Conflict and Convergence in the Application of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base

Conflict and Convergence in the Application of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law in Guantanamo Bay Naval Base

Author Henry K. Murigi

ISSN: 2521-2613
Affiliations: PhD Student, United States International University-Africa, Advocate of the High Court of Kenya. Senior Prosecution Counsel.
Source: Africa Nazarene University Law Journal, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, p. 1 – 20

Abstract

The conduct of war is not prohibited under international law. Often, serious violations of the rights of the individual occur. The consequences of war raise questions as to what the appropriate regime should be to resolve any concern that may arise as the effects of war. On the one hand, violation of human rights is evident during the conduct of war and, therefore, human rights regimes should apply to solve the problem. On the other hand, the essence of humanitarian war is to govern the conduct of war and should be the dominant regime to tackle such issues. The relationship between these two regimes is very controversial and equally topical. It goes to the heart of the war on terror after the events of 11 September 2001. One view is that everything that happens in Guantanamo Bay is a matter of humanitarian law and has nothing to do with human rights law. Another view holds that it is a purely human rights and law enforcement issue, dealing in domestic matters and nothing more. These two perspectives have grown separately and are often seen as conflictual. This article seeks to show that the two areas of law can coexist and that each should benefit from the other and not compete for supremacy.

Demystifying the Myth of Immovability Attached to Immovable Property in Terms of Property Law

Demystifying the Myth of Immovability Attached to Immovable Property in Terms of Property Law

Author Solomon O Afolabi

ISSN: 2521-2613
Affiliations: 
Source: Africa Nazarene University Law Journal, 2019, Volume 7, Issue 2, p. 33 – 46

Abstract

The categorisation of property as movable and immovable create, on the one hand, the impression that immovable property is generally fixed in nature and therefore not subject to mobility, and, on the other hand, that movable property can easily be moved from one position or location to another. This water-tight division in relation to the description of property has permeated the general understanding of the definition of immovable property in the context of property law. Scholarly research and judicial activism, particularly in some countries, of which Nigeria is an example, have identified that the application of the English doctrine ‘quic quid plantateur solo, solo cedit’ renders it possible, in appropriate cases, for an otherwise immovable property to change its status to that of movable under the law. In this regard, consideration is required to be given to how rights in immovable property can be transferred. It is posited that the dichotomy between movable and immovable property is no longer necessary for a proper understanding of the word ‘property’ in the legal context and should therefore be eradicated.