Abstract

Human trafficking remains one of the most pervasive forms of modern exploitation, affecting millions globally, yet it lacks explicit recognition as a distinct international crime under the Rome Statute. Current legal frameworks, including the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, partially address trafficking through proximate categories such as enslavement or sexual slavery. However, these classifications often require proof of ownership-like control, fail to capture the full spectrum of trafficking practices, and leave significant groups of victims without recourse to justice. This article examines the definitional, historical, and jurisprudential distinctions between trafficking and slavery, evaluates the Rome Statute’s existing categories of crimes against humanity, and highlights the limitations of relying on legal proxies. Drawing on the Palermo Protocol and international case law, the article argues for the inclusion of trafficking as a standalone crime under the Rome Statute. It proposes specific amendments to article 7 and discusses the procedural and political challenges inherent in such reform. Recognising trafficking explicitly would enhance the International Criminal Court’s capacity to prosecute human trafficking, provide coherent legal protections for victims, and reinforce the international community’s commitment to combating modern slavery in all its forms.