The Interface between the New and the Previous Land Laws in Kenya: Is there a Philosophical Shift?

The Interface between the New and the Previous Land Laws in Kenya: Is there a Philosophical Shift?

Authors Tom Ojienda and Mathews Okoth

ISSN: 2521-2613
Affiliations:LLB (University of Nairobi), LLM (King’s College), LLD (UNISA), Associate Professor of Law, Moi University School of Law; Advocate of the High Court of Kenya; LLB (Hons) (Moi University), Dip Law (Kenya School of Law), MBA Candidate (Edinburgh Business School); Advocate of the High Court of Kenya.
Source: Africa Nazarene University Law Journal, 2014, Issue 1, p. 107 – 121

Abstract

The Constitution of Kenya 2010 sought to redress the perennial problems associated with land access, use and management in Kenya. Consequently, Parliament has enacted statutes to operationalise Chapter Five of the Constitution dealing with land and the environment. The Land Act, for example, allows for conversion of public land to private land with the approval of either the National Assembly or County Assembly. However, the circumstances for granting the approval are not circumscribed with certainty, thus susceptible to abuse. Again, although the Constitution provides that the maximum period in which non-citizens can hold land in Kenya is 99 years, the Land Act fails to specify whether the period runs from when existing titles held by non-citizens were granted, or from the date of promulgation of the Constitution. The truncation of leaseholds that are for periods longer than 99 years will no doubt present myriad property rights claims, and a framework ought to have been laid out on how to redress such peculiar claims. In light of the foregoing, this article evaluates the interface between the new and previous land laws in Kenya with a view to establishing whether the latter are a philosophical shift from the former. The article seeks to achieve this objective principally by analysing the extent to which the new land laws address the issues that informed land reform in the first place.

The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: Emerging Jurisprudence on the Principles of Reparations for Victims of International Crimes

The Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: Emerging Jurisprudence on the Principles of Reparations for Victims of International Crimes

Author Colbert Ojiambo

ISSN: 2521-2613
Affiliations: LLM (International Trade and Investment in Africa) University of Pretoria, LLB (Honours) University of Nairobi; Lecturer in Law at the Africa Nazarene University; Advocate of the High Court of Kenya
Source: Africa Nazarene University Law Journal, 2014, Issue 1, p. 122 – 129

Abstract

None

Remote commissioning—Signing an affidavit in the “virtual presence” of the commissioner of oaths

Remote commissioning—Signing an affidavit in the “virtual presence” of the commissioner of oaths

Author: Ciresh Singh

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM PhD
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 3, 2024, p. 221-237
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i3a1

Abstract

Advances in technology since the turn of the millennium have resulted in technology being infused into all spheres of life. Most, if not all, human functions can now be performed with the use of technology. The law has not been immune to the influence of technology and legislation has been implemented, both abroad and domestically, to encourage the use of technology in law and commerce. Within the South African context, the use of technology was significantly accelerated during the Covid-19 pandemic. Despite the pandemic’s lockdown restrictions, technology allowed courts to conduct trials and other court applications virtually by making use of video conferencing. Technology also allowed contracts and agreements to be signed electronically, and notices and applications to be delivered or served via the use of electronic delivery mechanisms such as e-mail. Currently, there is some uncertainty as to whether a court affidavit can be signed and commissioned virtually. Section 10 of the Justices of the Peace and Commissioners of Oaths Act 16 of 1963, read with regulation 3(1) of the Regulations Governing the Administration of an Oath or Affirmation of 1972, provides that an affidavit must be signed in the presence of a Commissioner of Oaths. While some courts have adopted a broad interpretation of section 10, and allowed affidavits to be signed and commissioned remotely in the “virtual presence” of the Commissioner of Oaths, other courts have not taken such a modern approach. Given that the Justices of the Peace and Commissioners of Oaths Act was promulgated over 60 years ago, the time may have come to amend it to allow for the remote signing and commissioning of court affidavits.

The rights of transgender children in South Africa to gender-affirming care in the form of puberty blockers

The rights of transgender children in South Africa to gender-affirming care in the form of puberty blockers

Author: Sophy Baird

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 3, 2024, p. 238-256
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i3a2

Abstract

The provision of gender-affirming care to transgender children has sparked significant discourse within medical, ethical, and legal realms. This contribution examines the evolving conceptualisations of children’s autonomy and decision-making capacity within the context of paediatric health care, with particular attention devoted to the unique challenges posed by gender dysphoria. It also investigates the legal landscape surrounding the rights of transgender children to access gender-affirming care. This contribution advocates for a rights-based approach that prioritises the autonomy and well-being of transgender children in the provision of gender-affirming care, while also acknowledging the complexities and ethical dilemmas inherent in navigating this terrain.

