Abstract

Deemed dismissal or discharge, alternatively called termination of employment by operation of law (ex lege) is one of the most disputable issues in constitutional labour law. A termination of employment by operation of law arises when an employee absents himself or herself from his or her official duty for a period exceeding 30 days. Significantly, procedural safeguards against unfair dismissal are attenuated because the affected employee is given a semblance of a hearing. Moreover, the employee is asked to show cause why he or she should not be discharged. Since the authorities are clear that where dismissal is precipitated by the operation of law and there is no right to a hearing, deemed discharge unarguably represents far-reaching encroachment on the constitutional guarantee to fair labour practices and the statutory right not to be unfairly treated. An employee who is deemed dismissed has a restricted access to the purpose-built labour dispute resolution forums established by the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995. Although the uncertainties concerning the unconstitutionality of the deeming dismissal provisions were cast aside in Phethini v Minister of Education (2006) 27 ILJ 477 (SCA), the jurisdictional complexities displayed in recent cases such as Western Cape v Weder and MEC for Dept of Health [2014] 4 BLLR 393 (LC), Ramonetha v Department of Roads and Transport, Limpopo [2018] 1 BLLR 16 (LAC), Minister of Defence and Military Veterans v Mamasedi 2018 (2) SA 305 (SCA), Maswanganyi v Minister of Defence and Military Veterans (2020) 41 ILJ 1287 (CC) and Masinga v Chief of the SANDF [2022] ZASCA 1 (5 January 2022) compel a rethink of the constitutionality of the deemed discharge provisions.