A Legal Analysis of Local Government’s Housing Roles, Powers, Functions and Responsibilities in South Africa

A Legal Analysis of Local Government’s Housing Roles, Powers, Functions and Responsibilities in South Africa

Author: Paul Mudau

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, Department of Public, Constitutional and International Law, University of South Africa
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 1 – 41
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a1

Abstract

This article undertakes a comprehensive legal analysis of local government’s housing roles, powers, functions and responsibilities in South Africa. It outlines the place and role of local government in South Africa’s constitutional framework of multi-level governance and the decentralisation of housing powers to local government. Although the functional area of housing is listed as a ‘concurrent competency’ of the national and provincial spheres of government in terms of Part A of Schedule 4 of the constitution, local government still has significant housing roles and responsibilities emanating from court judgments and national legislation. Primarily, these roles and responsibilities are conferred by the Housing Act 107 of 1997, the Social Housing Act 16 of 2008, and other relevant legislation. Virtually, all municipalities may exercise attendant housing powers. Depending on the ability to demonstrate the capacity to administer one of the housing programmes, municipalities may ultimately be assigned to fulfil the housing functions or powers on behalf of provinces. Using a desktop-based qualitative research approach, the article employs documentary analysis and case law review to critically evaluate the legal framework and its application. Findings highlight gaps in the current legal framework, inadequate resource allocation and capacity constraints hindering local governments’ ability to effectively address housing needs. Recommendations are made for legislative reforms, decentralisation of housing powers, capacity building, and intergovernmental co-ordination to enhance local government’s housing roles, powers, functions and responsibilities. This research contributes to the ongoing debate on local government’s role in addressing South Africa’s housing challenges, providing valuable insights for policymakers, practitioners and scholars.

When the Apex Court’s Decision is not Final: The Power of Apex Courts to Review (Rescind) Their Decisions in Some African Countries

When the Apex Court’s Decision is not Final: The Power of Apex Courts to Review (Rescind) Their Decisions in Some African Countries

When the Apex Court’s Decision is not Final: The Power of Apex Courts to Review (Rescind) Their Decisions in Some African Countries

Author: Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 42 – 102
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a2

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Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
When the Apex Court’s Decision is not Final: The Power of Apex Courts to Review (Rescind) Their Decisions in Some African Countries
Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 42–102
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a2

Abstract

Generally, the decision of the highest/apex court in a country is final. However, courts are staffed by human beings, and it is natural to err. It is not uncommon for apex courts to make mistakes. Legislation and case law from African countries show that courts can ‘escape’ the consequences of their mistake in one of the three ways. First, by departing from a previous erroneous/outdated decision (in a subsequent case). Second, by invoking the ‘slip rule’ to correct clerical or arithmetical errors. Three, which is the focus of this article, by reviewing/rescinding their decisions. In this case, one of the parties to a judgment asks a court to re-open the case he/she has lost and set aside its decision. As the discussion below shows, this remedy is available to, among other things, protect the right of access to justice (courts) to prevent an injustice, or. to protect the integrity of the court. This ultimately contributes to the entrenchment of the rule of law. This article shows that African countries have adopted five different approaches in dealing with the apex courts’ powers to review their decisions. First, the constitutions of some African countries such as Ghana, Eswatini, the Gambia and Namibia expressly allow courts to review their decisions. Second, in some countries such as Uganda, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe the apex courts’ power/jurisdiction to review their decisions is provided for in their respective rules. Third, in some countries such as Lesotho, Seychelles, Zambia, and Sierra Leone neither the constitutions nor the rules empower apex courts to review their decisions. However, courts have invoked their inherent powers as the basis to review their decisions. Fourth, in Kenya, the Supreme Court’s powers to review its decisions are provided for in legislation and rules of the court. Finally, in Nigeria, the Supreme Court rules prohibit it from reviewing its decisions. However, the Supreme Court held that it has inherent powers to review its decisions. This article shows that, irrespective of the source(s) of the power, case law from all the courts show that there is consensus that apex courts will review their decision(s), whether criminal or civil, if it is in the interests of justice to do so. Different grounds/reasons are invoked to explain why it is in the interests of justice to review a court’s decision. In some countries the list of the grounds of review is closed whereas in others it is open. In some countries, judges often disagree on the issue of whether the apex court’s power to review its decisions is categorised as ‘inherent jurisdiction’ or ‘inherent power.’ In this article, it is argued that in countries where legislation empowers courts to review their decisions, they have jurisdiction. Inherent powers exist in countries where legislation is silent on court’s powers to review their decisions. Although finality of litigation is a very important principle, achieving the ends of justice is more important. Thus, apex courts should not be very conservative when developing principles on reviewing their decisions.