The concept of dominance through the lens of Babelegi and Dis-Chem [Discussion of Competition Commission v Babelegi Workwear Overall Manufacturers and Industrial Suppliers CC CR003Apr20 and Competition Commission v Dis-Chem Pharmacies CR008Apr20]

The concept of dominance through the lens of Babelegi and Dis-Chem [Discussion of Competition Commission v Babelegi Workwear Overall Manufacturers and Industrial Suppliers CC CR003Apr20 and Competition Commission v Dis-Chem Pharmacies CR008Apr20]

Author: Phumudzo S Munyai

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM LLD
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 3, 2024, p. 257-272
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i3a3

Abstract

This contribution provides an analysis of two landmark decisions of the Competition Tribunal in Competition Commission and Babelegi Workwear Overall Manufacturers and Industrial Suppliers CC CR003Apr20 and Competition Commission and Dis-Chem Pharmacies CR008Apr20. Arising from broadly similar sets of facts, and producing almost identical responses from the competition authorities, the decisions are significant for South Africa competition law, not only as the first to be considered under section 8(1)(a) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 but also due to a range of novel issues arising from the cases and findings of the Competition Tribunal. While the judgments, which were handed down a few years ago, remain sensations in many competition law lecturing halls across the country, they have to date elicited a disappointing rate of return in terms of legal academic commentary and debate. This contribution provides an overview of the two decisions, focusing particularly on the Tribunal’s decision to avoid defining the relevant markets for purposes of establishing dominance, but concluding nevertheless that the two firms were dominant and ultimately that they had abused their dominance by charging excessive prices in violation of section 8(1)(a) of the Competition Act.

Situated in time and space [Discussion of Gongqose v Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2018 5 SA 104 (SCA)]

Situated in time and space [Discussion of Gongqose v Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2018 5 SA 104 (SCA)]

Author: Lindani Mhlanga

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA LLB LLM LLD
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 3, 2024, p. 273-288
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2024/i3a4

Abstract

This contribution draws inspiration from a recently published book chapter, “The Trans-Temporality of Land Ownership in South Africa” by GE Kamdem Kamga and I de Villiers, which I have had the pleasure of reading and responding to in its formative stages. The chapter critically examines the evolving concept of land ownership within the suburbs of Bloemfontein, South Africa, particularly through the lens of time. Drawing from interviews conducted in the Cape Stands area, the chapter reveals how residents assert land ownership based not only on conventional legal instruments, such as title deeds, but also on non-traditional grounds like inheritance and longterm occupation. This exploration highlights the dual role of time in both entrenching inequality and offering a pathway to remedy it. The chapter juxtaposes conventional formal and informal understandings of land ownership, arguing that the passage of time has blurred the lines between this distinction, making it increasingly irrelevant in the eyes of those in possession. Building on this thesis, this contribution investigates whether the passage of time has, indeed, created the necessary space to reframe our understanding of land ownership, with the potential to address longstanding structural inequalities in South Africa. Using the landmark case of Gongqose v Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2018 5 SA 104 (SCA) as a focal point, the contribution explores the viability of this temporal space in facilitating transformative outcomes. It critically examines whether time has passed without any significant changes in traditional patterns of land ownership or whether there has been meaningful progress in creating opportunities to rethink and restructure land ownership in a more equitable and just manner.

An examination of decolonisation and Africanisation in the legal context

An examination of decolonisation and Africanisation in the legal context

Author: Fanelesibonge Craig Mabaso

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM PhD
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 35 Issue 3, 2024, p. 289-298
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2023/i3a5

Abstract

#Feesmustfall and #Rhodesmustfall were student-led movements that stimulated a necessary discussion of decolonisation, Africanisation and a reimagined post-colonial South Africa. While other academic fields have engaged in rigorous research on decolonisation and Africanisation, there has been very little research on decolonisation and Africanisation from a legal perspective. This contribution focuses on the decolonisation and Africanisation of the law in particular because the law is a sociopolitical construct that regulates all spheres of a person’s life, as well as the relationships that people have with each other and with the state. It is these spaces that were colonised, the law along with physical violence being the primary instrument of colonisation. With this in mind, any discussion of decolonisation necessitates a discussion of decolonising the law. The contribution will also examine the notion of Africanisation and its relationship to decolonisation.

