Abandoning the Spouse, Abandoning the House? Abandonment of Co-Ownership Shares in Immovable Property [Discussion of M V M (10751/2000) [2020] ZAGPPHC 155 (20 March 2020)]

by | Oct 23, 2022 | SLR, SLR V33 I3

Abandoning the Spouse, Abandoning the House? Abandonment of Co-Ownership Shares in Immovable Property [Discussion of M V M (10751/2000) [2020] ZAGPPHC 155 (20 March 2020)]

Author: Richard Cramer

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA (Hons) LLB LLM PhD (UCT), Post-doctoral Fellow: DST/NRF SARChI Research Chair: Mineral Law in Africa, Faculty of Law, University of Cape Town
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 33 Issue 3, 2022, p. 548 – 559
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2022/i3a10

Abstract

The case of M v M (10751/2000) [2020] ZAGPPHC 155 (20 March 2020) (“M v M”) is novel in its finding that the abandonment of immovable property is possible in South African law. It is also novel in finding that the requisite intention to abandon a co-ownership share in immovable property could be inferred from the facts of the case. Past case law concerning the abandonment of immovable property always failed to make a finding of abandonment as the requisite intention could never be established. This approach was consistent with our courts’ unwillingness to infer an intention to abandon valuable property in the absence of clear intention to do so. This case note seeks to critique the decision of the court in M v M in light of a legal framework in which the abandonment of landownership does not appear possible given the principle of publicity. It further seeks to ask if there were other avenues available to the court to reach what was an undeniably just outcome on the set of facts before the court.

The Conduct of “Price Undertakings” and “Interim Reviews” in the Anti-Dumping Regime of South Africa [Discussion of Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GMBH V International Trade Administration Commission (66248/2014) 2020 ZAGPPHC 141 (14 February 2020)]

by | Oct 23, 2022 | SLR, SLR V33 I3

The Conduct of “Price Undertakings” and “Interim Reviews” in the Anti-Dumping Regime of South Africa [Discussion of Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GMBH V International Trade Administration Commission (66248/2014) 2020 ZAGPPHC 141 (14 February 2020)]

Author: Clive Vinti

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB (cum laude) LLM PhD, Senior Lecturer, Department of Public Law, University of the Free State
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 33 Issue 3, 2022, p. 560 – 578
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2022/i3a11

Abstract

The administration of anti-dumping investigations is the sole mandate of the International Trade Administration Commission (“ITAC”). This investigation has two stages, the preliminary and final investigation stages, which are accompanied by investigation reports at each stage. The investigation can be terminated or suspended after the preliminary investigation if the offending exporter ceases exports to the Southern African Customs Union (“SACU”) at the dumped prices or revises its prices such that ITAC is satisfied that injurious dumping has been eliminated. Twelve months after the publication of the final determination in the original investigation or the previous review, interested parties can request an interim review of the duty if there are significantly changed circumstances. It is these two aspects of dumping investigations that were the subject of litigation for the first time in South African law in Casar Drahtseilwerk Saar GMBH v International Trade Administration Commission (66248/2014) 2020 ZAGPPHC 141 (14 February 2020). This note assesses the novel approach employed by the court in readily construing these aspects of the anti-dumping investigation in South Africa in accordance with the jurisprudence on the Anti-Dumping Agreement. This approach is commendable in light of the ambivalent attitude of South African courts towards the country’s obligations in terms of the multilateral agreements of the World Trade Organization, despite the promulgation of local legislation to comply with these obligations and the constitutional injunction to prefer any reasonable interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation that is inconsistent with international law.