Presence as a Ground for Jurisdiction in Common Law Africa

Presence as a Ground for Jurisdiction in Common Law Africa

Authors: Thomas Kojo Quansah and Theophilus Edwin Coleman

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: LLB (Ghana) LLM (UJ); Lecturer, Law School, University of Professional Studies, Accra, Ghana; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University at Buffalo School of Law, New York (USA); Senior Research Associate, Research Centre for Private International Law in Emerging Countries (RCPILEC), Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg, South Africa
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 103 – 145
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a3

Abstract

Before rendering a binding judgment against a party, a court must have personal jurisdiction over that party. Courts may assume jurisdiction over a person in various ways. The oldest and most contentious method is the personal service of the defendant with the court process while they are present in the state. This basis is known as the mere presence, temporary presence, or physical presence rule, which originates from English common law. Under common law, the defendant’s presence within the court’s jurisdiction remains one of the primary bases for the court to assume jurisdiction over a civil action. The physical presence grounds for jurisdiction have recently faced significant challenges and criticisms from some scholars. Others contend that it is still relevant, primarily for the reasons behind its original justification. There is also the question of how the presence of a legal person is determined for establishing a court’s jurisdiction. Considering the foregoing, re-examining presence as a ground for jurisdiction appears warranted. This article, therefore, investigates presence as a basis for jurisdiction, its history, and the presence of natural and legal persons. Given the various common law countries with somewhat divergent approaches, a comparative study of relevant countries will be conducted, leading to pertinent observations, remarks, and recommendations regarding the way forward. With recent technological developments and advancements in common law African countries, this article explores whether the presence doctrine is an appropriate tool for courts to exercise jurisdiction.

Towards an Enabling Regulatory Environment for Fintech Startups in Africa: Lessons From Nigeria

Towards an Enabling Regulatory Environment for Fintech Startups in Africa: Lessons From Nigeria

Author: Albert Chris Puja

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: LLB (Unizik), LLM cum laude, LLD (UWC)
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 146 – 189
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a4

Abstract

This article examines how regulatory environments in Africa can be reformed to support fintech startups better, using Nigeria as a case study. Fintech startups are increasingly important in advancing financial inclusion, promoting competition and enabling innovation in African financial sectors. However, they face regulatory challenges that are sometimes overlooked in broader fintech discourse. These challenges include regulatory uncertainty, lack of tailored licensing regimes, fragmented oversight, and excessive compliance burdens. The article outlines the main elements of the regulatory environment in which fintech startups operate. These include policy frameworks, regulatory frameworks, institutional arrangements, and innovation-enabling mechanisms. It then explains how gaps in these frameworks create barriers to entry, restrict growth and increase regulatory complexity for fintech startups. The case study of Nigeria shows that, although policymakers and regulators have introduced a national fintech strategy, strengthened institutional capacity, established innovation facilitators and introduced tailored regulations, the regulatory environment remains characterised by some outdated laws, fragmented legal frameworks and flaws in regulatory co-ordination. The article proposes targeted reforms to address these issues and strengthen the regulatory environment. These proposals offer practical guidance for other African countries seeking to support their fintech startups more effectively. The article argues that an ideal regulatory environment enables fintech startups to thrive while upholding key regulatory objectives such as financial stability, financial integrity and consumer protection. Further, any reform to improve the regulatory environment must consider local conditions, including institutional capacity, resource constraints, and the maturity of the domestic fintech ecosystem.

