The protection of fictional characters with specific reference to the Rapid Phase case

The protection of fictional characters with specific reference to the Rapid Phase case

Authors S Karjiker and L Mc Loud

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Anton Mostert Chair of Intellectual Property Law, Professor in Department of Mercantile Law, Stellenbosch University; LLB student, Stellenbosch University
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 4, 2019, p. 688 – 712

Abstract

Die outeurs bespreek die beskerming van fiktiewe karakters binne die konteks van die Suid-Afrikaanse kopiereg. Die enigste Suid-Afrikaanse saak wat handel oor die beskerming van fiktiewe karakters is Rapid Phase Entertainment CC v SABC. In hierdie saak het die eiser (die skeppers van die strokiesprent “Madam and Eve”) ’n saak vir kopieregskending teen die verweerder, die SAUK, ingestel. Die eiser het beweer dat die verweerder die karakters van sy strokiesprent onregmatig in een van die verweerder se televisie advertensies gebruik het. Hierdie uitspraak het heelwat kritiek ontlok en derhalwe is die Suid-Afrikaanse posisie rakende die beskerming van fiktiewe karakters onseker en onderontwikkeld. In hierdie artikel formuleer die outeurs ’n benadering wat deur die Suid-Afrikaanse howe in die toekoms toegepas kan word wanneer hulle gekonfronteer word met ’n saak wat handel oor die kopieregskending van ’n fiktiewe karakter. Omdat die Suid-Afrikaanse howe tot op datum nog nie die kwessie voldoende aangespreek het nie, is die Amerikaanse reg geraadpleeg om die benadering te formuleer. Die Amerikaanse standpunt was oorspronklik dat fiktiewe karakters nie onafhanklik van die werk waarin hulle oorspronklik voorgekom het, beskerm kon word nie. Hierdie benadering was egter aangepas in Walt Disney Productions v Air Pirates waarin die hof bevind het dat dit wel moontlik is vir ’n fiktiewe karakter om onafhanklik van die oorspronklike werk beskerm te word. Die vraag wat egter ontstaan is: Wanneer word hierdie onafhanklike beskerming deur die karakters geniet? Hierdie vraag vorm die sentrale ondersoek van die artikel.

Hierdie artikel bevat ’n omvattende ontleding van die Rapid Phase-saak. Die outeurs verwys na ’n alternatiewe gevolgtrekking waartoe die hof moontlik kon kom indien dit die korrekte benadering in die konteks van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg toegepas het. Die outeurs stel voor dat hierdie nuut geformuleerde benadering in die toekoms deur die Suid-Afrikaanse howe toegepas word om ’n uitspraak soos dié in die Rapid Phase-saak te vermy en te verseker dat die hof ’n moderne benadering toepas wanneer dit kom by die beskerming van fiktiewe karakters.

Testamentêre trusts en die Nederlandse testamentair bewind – ’n regsvergelykende ondersoek

Testamentêre trusts en die Nederlandse testamentair bewind – ’n regsvergelykende ondersoek

Authors Eben Nel

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Navorsingsgenoot, Nelson Mandela Universiteit, Port Elizabeth.
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 4, 2019, p. 713 – 727

Abstract

The writer investigates, within the historical contexts, the tangent points as well as differences between   the testamentary trust in South Africa and the testamentair bewind in Dutch law; first-mentioned as a common law sui generis figure, operating within a mixed-law jurisdiction, and the other a creation of statute in a civil law environment.

The trust manifests in both a discretionary and bewind fashion and is therefore a versatile and comprehensive testamentary instrument, while the Dutch testamentair bewind serves specific welldefined purposes. The vesting of assets is the core differentiator between the ownership trust and the bewind and allows the testator to dictate the control over the bequest long after his or her demise. At the heart of such control by the testator is the principle of freedom of testation, which has been limited by statutory intervention in many European jurisdictions. The testamentair bewind allows the testator to place the bequest under administrative control and limits the powers and rights of the heir, protecting minors, spendthrifts, persons with limited intellectual capacity, and limited rights over property. The similarities in application between the testamentary trust and the testamentair bewind, and in particular the protective nature thereof, indicate the need for a trust-like figure in the estate and fiduciary environment. It is submitted that the ownership aspect can be accommodated by the Dutch legal system and an introduction of the testamentary trust figure in the Netherlands shall not only enrich the legal dispensation, but also empower both the testator and the fiduciary practitioner. It is submitted that the introduction of an ownership trust figure in the Netherlands shall contribute to the planning, protection, preservation and successful transfer of assets from one generation to the next.

