Abstract

This overview covers the following:

1. Equality
2. Dignity
3. Personal freedom and security
4. Freedom of expression
5. Freedom of association
6. Political rights
7. Citizenship
8. Labour relations
9. Property
10. Social security
11. Children’s rights
12. Education
13. Access to courts
14. General provisions regarding the bill of rights

Abstract

Breach of promise by a betrothed is not met with the same sanctions as breach of contract. The disappointed previously engaged party cannot approach the court for an order against the other party for specific performance. The erstwhile future spouse cannot be compelled to enter into the envisaged marriage relationship notwithstanding the doubt that surfaced about the everlasting joyous nature of this union. For the same reason, no claim for positive interest as damages will be honoured by a court. The deserted betrothed cannot claim half of the estate of the other party because she was under the impression that the marriage would have been in community of property. The unavailability of these categories of remedies indicates that the foundation of an engagement agreement should not be seen as a contract between the parties to enter into a legal relationship which will entitle them to reciprocal claims for performance. It must rather be classified as a factual relationship between two parties that is recognised in law and therefore carries consequences. A betrothed cannot simultaneously be engaged to more than one prospective future spouse in a legal system that only recognises a monogamous marriage.

The unsavoury conduct of the guilty party who breached the promise to marry on the proverbial steps of the church, is, however, often the cause of damage and hardship for the innocent party and may also cause prejudice to her family when they have indebted themselves for the prospective marriage. The disappointed previous fiancée may have incurred significant costs for the bridal lay-out, the wedding feast and the intended honeymoon, but it may also include the loss of a previous job opportunity or the burdening of the claimant with the cost of a new dwelling that would not otherwise have been encountered.

Common law recognised the need to reimburse the innocent party for such losses and also for the personal injury suffered if the breach occurred shortly before the marriage was supposed to be concluded or the conduct of the guilty party was especially harsh and impolite. Harbouring bad manners comes at a cost.

In this contribution the historical development of the applicable claims is discussed by way of comparison with other legal systems in order to define the underlying foundation of the claims as recognised in South African law. In principle, claims founded on the actio legis Aquiliae as well as the actio iniuriarum should be available, provided the various requirements for the remedy can be met.

It is questioned whether there is any truth in the premise that the continued recognition of such a delictual claim will endanger the value of marriage as a binding institution in modern society and that this excuse justifies the demise of the sanctions against such a delict in some modern societies. The well-known proverb ubi ius ibi remedium also indicates that as long as the delictual conduct of the unreliable suitor is recognised as unacceptable conduct, private law should provide a suitable remedy to the injured subject. It is presumed that parties who decided mutually to become betrothed represent to each other and to third parties that they intend to enter into marriage as a lifelong relationship and that all concerned may act according to this representation of their mutual intent. Should any of the parties experience a serious change of heart and repudiate the agreement, the other may claim for any damage suffered as a result of the breach with the actio legis Aquiliae. In addition, the contumely conduct entitles the aggrieved party to claim solatium for the injury to her personality rights. Although the claims founded in the breach of promise are often referred to as contractual claims, the case law displays many examples where the claimant for the wasted damages caused by the delictual behaviour happened to be the parents or guardian of the party left in the lurch, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant did not enter into a contract with them as the future in-laws. This points to the fact that the remedy is a delictual and not a contractual remedy and founded in the breach of trust.

Abstract

Café Chameleon se Guardrisk polis het besigheidsverlies gedek as dit die gevolg is van ’n aanmeldbare siekte wat voorgekom het binne ’n radius van 50 kilometer vanaf sy restourant in Kaapstad. So ’n siekte, Covid-19, het voorgeval. ’n Epidemie het ontwikkel en die regering het ’n staat van algemene inperking afgekondig. Ten gevolge van die inperking het Café Chameleon wesenlike dog ongekwantifiseerde besigheidsverliese gely.

’n Verklarende bevel is ten gunste van Café Chameleon in die Kaap uitgereik. Guardrisk Insurance het appelleer maar die hoogste hof van appèl het die appèl eenparig van die hand gewys. Die hof het die kontraktuele risikobepalings aan die hand van die sogenaamde objektiewe benadering uitgelê en bevind dat die gebeurtenis waarteen verseker is, verlies as gevolg van ’n inperking insluit. Ingevolge die tans geldende objektiewe benadering word daar nie gepoog om die kontraktante se werklike bedoeling vas te stel nie. Die vraag is bloot hoe ’n redelike man in die skoene van die kontraktante hul woorde en gedrag sou verstaan het. Volgens sommige beslissings gaan dit wel nog om ’n konstruktiewe bedoeling. Die aard, ooreenkomste en verskille tussen die objektiewe benadering en die tradisionele subjektiewe benadering word in die bespreking uitgelig. Daar word aan die hand gedoen dat die huidige interpretasie benadering eintlik ’n hibriede benadering is. Die objektiewe benadering hang in werklikheid saam met die vertrouensteorie vir kontraktuele aanspreeklikheid en word getemper deur byvoorbeeld die verweer van redelike dwaling. Wat vasstaan, is dat interpretasie ’n fyn kuns is en dat selfs die meer objektiewe benadering nie noodwendig feilloos is nie. Trouens, die hof se uitleg van die versekerde gebeurtenis aan die hand van die objektiewe benadering word bevraagteken.

