The Right to Deletion: Identity, Memory, and Surveillance Capitalism

by | Oct 26, 2022 | SLR, SLR V33 I3

The Right to Deletion: Identity, Memory, and Surveillance Capitalism

Author: Yvonne Jooste

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM LLD, Research Associate, Department of Jurisprudence, University of Pretoria
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 33 Issue 3, 2022, p. 460 – 483
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2022/i3a6

Abstract

This article considers “the right to deletion” enacted under the Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 and uses the right as a lens through which to contemplate (1) memory, identity, and forgetting in the digital age; (2) the erosion of the privacies of life and the notion of “home” in the context of ubiquitous technologies; and (3) a new form of instrumentarian power created by surveillance capitalist regimes that aims to make individuals into known and knowable entities for economic ends as well as the implications of this form of power for the values of dignity, democracy and privacy. It is suggested that the reclaiming of forgetting is necessary for human growth and agency and that the reclaiming of “home” is required as a shelter for the privacies of life, intimacy, and freedom. The argument is also made that the right to deletion should be understood within the context of the increasing loss of privacy within societies under techno-capitalist control.

Local Government and the Conundrum of Constitutional Competencies in South Africa: the Tussle Between City of Tshwane Municipality and the Gauteng Health Department Over Ambulance Services

by | Oct 26, 2022 | SLR, SLR V33 I3

Local Government and the Conundrum of Constitutional Competencies in South Africa: the Tussle Between City of Tshwane Municipality and the Gauteng Health Department Over Ambulance Services

Author: Oliver Fuo

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM LLD, Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, North-West University, South Africa
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 33 Issue 3, 2022, p. 484 – 500
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2022/i3a7

Abstract

Local government’s autonomy in post-apartheid South Africa is constitutionally guaranteed. A reading of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 shows that local government, made up of 257 municipalities, has a wide range of powers and functions. However, confusion over the scope of constitutional distribution of powers and functions vis-à-vis other spheres of government often constrains the ability of municipalities to take action over a function not expressly assigned to local government in Schedules 4B and 5B of the Constitution. The squabbles between the City of Tshwane and the Gauteng Health Department over the power to provide ambulance services in March 2021 show how some municipalities may be hamstrung from taking action that seeks to operationalise and deliver a function that is not expressly conferred on local government in terms of Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. This article discusses why and how municipalities with the requisite capacity should be able to provide ambulance services, although this is listed in Schedule 5A of the Constitution as a functional area of exclusive provincial legislative competence. I argue that three features in the Constitution give the power to provide ambulance services to municipalities that have the requisite capacity: the framing of health rights and concomitant obligations; the incidental powers of municipalities; and the principle of allocative subsidiarity. It is argued that, given the mandatory wording of the principle of allocative subsidiarity in sections 156(4) of the Constitution and 32(2) of the National Health Act 61 of 2003, where a provincial health department is averse to assigning the provision of ambulance services to a municipality that has the requisite capacity, such a municipality can approach the High Court for an order compelling the department to assign this function.

King Nno V De Jager 2021 4 SA 1 (CC): Three Perspectives

by | Oct 26, 2022 | SLR, SLR V33 I3

King Nno V De Jager 2021 4 SA 1 (CC): Three Perspectives

Authors: François du Toit, Matthew Harding and Andreas Humm

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA (Law) LLB LLM LLD, Senior Professor, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape; BA (Hons) LLB (Hons) BCL DPhil, Dean, Melbourne Law School, University of Melbourne; Dr iur Mag iur, Former Research Associate, Max Planck Institute for Comparative and International, Private Law, Hamburg
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 33 Issue 3, 2022, p. 501 – 528
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2022/i3a8

