ARTICLE
Pardons: From royal veto of judicial sentences to executive usurpation of judicial power
Author: Loammi Wolf
ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Research Associate, UFS Centre for Human Rights, University of the Free State
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 143 Issue 4, p. 753-798
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v143/i4a7
Abstract
The pardon was received as part of the royal prerogatives in South Africa in 1909. Historically, the pardon was a veto of judicial sentences to grant mercy after the British sovereign was stripped of judicial powers in 1701. In South Africa, the Crown assigned the exercise of prerogative powers to the Governor-General and delegated these powers to him in 1937. The common-law discretion in pardons was codified by the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Act 31 of 1917 and again by the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955, encompassing free pardons, the remission of prison sentences, and the reprieve of capital punishment. The Prisons Act 8 of 1959 conferred a concurrent power for restorative justice upon the justice minister to remit prison sentences for purposes of parole — an early executive usurpation of judicial power that negated the binding force of judicial sentences. In 1961, the royal prerogatives were transformed into republican head-of-state powers with a different character. The wording of the pardon provision has essentially stayed the same since 1961, but the power constraints and content have changed. Following criminal justice reforms in 1977, the head of state could no longer remit prison sentences. After 1991, the courts largely ignored the codification of pardons, which had reduced the scope of that power, and assumed that the pre-1917 common law remained applicable. The courts also falsely classified the erstwhile judicial prerogative as being executive in nature. Legislative sloppiness regarding the savings clauses of the former prerogative further complicated matters. This state of affairs resulted in a substantial usurpation of judicial power by the executive in transgression of the binding force of judicial sentences under s 165(5) of the Constitution.