Evening out the divide between rights and culture: a case for mobilising positive culture in state responses to gender-based violence in Kenya

Evening out the divide between rights and culture: a case for mobilising positive culture in state responses to gender-based violence in Kenya

Evening out the divide between rights and culture: a case for mobilising positive culture in state responses to gender-based violence in Kenya

Author: Faith Kabata

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM LLD, Lecturer, Kenyatta University School of Law
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 33 Issue 1, 2022, p. 139 – 160
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2022/i1a7

Share

Cite this article

Kabata, F
Evening out the divide between rights and culture: a case for mobilising positive culture in state responses to gender-based violence in Kenya
Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 33 Issue 1, 2022, p. 139 – 160
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2022/i1a7

Abstract

The main focus of the article is on the inadequacy of state responses in  eliminating gender-based violence in its structural and direct expressions.  The article departs from the premise that gender, sexuality, and identity are  cultural constructs and argues that culture and social constructs are dynamic  and changing, hence state responses to eliminate gender-based violence must  engage the positive and egalitarian aspects of African culture for social  legitimacy. While acknowledging that constitutional and legal frameworks  lay a normative foundational basis for protection against gender-based  violence, the effectiveness of these frameworks must be measured through  implementation. It is in the implementation of the constitutional and legal  norms that cultural contestations emerge, for instance, in the context of  structural forms of gender-based violence such as female genital mutilation  and marital rape. The main question that the article seeks to answer is  how states can bridge the gap between norms and implementation which  arises out of cultural contestations. Focusing on Kenya as a case study,  the article examines state responses to structural forms of gender-based  violence, specifically, female genital mutilation and marital rape. The Kenyan  constitutional framework recognises culture as the foundation of the nation  and the right to culture in the Bill of Rights, and on equal footing embraces  egalitarian principles which place dignity, freedom, and equality at the core of  societal relations. Applying doctrinal research methodology, we analyse case  law on female genital mutilation and legislative initiatives in the prohibition  of marital rape to identify and distil the judicial and legislative approaches  on the interplay between the prohibition of gender-based violence norms and  culture. Based on this, the article suggests proposals on how the progressive  aspects of African culture that resonate with the egalitarian constitutional  structure can be engaged in state responses to gender-based violence. 

Horizontal accountability: Bottom-up oversight of public duty bearers in Malawi

Horizontal accountability: Bottom-up oversight of public duty bearers in Malawi

Authors: Dan Kuwali and Chikosa M Silungwe

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: Dan Kuwali holds an LLD (Lund). He is an Extraordinary Professor of Law at the University of Pretoria, South Africa; Visiting Professor, Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, Sweden; Adjunct Professor and Executive Director, Centre for Strategic Studies, Malawi University of Science and Technology; Fellow at the Carr Centre for Human Rights Policy, Harvard Kennedy School; and Chief of Legal Services and Judge Advocate General, Malawi Defence Force; Chikosa Silungwe holds a PhD (Warwick). He is a Former Attorney General, Government of the Republic of Malawi and a consultant at the Mizumali Foundation, Lilongwe, Malawi
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 9 Issue 1, p. 1 – 23
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v9/i1a1

Abstract

The principle of public duty requires that public authorities should be held accountable for their acts, omissions, decisions, policies and use of public resources. Focusing on Malawi as a country whose democracy has been tried and tested, this paper locates and dissects the notion of public duty in s 12 of the Constitution of Malawi as an instrument for horizontal accountability that can be employed by the citizenry, based on ss 15 and 41 of the Constitution, for more effective and proactive oversight, as opposed to an ex post facto mechanism exercised by the Ombudsman in terms of s 123 of the Constitution. The central argument of this paper is that those who exercise a public duty do so based on people’s sovereignty and they have an obligation to account to the people for the exercise of State authority. The paper concludes that public duty is a corollary of democratic accountability, and both derive from the protection of individual rights and the rule of law.