Abstract

In the King case, the South African Constitutional Court adjudicated on a gender-based disinheritance under a testamentary fideicommissum. The court, in three judgments, found that the disinheritance violated public policy and was, moreover, unconstitutional and thus invalid. King was the Constitutional Court’s first pronouncement on a gender-based disinheritance in a purely private bequest. It therefore stands in contrast to earlier High Court and Supreme Court of Appeal judgments regarding the exclusion of potential beneficiaries under testamentary charitable bequests. This contribution provides three perspectives by commentators from three jurisdictions on the Constitutional Court’s judgment in King. The first perspective argues against an objection that can be raised against a judgment such as King, namely that it constitutes an unjustified judicial violation of personal autonomy, freedom of disposition and private property in the law of gifts and trusts. The first perspective posits that discriminatory goals such as those pursued through explicit gender-exclusive disinheritances are inherently worthless and the judicial invalidation of such disinheritances therefore have a negligible impact on personal autonomy, freedom of disposition and private property. The second perspective cautions against the Constitutional Court’s express rejection of the public/private divide in the law of gifts and trusts. It argues that the divide plays an important role in striking a balance between personal autonomy, freedom of disposition and private property on the one hand, and policy as well as constitutional imperatives regarding equality and non-discrimination on the other hand. The second perspective thus advocates that the public/private divide must be retained in the law of gifts and trusts. The third perspective evaluates the King case from a German viewpoint and argues that the Constitutional Court’s reasoning in this case undervalued freedom of testation. The third perspective advances a solution that strives to balance the arguments that underpin the first and second perspectives.

Blood is Thicker Than Water, but is it Thicker Than Ink? An Analysis of Parenthood and Sperm Donor Agreements in the Wake of QG V CS (32200/2020) 2021 ZAGPPHC 366 (17 June 2021)

Blood is Thicker Than Water, but is it Thicker Than Ink? An Analysis of Parenthood and Sperm Donor Agreements in the Wake of QG V CS (32200/2020) 2021 ZAGPPHC 366 (17 June 2021)

by | Oct 26, 2022 | SLR, SLR V33 I3

Blood is Thicker Than Water, but is it Thicker Than Ink? An Analysis of Parenthood and Sperm Donor Agreements in the Wake of QG V CS (32200/2020) 2021 ZAGPPHC 366 (17 June 2021)

Authors: Bonginkosi Shozi, Roasia Hazarilall and Donrich Thaldar

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM PhD, Postdoctoral Scholar, Institute for Practical Ethics, UC San Diego, Honorary Research Fellow, University of KwaZulu-Natal; LLB, Masters candidate, University of KwaZulu-Natal; BLC LLB MPPS PGDip PhD, Professor, University of KwaZulu-Natal
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 33 Issue 3, 2022, p. 529 – 547
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2022/i3a9

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Shozi, B, Hazarilall, R and Thaldar, D
Blood is Thicker Than Water, but is it Thicker Than Ink? An Analysis of Parenthood and Sperm Donor Agreements in the Wake of QG V CS (32200/2020) 2021 ZAGPPHC 366 (17 June 2021)
Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 33 Issue 3, 2022, p. 529 – 547
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2022/i3a9

Abstract

The recent case of QG v CS (32200/2020) 2021 ZAGPPHC 366 (17 June 2021) concerns a sperm donor who applied to the court for parental responsibilities and rights in respect of a child conceived with his sperm. This is despite the fact that he had concluded a written agreement with the child’s legal parents before the child’s conception which stipulated, inter alia, that he would have no such responsibilities and rights in respect of the child. The ruling of the High Court in this case is a significant development in South African reproductive law, as the first case that deals with the legal position of a sperm donor with regard to a donor-conceived child. The following important legal principles that were laid down in the case are identified and analysed. First, there is no prohibition on a sperm donor or his family members from approaching the court in terms of section 23 or 24 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005 to acquire parental responsibilities and rights in respect of the donor-conceived child. However, if a sperm donor or his family members bring an application in terms of section 23 or 24, they cannot rely on their genetic link with the donor-conceived child. Secondly, sperm donor agreements are in principle legal and enforceable, but the court is not bound to enforce provisions dealing with parental responsibilities and rights if it is of the opinion that such provisions are not in the best interests of the child. A sperm donor agreement may, however, be informative regarding the parties’ intentions. Criticism is expressed about the way in which the court dealt with the issues of the locus standi of donors and the psychological evaluation of donors and recepients where known donors are used.

Clarity, consistency, and community convictions: understanding the defence of consent in South African criminal law

by | Oct 26, 2022 | SACJ, SACJ V35 I2 2022

Clarity, consistency, and community convictions: understanding the defence of consent in South African criminal law

Author: Jameelah Omar

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: LLB LLM (Cape Town), Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 35 Issue 2, p. 131 – 155
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v35/i2a1

Abstract

This article will consider the defence of consent and whether its conception has changed over the years through jurisprudence. It will focus on a few areas that have seen developments in relation to the defence, namely, active euthanasia, sadomasochism, and sexual offences.