Corporate Social Responsibility Within the Paradigm of Transformative Constitutionalism in South Africa

Corporate Social Responsibility Within the Paradigm of Transformative Constitutionalism in South Africa

Authors: Tebello Thabane, Prince Mathibela and Justice Mudzamiri

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: Senior Law Lecturer, Commercial Law Department, University of Cape Town, South Africa, BA Law, LLB (National University of Lesotho), LLM (UP), LLM (UFS), PhD (UCT). Advocate of the High Court of South Africa and Lesotho; PhD candidate at Stellenbosch University Law Faculty, Commercial Law Department, Attorney of the High Court of South Africa. Legal Advisor at SouthSouth North NPC. BA, LLB (Wits), LLM (University of Cape Town); Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Department of Mercantile Law, University of Johannesburg. LLB (University of Fort Hare), LLM (University of Johannesburg), LLD (University of Fort Hare). Attorney of the High Court of South Africa
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 190 – 218
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a5

Abstract

South Africa is considered one of the most unequal societies in the world. This inequality is primarily attributed to the negative impact of apartheid on the distribution of resources. To address this issue, efforts have been made to transform society by incorporating substantive equality and transformative justice principles into the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, related laws, and voluntary codes. The main object of this article is to investigate whether, in its current form, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has the potential to effectively deepen social transformation in South Africa or if it requires further strengthening. The article compares the approaches of South Africa and India in addressing inequality through legal tools, evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of each approach, and proposes law reform that would ensure social transformation in South Africa.

The Plight of First Responders Suffering from Mental Disorders: Will an Amended Workers’ Compensation Act Relieve their Predicament?

The Plight of First Responders Suffering from Mental Disorders: Will an Amended Workers’ Compensation Act Relieve their Predicament?

Author Karin Calitz

ISSN: 2413-9874
Affiliations: Professor Emeritus and Research Fellow, Department of Mercantile Law, Stellenbosch University
Source: Industrial Law Journal, Volume 46 Issue 3, 2025, p. 1523 – 1550

Abstract

First responders are at great risk to contract Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), because of the nature of their work. This often leads to suicide or homicide-suicide, involving family members.
The process of claiming benefits from the Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Act 130 of 1993 (COIDA), often exacerbates the PTSD symptoms because the onus of proof that PTSD arose out of and in the course of employment rests on the employee. Claiming compensation often takes years, partly due to the lack of expertise of commissioners and tribunals, leaving employees no other choice but to appeal to the High Court.
Legal comparison indicates that certain provinces in Canada, and some states in the US and Australia, have adopted presumptive legislation which relieves first responders of the onus to prove that PTSD arose out of their employment.
The Compensation for Occupational Injuries and Diseases Amendment Act 10 of 2022 (COIDAA), which is not in force yet, for the first time includes PTSD (but no other mental illness) in the definition of an occupational disease. COIDA’s draft Schedule 3 lists PTSD as an occupational disease that will be covered by a presumption but does not limit the presumption to any categories of injured or diseased employees. This means that any employee suffering from PTSD will be covered by the presumption as soon as it is established that the person suffers from PTSD. In light of the fact that the Compensation Fund (CF) experiences serious financial difficulties, the article agrees that rehabilitation and return-to-work measures introduced by the COIDAA are laudable, but at present financially unattainable. More informal, less costly measures, such as online psychoeducation training of first responders, peer groups and families to recognise the symptoms of PTSD and how to deal with those, can nurture resilience of first responders and empower those closest to them to support them. By ensuring a psychosocial safety climate, employers can do much to prevent PTSD. A code of good practice could include these recommendations.
The article further recommends that the presumption should at first only cover first responders as a matter of urgency until the CF becomes financially viable again.

‘Just and Equitable’ Grounds for Review in Section 158(1B) of the LRA

‘Just and Equitable’ Grounds for Review in Section 158(1B) of the LRA

Author Andrea Joy Zitzke

ISSN: 2413-9874
Affiliations: BA Law (Pretoria), LLB (Pretoria), LLM (Stellenbosch), LLD candidate (Free State)
Source: Industrial Law Journal, Volume 46 Issue 3, 2025, p. 1550 – 1573

Abstract

When will a court find it ‘just and equitable’ to intervene during incomplete proceedings in terms of s 158(1B) of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA)? It is becoming more and more commonplace, contrary to the purpose of the LRA, to bring reviews during incomplete Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and bargaining council proceedings. It is therefore necessary to clarify when a court will exercise its discretion to review proceedings before their finalisation. Since determining what is ‘just and equitable’ has been a ‘difficult horse to ride’ for the court and litigants alike, it is necessary for principles to be extracted from previous decisions in order to produce concrete rules that will assist with establishing when a court may intervene during incomplete proceedings in terms of s 158(1B) in accordance with legal certainty and stare decisis. In this contribution, the history of case law is traced in an attempt to distil relevant concrete principles that can assist practitioners and courts in this determination.