The Constitutional Court of Uganda: Blurring/misunderstanding its jurisdiction

The Constitutional Court of Uganda: Blurring/misunderstanding its jurisdiction

Author: Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 9 Issue 1, p. 24 – 66
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v9/i1a2

Abstract

Article 137 of the Constitution of Uganda (the Constitution) provides for the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court (the Court) to interpret the Constitution and to determine whether any law or conduct—act or omission—is contrary to the Constitution. The drafting history of art 137 shows that the court’s jurisdiction to interpret the Constitution is different from that of declaring whether any law or conduct is inconsistent with the Constitution. However, the jurisprudence of the Court shows that it has blurred the distinction between these two mandates. In this article, the author relies on the drafting history of art 137 to argue, inter alia, that the Court’s approach in this regard is debatable. It is also argued that, although the intention of the drafters of the Constitution was that the Court was not to be the first and final court in matters of constitutional interpretation, the literal interpretation of art 137 and the jurisprudence on art 137 show the opposite. It is further argued that in some instances the Court has misunderstood its jurisdiction under art 137(5) and (6) and that the Court does not have the power to declare legislation unconstitutional under art 137(5). It is also submitted that the Court’s argument that its jurisdiction is limited to interpreting the Constitution or that any petition before it cannot be resolved without first interpreting the Constitution is erroneous. It is further argued that Uganda may have to follow the South African model in which other courts, such as the High Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal, are also empowered to declare legislation unconstitutional.

Recusal of a judge in adjudication: Recent developments in South Africa and Botswana

Recusal of a judge in adjudication: Recent developments in South Africa and Botswana

Authors: Chuks Okpaluba and Tumo C Maloka

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: LLB LLM (London) PhD (University of the West Indies); Research Fellow, Centre for Human Rights, University of the Free State, South Africa; BA LLB LLM (UCT) LLD (UFH), Associate Professor, Department of Mercantile and Labour Law, University of Limpopo
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 9 Issue 1, p. 67 – 93
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v9/i1a3

Abstract

Both at common law and under contemporary constitutional jurisprudence, the principle is that a judge who finds himself or herself in a situation where their personal interest(s) in the case in court will lead a dispassionate and independent observer to reasonably suspect that they will be biased or reasonably apprehended to be so, must not sit and hear the case. Even before the commencement of the hearing, the judge is expected to disclose their interest(s) in the case or association with one of the parties to both sides in the case so as to hear their views on the matter. Otherwise, a party who might be prejudiced by the outcome should, as early as possible in the proceedings, apply to the judge to recuse himself or herself from adjudicating the case. Sometimes, the judge might have entered the adjudication without any personal baggage, but one of the parties apprehends bias on account of the utterances or conduct of the judge in the proceedings, and the party affected must apply for the recusal of the judge from the trial or proceedings. Recent developments have shown that the circumstances in which recusal is permissible are far from being exhausted, hence the category of possible recusal cases is not closed. The cases that have arisen in the last ten years in Botswana and South Africa are very extensive in terms of volume and the variety of the issues that they raise and therefore they provide the material around which this article is constructed.

Discretion in the exercise of jurisdiction in conflict cases in Nigeria

Discretion in the exercise of jurisdiction in conflict cases in Nigeria

Authors: Chilenye Nwapi, Emeka J Egbebu and Thankgod Akazua

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: Research Associate, Canadian Institute of Resources Law, University of Calgary, Calgary, Canada; Senior Magistrate, Imo State Judiciary, Owerri, Nigeria; 4th Year Law Student, Rivers State University, Port Harcourt, Nigeria
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 9 Issue 1, p. 94 – 129
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v9/i1a4

Abstract

This article analyses the jurisprudence of discretionary jurisdiction in conflicts cases in Nigeria to interrogate the considerations of theory and practical policy (or lack thereof) that, in the authors’ view, have influenced the development of the relevant law and procedure. The analysis includes an assessment of whether too much or too little weight has been given to some theories or policies. The article discusses discretionary jurisdiction in three main situations: (1) where the defendant is outside the jurisdiction of the forum court and, therefore, must be served ex juris; (2) when the court is invited to decline jurisdiction based on the doctrine of forum non conveniens; and (3) when there are parallel proceedings in a foreign jurisdiction. A key finding is that discretionary jurisdiction in Nigeria is highly under-theorised in the jurisprudence. Nigerian intellectuals have, for their part, not given the subject adequate consideration. There is, therefore, a dearth of literature to draw on. The article sifts through the rules of court and court decisions to discover the theoretical and practical considerations for the courts’ exercise of discretionary jurisdiction in the three situations mentioned.