’n Alternatiewe voorstel is dat die voorkoms van Covid-19 binne ’n sekere radius van die versekerde se besigheid aanvaar word as die versekerde gebeurtenis omdat so ’n uitleg in die algemeen meer betroubare resultate lewer. In die betrokke omstandighede sou dit egter nie ’n verskil aan die uitkoms van die geding gemaak het nie.

Abstract

Personal rights may be transferred by means of cession, and, in such an instance, the cedent (creditor) does not need the debtor’s permission, but once the debtor has been informed, the debt is redeemed only if he performs against the cessionary. If however, someone owes a debt, he (the debtor) can free himself of the obligation only if he redeems the debt, if he is released, or through the running of prescription. But sometimes it might be necessary that a restructuring of someone’s debts takes place or the debtor may want to be replaced with someone else who is willing to take over his obligation. This can be done only with the cooperation and agreement of the creditor. In such a case the debtor delegates his obligation to another person, who then becomes the new debtor of a new debt – the creditor relinquishes his right against the old debtor and accepts the new debtor and the new debt. The old debt no longer exists. It is also possible to rearrange the debt and create a new obligation which extinguishes the old debt – a novation takes place.

This contribution starts with a discussion of these general principles and particularly the role that they (should) play when one is dealing with a secured debt which the debtor wants to delegate or when novation comes into play. This leads into a discussion of Wilke NO v Griekwaland Wes Korporatief Ltd (1327/2019) 2020 ZASCA 182 (23 Dec 2020) and the judgments in the earlier courts in which the supreme court of appeal and the other courts did not consider the implications of delegation and novation on an underlying debt when that debt was secured. Delegation and novation extinguish the underlying debt and any security right fortifying that debt is thereby also extinguished because of the principle of accessority. If the creditor requires the new debt to be secured, a new security right needs to be established by meeting all the requirements for the establishment of such security whether it is a right of suretyship or a real security right. A creditor must carefully consider agreeing to a delegation or novation of a secured debt since the implication is that he loses his secured and preferential position, and, even with the creation of a new security right, he loses the ranking he initially held in the line of secured creditors when a right of mortgage, for example, is at stake – qui prior est tempore potior est iure (D 20 4 11pr).

Abstract

In Beadica 231 CC v Trustees, Oregon Trust het die konstitusionele hof bevestig dat die handves van regte indirek toegepas moet word op kontraktuele bepalings en die uitvoering daarvan. Volgens die hof is begrippe soos redelikheid, billikheid, goeie trou en grondwetlike waardes nie regsbegrippe nie maar abstrakte waardes wat gebruik word om die regsreël toe te pas dat kontrakte nie teen die openbare beleid mag wees nie. Daarmee wou die hof meningsverskille in die regspraak en -literatuur uit die weg ruim. Dit is onwaarskynlik dat die hof daarin geslaag het. Die werklike meningsverskille gaan oor hoeveel gewig in besondere gevalle geheg moet word aan kontrakteervryheid aan die een kant, en die handvesregte wat deur kontrakte en hulle uitvoer beperk word aan die ander kant. Deur bevindings in uitsprake sorgvuldig te motiveer met verwysing na die faktore in artikel 36(1) van die grondwet sal die standpunte duideliker gestel word en meer sinvolle debatte daaroor gevoer kan word. Dit verg ’n direkte toepassing van die handves van regte.

In AB v Pridwin Preparatory School het die konstitusionele hof beslis dat wanneer die ongeldigheid van optrede ingevolge ’n kontraktuele bepaling op die openbare-beleid-reël gebaseer word, die handves indirek daarop toegepas moet word, terwyl gevalle waarin die applikante hulle saak slegs op die skending van handvesregte baseer, nie-kontraktuele geskille is waarop die handves direk toegepas moet word. Die skending van handvesregte vind egter nooit in ’n lugleegte plaas nie, maar altyd binne die raamwerk van die een of ander regsterrein, in hierdie geval die kontraktereg, en die uitwerking van die uitoefening van die grondwetlike reg op kontrakteervryheid op ander handvesregte moet vasgestel word ongeag of indirekte of direkte toepassing van die handves plaasvind. Daar bestaan nie so iets soos gewone kontraktereg en daarnaas grondwetlike kontraktereg nie. Die hof se direkte toepassing het in elk geval op indirekte toepassing neergekom want die algemene beperkingsbepaling is nie toegepas nie. Die hof se uitleg van “in terms of law” in artikel 36(1), naamlik dat dit slegs geld vir beperkings “in” regsreëls, is die enigste rede wat die hof sedert 1995 aangevoer het waarom die hof die handves nie direk op kontraktuele bepalings en hulle uitvoering toepas nie. Die uitdrukking sluit geen beperking uit nie, maar verorden die formele legaliteitsbeginsel dat alle beperkings uitdruklik of stilswyend deur regsreëls gemagtig moet word. Die hof se benadering veroorsaak verwarring en onsekerheid soos duidelik blyk uit onder andere die verskillende uitsprake in Dladla v City of Johannesburg (2018 2 BCLR 119 (KH), 2018 2 SA 327 (KH)).