Comparing sentencing for robbery with Strafzumessung für Raub

by | Oct 26, 2022 | SACJ, SACJ V35 I2 2022

Comparing sentencing for robbery with Strafzumessung für Raub

Author: SS Terblanche

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: BJuris (PU for CHE) LLD (Unisa). Honorary Professor, UKZN.
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 35 Issue 2, p. 156 – 174
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v35/i2a2

Abstract

It is a safe assumption that robbery exists, as a crime, in virtually every legal system. Very broadly spoken, it is a crime that consists of the forceful taking of another person’s property. Robbery is often regarded as one of the more serious crimes that can be committed. Such seriousness is then reflected in the severity of the sentence imposed on the robber. However, not all robberies are equally serious.
What factors determine whether one robbery is more or less serious than another? From a South African perspective, the answer to this question is far from certain. This uncertainty exists even though robbery is prevalent – in other words, there is much potential in South African criminal justice to provide a more certain answer.
This contribution explains how South African courts approach sentencing for robbery. It starts by briefly discussing the definition of robbery and then moves to principles governing sentencing in South Africa in general, and the sentencing of robbery in particular.1 I then briefly discuss the same subject matter in German law. Finally, the contribution analyses the most pressing issues afflicting sentencing in South Africa and, in this process, contrasts the legal principles that are in place in Germany.

Damages for injuries arising from unlawful shooting by police and other security agents: South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland/Eswatini (2)

by | Oct 26, 2022 | SACJ, SACJ V35 I2 2022

Damages for injuries arising from unlawful shooting by police and other security agents: South Africa, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia and Swaziland/Eswatini (2)

Author: Chuks Okpaluba

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: LLB, LLM (London), PhD (West Indies), Research Fellow, Centre for Human Rights, University of the Free State
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 35 Issue 2, p. 175 – 197
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v35/i2a3

Abstract

The discussion of the South African cases involving wrongful police shootings and the damages awarded in that regard formed the subject of the discussion in the first part of this series. That discussion continues in the current part two which winds up with the analysis of the cases from Lesotho and Malawi involving injuries caused by the use of firearms by police officers and other security agents. The deprivation of personal liberties and physical and other injuries caused by police shootings may appear similar to the heads of damages recoverable in these jurisdictions such that guiding principles are uniformly applied. At the end of the day, the amounts finally awarded differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as the courts in the smaller jurisdictions of Southern Africa often emphasise the disparities between their economies and the more developed South African economy such that the amounts finally awarded reflect such socio-economic disparities.

The criminal jurisdiction of the Seychelles Employment Tribunal

by | Oct 26, 2022 | SACJ, SACJ V35 I2 2022

The criminal jurisdiction of the Seychelles Employment Tribunal

Author: Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

ISSN: 1996-2118
Affiliations: LLB (Makerere) LLM (UP) LLM (UFS) LLD (UWC), Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape
Source: South African Journal of Criminal Justice, Volume 35 Issue 2, p. 198 – 221
https://doi.org/10.47348/SACJ/v35/i2a4

Abstract

The Seychellois Employment Tribunal was established under s 73A of the Employment Act (the Act). Section 6(3)(1) of Schedule 6 to the Act provides that ‘the Tribunal shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine employment and labour related matters’. Under the Act, employment and labour matters can be divided into two categories: civil and criminal. Section 76 of the Act provides for employment and labour-related offences. The Tribunal started operation in November 2008. Between 3 December 2008 (when the Tribunal handed down its first decision) and 1 December 2021 (when the research for this article was conducted) the Tribunal received 2,478 civil cases and 172 criminal cases. The author studied the criminal cases/files and on the basis of that study. The aim of the study is to illustrate how the Tribunal has interpreted and/or applied s 76 of the Act when dealing with the following issues: the offences under the Act; the prosecution of the offences under the Act; the right to a fair trial; the burden(s) of proof under s 76 of Act; the prosecution of legal persons/companies before the Tribunal; and penalty and sentencing issues. The author argues, inter alia, that the Tribunal should respect the principle of corporate legal personality when dealing with juristic persons accused of committing offences; the reverse onus under s 76(3) of the Act is not unconstitutional; during sentencing, the Tribunal should clearly distinguish between mitigating factors that are applicable to juristic persons and those applicable to natural persons; and that the Attorney-General does not need the consent of the competent officer before he/she can institute a prosecution before the Tribunal.