Bringing Gender and Class into the Frame: An Intersectional Analysis of the Decoloniality-As-Race Critique of the Use of Law for Social Change

Bringing Gender and Class into the Frame: An Intersectional Analysis of the Decoloniality-As-Race Critique of the Use of Law for Social Change

Authors: Jackie Dugard & Angela María Sánchez

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA LLB BAHons LLM MPhil PhD, Associate Professor, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand; LLM student, Universidad de los Andes
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 32 Issue 1, 2021, p. 24 – 46
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/v32/i1a2

Abstract

During 2017, South African decoloniality theorist Tshepo Madlingozi argued, in relation to the ongoing socio-political and economic exclusion of the black majority in South Africa, that the post-1994 rights-based constitutional order represents more continuity than rupture, consolidating a triumph of social justice over liberation and a privileging of the democratisation paradigm over the decolonisation one. In Madlingozi’s critique of the “neo-apartheid” social justice order, race continues to be the most important dividing line, and human rights constitute a western “perpetuation of the coloniality of being”. This argument resonates with broader contemporary critiques of the weak, compromising and imperial nature of human rights. Against this backdrop, we examine the potential, as well as the limits, of using human rights as a tool for social change. Engaging an intersectional analysis informed by the seminal work of Kimberlé Crenshaw and Nancy Fraser, we find that the focus on decoloniality-as-race obscures other critical fault lines to the detriment of progressive change, and that a radical reading of human rights is capable of correcting this flaw. We argue that the incorporation of gender and class lenses provides a powerful tool to change both the narrative about the drivers of inequality among capitalist democracies and the role of socio-economic rights adjudication within them. Our article is also an invitation to rethink the domestic constitutional histories of the global south by acknowledging rights-based redistributive transformations within the context of market and development policies, and to push for the uptake of rights to empower social struggle and tackle structural disadvantage.

Public Policy in Family Contracts, Part II: Antenuptial Contracts

Public Policy in Family Contracts, Part II: Antenuptial Contracts

Author: Elsje Bonthuys

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA LLB LLM (Stell) PhD (Cantab), Professor, University of the Witwatersrand
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 32 Issue 1, 2021, p. 3 – 23
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/v32/i1a1

Abstract

This, the second part of an article on public policy in contracts between family members, focuses on legality in antenuptial contracts, particularly those which exclude all forms of sharing between spouses. The Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984 is now 35 years old and, apart from writing, it neither requires formalities to ensure that prospective spouses who enter into antenuptial contracts fully appreciate the consequences of their agreements, nor does it guarantee that the agreed upon property system is fair to both spouses. Instead, the focus is upon protecting the interests of third parties and creditors. The common-law principle of immutability makes it very onerous for parties to change the matrimonial property consequences during their marriage and, because the judicial discretion to order redistribution of benefits at divorce is limited to marriages concluded before the implementation of the Matrimonial Property Act, enforcement of antenuptial contracts at the termination of the marriage can lead to grossly unfair results. This unfairness has implications for gender equality, both because of gendered disparities in bargaining power at the conclusion of antenuptial contracts and legislation which limits the courts’ ability to deviate from contracts which mostly favour men, while retaining a discretion to deviate from contracts which tend to favour women. This article argues that the second leg of the public policy test, as articulated by the Constitutional Court in Barkhuizen v Napier can remedy the inadequacies in the statutory and common law by allowing the courts to consider inequalities in bargaining power and unfairness at the time of the enforcement of antenuptial contracts, in effect overriding the principle of immutability and creating a residual judicial discretion not to enforce an antenuptial contract.