Unfounded Accusations of Racism as Workplace Discrimination: Solidarity on behalf of K v Western Cape Education Department & others [2024] ZALCCT 59

Unfounded Accusations of Racism as Workplace Discrimination: Solidarity on behalf of K v Western Cape Education Department & others [2024] ZALCCT 59

Author Marius van Staden

ISSN: 2413-9874
Affiliations: Associate Professor, School of Law, Wits University
Source: Industrial Law Journal, Volume 46 Issue 3, 2025, p. 1573 – 1589

Abstract

This case note examines a Labour Court judgment concerning unfounded accusations of racism in the workplace, focusing on the intersection between misconduct and discrimination. The case raises important questions about the interpretation of the Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 and employer liability for discriminatory conduct. Through analysis of the court’s reasoning, this note identifies three significant problematic elements: the failure to recognise unfounded accusations of racism as inherently discriminatory, an overly technical approach to employer liability under s 60, and a questionable treatment of the severity threshold for harassment. Drawing on established jurisprudence, the analysis demonstrates how the judgment diverges from existing legal principles regarding workplace discrimination. The note argues that the court’s approach potentially undermines the protective purpose of anti-discrimination legislation and may set concerning precedents for future cases involving unfounded allegations of racism in workplace disputes. It concludes that a more purposive interpretation of anti-discrimination provisions is necessary to balance addressing genuine racial discrimination effectively and preventing the weaponisation of racial allegations.

Parental Leave for All: Van Wyk & others v Minister of Employment & Labour (Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria & others as Amici Curiae) (2024) 45 ILJ 194 (GJ)

Parental Leave for All: Van Wyk & others v Minister of Employment & Labour (Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria & others as Amici Curiae) (2024) 45 ILJ 194 (GJ)

Author Asheelia Behari

ISSN: 2413-9874
Affiliations: Lecturer, Department of Public Management, Law & Economics, Durban University of Technology; LLB LLM PhD (UKZN)
Source: Industrial Law Journal, Volume 46 Issue 3, 2025, p. 1589 – 1606

Abstract

This case note examines the court decision to declare the various provisions of leave from work for the purpose of caregiving in the Basic Conditions of Employment Act unconstitutional on the basis of a violation of the rights to equality and dignity because it differentiates between categories of parents. The resulting order made by the High Court was to award four months of parental leave to be shared between the mother and father of a newborn baby. The case note discusses the implications of this decision in light of the awaiting Constitutional Court judgment, which will make a final determination as to the constitutionality of maternity leave.

The structure of parking in sectional titles schemes

ARTIKEL

The structure of parking in sectional titles schemes

Author: CG Van der Merwe

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Research Fellow, Department of Private Law, University of Stellenbosch, Emeritus Professor in Civil Law, University of Aberdeen and the Law Faculty, University of Stellenbosch
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 3, 2025, p. 439-453
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2025/i3a1

