC Sonnekus and EC Schlemmer: Principles of Rights of Real and Personal Security in South African Law

Author: J Scott

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of South Africa
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 4, 2022, p. 839-846
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2022/i4a13

Abstract

None

The Black Flame (part three): Snyman’s Criminal Law

by | Oct 9, 2022 | SACJ, SACJ V35 I1 2022

The Black Flame (part three): Snyman’s Criminal Law

Author: Tshepo Bogosi Mosaka

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: LLB (Wits) LLM (UCT) PhD (Nottingham), Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 35 Issue 1, p. 1 – 18
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v35/i1a1

Abstract

Part three of this trilogy of papers (entitled after WEB du Bois’s trilogy of novels titled the Black Flame) concludes an extraordinarily prolonged attempt to open a dialogue with the esteemed author and revisor of Snyman’s Criminal Law. The core message of this trilogy is that a small window into a vibrant indigenous criminal law scholarship that is not perpetually northbound-gazing towards Europe has been opened by the latest edition of Snyman’s Criminal Law. The first two parts of this trilogy revealed some of the areas in which the next edition, and South African criminal law scholarship in general, can proceed further into this decolonial direction. This third paper builds on the first two, which focused mainly on the introductory and historical aspects (part one), and the General Part (part two) respectively, by focusing on the Special Part of South African criminal law. In particular, this paper makes decolonial interventions in three areas in which it is argued that the next edition of the book can improve: (i) the taxonomic arrangement of offences; (ii) the total exclusion of African customary law offences from the discussion; and (iii) the complex crime of corruption.

The importance of explicit reasons when overturning a conviction: Non-compliance with the competency test or the requirement to admonish complainants

by | Oct 9, 2022 | SACJ, SACJ V35 I1 2022

The importance of explicit reasons when overturning a conviction: Non-compliance with the competency test or the requirement to admonish complainants

Author: Nondumiso Phenyane

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: B Soc Sci LLB LLM (UCT), Lecturer, Departments of Public and Mercantile Law, Stellenbosch University
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 35 Issue 1, p. 19 – 33
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v35/i1a2

Abstract

There are numerous cases in which magistrates failed to properly administer the competency test or to admonish complainants in terms of s 164(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. In many of these cases, the magistrates nonetheless found the accused guilty based on the inadmissible evidence of the complainants. On review or appeal, however, the higher courts set the decisions of the magistrates aside because the magistrates’ decisions were based on the unreliable evidence of the complainants. While the rulings of the higher courts were legally sound, if not explained explicitly and thoroughly, they may appear unjust, clinical, harsh, inconsiderate, or even nonsensical. Such matters involve the fundamental rights of complainants and accused persons. They also result in severe consequences for complainants and accused persons, and they involve vulnerable groups such as children and mentally-ill individuals. It is therefore important that the higher courts reviewing the procedural errors of magistrates provide explicit and thorough explanations for their findings. To avoid perceptions that the decisions of the higher courts are unjust, the rulings of the courts should expressly acknowledge and address the unfortunate consequences suffered by both complainants and accused persons when a magistrate’s conviction is unsustainable because it was based on evidence that was not properly admitted. Acknowledging and addressing the injustices may help courts provide reasons for their decisions that go beyond merely stating that the complainants’ evidence is excluded because it is unreliable. Explicit reasons in such instances would go a long way in engendering and maintaining public confidence in the judicial system and enhancing public scrutiny of the current legal position.

Damages for injuries arising from unlawful shooting by police and other security agents: South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland/Eswatini (1)

by | Oct 9, 2022 | SACJ, SACJ V35 I1 2022

Damages for injuries arising from unlawful shooting by police and other security agents: South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland/Eswatini (1)

Author: Chuks Okpaluba

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: LLB, LLM (London), PhD (West Indies), Research Fellow, Centre for Human Rights, University of the Free State
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 35 Issue 1, p. 34 – 57
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v35/i1a3

Abstract

The fact that the police and other security officers are authorised to carry firearms in the performance of their duties does not mean that they can lawfully use them at their whim or caprice. This is especially so if it be said that the objects of the police service are, inter alia, to protect the safety of its members and safeguard the public from harm. Although the primary duty of the police officer is to arrest and bring suspects to justice, however, the question of the wrongful use of their official firearms often comes up for determination. For instance, it is the law that the police can use reasonable force to arrest a suspect who resists arrest or who is violent. The question whether the force used was excessive in the circumstances a police officer finds him/herself is determinative as to whether the state will be held liable for the force used. In determining liability as well as the quantum of damages in these circumstances, one finds that all police shooting cases are not always connected with arrests. Sometimes a police officer shoots at a so-called suspect for no apparent reason, and even where the officer suspects that an offence has been committed, such suspicion may not be reasonable, or sufficient to justify the shooting. This enquiry examines the quantum of damages that have been awarded in South Africa in comparative perspective with the experiences of Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland/Eswatini in instances of unlawful shooting by police officers and further comparative awards made in respect of shootings by other security personnel. It is clear from this study that, owing essentially to the seriousness of the bodily injuries resulting from such shootings, the courts tend to make heavier awards in the circumstances of such shootings than in the normal or straight-forward wrongful arrest and detention cases.