Abstract

The relationship between law, science and art has long been uncertain. In part by adopting a historical perspective, this contribution explores how various views on this distinction have differed over time, and what the potential implications of these views are for what lawyers do, or are supposed to do. The focus is first on what constitutes a science. It is indicated that the concept has various meanings, which differ according to how its methodology is defined. Nonetheless, the discipline of law could at least be described as a science in a broad sense, insofar as it makes use of systematic thinking and reasoning. An application of these methods may then reveal that a particular legal rule exists or that someone ought to do something. This practice then differs from the methods used by natural scientists to establish what exists or is in nature. It is further shown that jurists have at times heavily relied on so-called scientific methods to create highly abstract conceptual structures, which in turn elicited the response that law has no autonomous or independent nature, and should be viewed from the perspective of disciplines outside the law. It is concluded that this may be an over-reaction, but that there clearly is room for lawyers to derive some benefit from the perspectives of these disciplines. The relationship between law and art, unsurprisingly, is also contested and depends on how the elusive concept of art is defined. To some, the “art” of law involves nothing less than the creative practice of living according to justice, whereas others simply regard law as an “art” insofar as it entails the creative practice of applying rules skilfully. The contribution then explores to what extent the works of lawyers could be described as works of art, and conversely, to what extent the perspectives of the arts and humanities, as well as the creative works of artists may in turn advance an understanding of the law and its impact on society.