Abstract

Parkering in deelskemas is dikwels ’n omstrede, netelige en verwarrende saak. Die aanhou van twee of meer motors en dikwels groter voertuie, veroorsaak dat huidige deeltitelskemas nie voldoende ruimte het om die aanvraag na parkeerplekke te bevredig nie. Dit veroorsaak chaos en dwing trustees om informele parkeerreëlings te tref sonder inagneming van toepaslike wetgewing en die ooreenstemmende regulasies.
Parkeerplekke en gemeenskaplike motorhuise kan slegs op nege maniere wettig gestruktureer word. Parkering vir motors op parkeerstaanplekke of in motorhuise kan as gedeeltes van dele, individuele dele of as geregistreerde uitsluitlike gebruiksgebiede gestruktureer word deur dieselfde nommer, individuele nommers of unieke nommers soos P1 en P2 op die deelplan aan te toon. Verder kan dit gestruktureer word as geverfde parkeerplekke op die gemeenskaplike eiendom waar die stelreël eerste kom, eerste maal geld, of as uitsluitlike gebruiksgebiede wat op gedragsreëls gebaseer is. Nog verder kan staanplekke vir voertuie ingevolge ’n spesiale besluit of ingevolge ’n eenparige besluit én toewysing deur die eienaars as huurkontrakte van tot tien jaar of langtermynhuurkontrakte van meer as tien jaar gestruktureer word. Nogeens kan parkering gestruktureer word as grondserwitute ten gunste van buureienaars as vergoeding vir die verslapping van soneringsvereistes. Ten slotte kan parkering deur skriftelike trusteegoedkeuring, gewoonlik in noodgevalle, ingevolge skemagedragsreëls gestruktureer word as tydelike parkering.
Voorbeelde van meer omvattende regulering van parkering in die skemagedragsreëls is die vasklamping en wegsleep van voertuie wat onwettiglik geparkeer is en die verbod op die drup van olie op ’n parkeerplek of die aftakeling van voertuie in ’n motorhuis. Verder reguleer verskeie gedragsreëls die spoedgrens, en die hinderlike gebruik van toeters en die speel van harde musiek in staande voertuie op die perseel wat ’n oorlas daarstel. Ten slotte bepaal die gedragsreëls dat geen persoon in enige voertuig, of in ’n motorhuis of parkeerplek mag woon of slaap nie of dat ’n motorhuis as ’n slaapplek vir huispersoneel gebruik mag word nie.
Behalwe Kaapstad se Munisipale Beplanningsverordening van 2015 wat die minimum aantal besoekerparkeerplekke in deeltitelskemas bepaal, bepaal slegs een skemagedragsreël dat ’n eienaar of okkupeerder behalwe in ’n noodgeval, geen besoeker mag toelaat om ’n ander parkeerplek as ’n besoekerparkeerplek vir ’n bepaalde tyd te gebruik nie, sonder om besoekerparkeerplekke verder te reguleer.
Daarom word besoekerparkeerplekke dikwels meer omvattend in die skemagedragreëls vervat. Voorbeelde is dat die aangewese besoekerparkeerplekke uitsluitlik vir die korttermyn gebruik van bona fide besoekers is en dat eienaars of inwoners nie daarop mag parkeer of onpadwaardige voertuie daar mag berg nie; dat besoekerparkeerplekke nie vir langer as vier uur sonder vooraf bespreking beset mag word nie en dat identiteitskyfplakkers op alle besoekervoertuie aangebring moet word.
Laastens, moet parkeerplekke slegs vir parkeerdoeleindes gebruik word en nie vir enige ander doeleindes nie. Indien dit gebeur, mag die regspersoon die CSOS (ombud ingevolge Wet 9 van 2011) nader vir die verwydering van enigiets wat onregmatig op die parkeerplek geplaas is. Hierdie beginsel word verder uitgebrei in bykomstige skemagedragsreëls wat onder andere kan bepaal dat motorhuise primêr vir parkering gebruik moet word en nie vir residensiële doeleindes of as stoorruimte nie en dat geen sleepwaens, karavane of bote op die toegewese besoekerparkeerplekke of enige ander deel van die gemeenskaplike eiendom geparkeer of gestoor mag word nie.
My slotsom is dat kopers van eenhede in ’n deeltitelskema eerstens moet verseker dat die parkeerrregte wat hulle verkry fisies identifiseerbaar is en duidelik aangedui word in die koopooreenkoms. Daarvoor moet die deelplan, die geregistreerde skemareëls of die betrokke notariële sessie van die parkeerregte in die eienaar se naam noukeurig geraadpleeg word. Tweedens is die inhoud van addisionele gedragsreëls nou verbonde aan die karakter en fisiese eienskappe van die spesifieke skema.
In die praktyk word motorafdakke en veral motorhuise in die vorm van ’n tussenvloer aan die agterkant van die motorhuis dikwels gebruik om tuingereedskap en oortollige besittings te stoor. Ek stel voor dat hierdie populêre gebruik gelegitimeer word in die vorm van geregistreerde motorhuis cum bergings-uitsluitlike gebruikareas.