Oudekraal after fifteen years: the second act (or, a reassessment of the status and force of defective administrative decisions pending judicial review)

Oudekraal after fifteen years: the second act (or, a reassessment of the status and force of defective administrative decisions pending judicial review)

Oudekraal after fifteen years: the second act (or, a reassessment of the status and force of defective administrative decisions pending judicial review)

Authors: DM Pretorius

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA (Hons) LLB LLM PhD PGCE, Partner: Bowmans, Johannesburg; Director: St Augustine College of South Africa
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 31 Issue 1, 2020, p. 3 – 36

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Pretorius, DM
Oudekraal after fifteen years: the second act (or, a reassessment of the status and force of defective administrative decisions pending judicial review)
Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 31 Issue 1, 2020, p. 3 – 36

Abstract

This article revisits the decision of the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) in Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) (“Oudekraal”) with reference to subsequent case law in an endeavour to clarify the ramifications of the Oudekraal decision. In particular, this article assesses the status and effect of ostensibly defective administrative action pending the outcome of judicial review proceedings aimed at ascertaining the validity or otherwise of such action. The article explores whether the impact of Oudekraal is that a person affected by administrative action which is prima facie unlawful is nevertheless bound by it unless and until it is declared invalid and set aside on judicial review. It also explores whether organs of state are bound by apparently flawed administrative action and must give effect to it as though it were lawful and valid, unless and until it is formally declared invalid and set aside by a court of law. The conclusion is that Oudekraal confirms that a person may disregard prima facie unlawful administrative action and, if it were to be enforced against him, challenge its validity reactively. However, absent statutory indications to the contrary, the author of seemingly unlawful administrative action may not disregard it despite its apparent legal infirmities. Likewise other organs of state are, unless otherwise authorised by law, generally bound by that defective administrative action unless and until it is set aside on review. The SCA enunciated several discrete principles in Oudekraal but subsequent case law has tended to conflate these principles, with resultant confusion about the import of Oudekraal. This article recommends that the questions posed above should not be answered with reference to elusive general principles sought to be inferred from Oudekraal, but rather with reference to the specific provisions of the relevant legislation.

Does the bill of rights apply extraterritorially for tax administration purposes?

Does the bill of rights apply extraterritorially for tax administration purposes

Author Fareed Moosa

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: University of the Western Cape
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 31 Issue 1, 2020, p. 37 – 54

Abstract

South Africa’s (“SA”) tax laws have extraterritorial effect, particularly considering Parliament’s ratification of the Convention on Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters dated June 2011, as amended, which was gazetted into law with effect from 1 March 2014. As such, SARS is empowered to enforce its tax collection powers under the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 on foreign soil in relation to SA taxpayers located there. This raises the question of whether taxpayers outside SA’s geographical limits are entitled to the protection of the Bill of Rights (“BOR”) as far as this charter applies to taxpayers. The majority of the Constitutional Court, in Kaunda v President of the Republic of South Africa (“Kaunda”), held that the BOR is territorially bound and has no application beyond SA’s borders. This decision, if applied rigidly, has the undesirable effect that taxpayers on foreign soil cannot assert fundamental rights against SARS or its foreign agents during tax administration processes occurring outside SA, even though such rights would be available to those taxpayers if the tax administration occurred in SA. This article argues that, despite the majority judgment in Kaunda, a sound legal basis exists to hold that all foreign-based South African taxpayers are entitled to BOR protection.

Unlocking the potential of wellbeing in the environmental right: a teleological interpretation

Unlocking the potential of wellbeing in the environmental right: a teleological interpretation

Author Megan Donald

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BTS BA(Hons) LLB LLM, LLD Candidate, Stellenbosch University
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 31 Issue 1, 2020, p. 55 – 79

Abstract

The concept of well-being in the environmental right in section 24(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (“Constitution”) has great potential for enhancing the quality of life for people in South Africa, particularly the poor who bear the brunt of environmental pollution and degradation. The meaning of well-being is potentially very extensive and requires more delineation if it is to be useful and effective for claimants. It is suggested that the potential of the environmental right to promote social justice and improve the quality of life of South Africans is best unlocked through a teleological and interdependent interpretation of section 24 in the context of the Bill of Rights. This article explores the (under)development of well-being and the environmental right before the courts. It then investigates the interpretation of the term in the textual setting of section 24 as well as in the context of the Bill of Rights and the values and goals underpinning the Constitution. The Bill of Rights is indicative of what the Constitution deems essential for a life of equality, dignity, and freedom, and it is consequently indicative of the entitlements and interests which underpin human well-being. This article proposes an interpretation of well-being that encompasses, at a minimum, the interests already recognised in the Bill of Rights so that where an aspect of the environment negatively impacts an aspect of a fundamental human right, there is an impact on well-being in terms of section 24(a). This interpretation highlights the potential of well-being to promote constitutional goals and values and to address circumstances of intersecting disadvantage or harm. The proposed approach to well-being would provide much-needed clarity to potential claimants by providing a framework for the scope of well-being. This could assist in unlocking the full potential of the environmental right.