A Legal Analysis of Local Government’s Housing Roles, Powers, Functions and Responsibilities in South Africa

A Legal Analysis of Local Government’s Housing Roles, Powers, Functions and Responsibilities in South Africa

Author: Paul Mudau

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, Department of Public, Constitutional and International Law, University of South Africa
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 1 – 41
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a1

Abstract

This article undertakes a comprehensive legal analysis of local government’s housing roles, powers, functions and responsibilities in South Africa. It outlines the place and role of local government in South Africa’s constitutional framework of multi-level governance and the decentralisation of housing powers to local government. Although the functional area of housing is listed as a ‘concurrent competency’ of the national and provincial spheres of government in terms of Part A of Schedule 4 of the constitution, local government still has significant housing roles and responsibilities emanating from court judgments and national legislation. Primarily, these roles and responsibilities are conferred by the Housing Act 107 of 1997, the Social Housing Act 16 of 2008, and other relevant legislation. Virtually, all municipalities may exercise attendant housing powers. Depending on the ability to demonstrate the capacity to administer one of the housing programmes, municipalities may ultimately be assigned to fulfil the housing functions or powers on behalf of provinces. Using a desktop-based qualitative research approach, the article employs documentary analysis and case law review to critically evaluate the legal framework and its application. Findings highlight gaps in the current legal framework, inadequate resource allocation and capacity constraints hindering local governments’ ability to effectively address housing needs. Recommendations are made for legislative reforms, decentralisation of housing powers, capacity building, and intergovernmental co-ordination to enhance local government’s housing roles, powers, functions and responsibilities. This research contributes to the ongoing debate on local government’s role in addressing South Africa’s housing challenges, providing valuable insights for policymakers, practitioners and scholars.

When the Apex Court’s Decision is not Final: The Power of Apex Courts to Review (Rescind) Their Decisions in Some African Countries

When the Apex Court’s Decision is not Final: The Power of Apex Courts to Review (Rescind) Their Decisions in Some African Countries

When the Apex Court’s Decision is not Final: The Power of Apex Courts to Review (Rescind) Their Decisions in Some African Countries

Author: Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape, South Africa
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 42 – 102
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a2

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Cite this article

Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi
When the Apex Court’s Decision is not Final: The Power of Apex Courts to Review (Rescind) Their Decisions in Some African Countries
Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 42–102
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a2

Abstract

Generally, the decision of the highest/apex court in a country is final. However, courts are staffed by human beings, and it is natural to err. It is not uncommon for apex courts to make mistakes. Legislation and case law from African countries show that courts can ‘escape’ the consequences of their mistake in one of the three ways. First, by departing from a previous erroneous/outdated decision (in a subsequent case). Second, by invoking the ‘slip rule’ to correct clerical or arithmetical errors. Three, which is the focus of this article, by reviewing/rescinding their decisions. In this case, one of the parties to a judgment asks a court to re-open the case he/she has lost and set aside its decision. As the discussion below shows, this remedy is available to, among other things, protect the right of access to justice (courts) to prevent an injustice, or. to protect the integrity of the court. This ultimately contributes to the entrenchment of the rule of law. This article shows that African countries have adopted five different approaches in dealing with the apex courts’ powers to review their decisions. First, the constitutions of some African countries such as Ghana, Eswatini, the Gambia and Namibia expressly allow courts to review their decisions. Second, in some countries such as Uganda, South Africa, Tanzania and Zimbabwe the apex courts’ power/jurisdiction to review their decisions is provided for in their respective rules. Third, in some countries such as Lesotho, Seychelles, Zambia, and Sierra Leone neither the constitutions nor the rules empower apex courts to review their decisions. However, courts have invoked their inherent powers as the basis to review their decisions. Fourth, in Kenya, the Supreme Court’s powers to review its decisions are provided for in legislation and rules of the court. Finally, in Nigeria, the Supreme Court rules prohibit it from reviewing its decisions. However, the Supreme Court held that it has inherent powers to review its decisions. This article shows that, irrespective of the source(s) of the power, case law from all the courts show that there is consensus that apex courts will review their decision(s), whether criminal or civil, if it is in the interests of justice to do so. Different grounds/reasons are invoked to explain why it is in the interests of justice to review a court’s decision. In some countries the list of the grounds of review is closed whereas in others it is open. In some countries, judges often disagree on the issue of whether the apex court’s power to review its decisions is categorised as ‘inherent jurisdiction’ or ‘inherent power.’ In this article, it is argued that in countries where legislation empowers courts to review their decisions, they have jurisdiction. Inherent powers exist in countries where legislation is silent on court’s powers to review their decisions. Although finality of litigation is a very important principle, achieving the ends of justice is more important. Thus, apex courts should not be very conservative when developing principles on reviewing their decisions.

Presence as a Ground for Jurisdiction in Common Law Africa

Presence as a Ground for Jurisdiction in Common Law Africa

Authors: Thomas Kojo Quansah and Theophilus Edwin Coleman

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: LLB (Ghana) LLM (UJ); Lecturer, Law School, University of Professional Studies, Accra, Ghana; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University at Buffalo School of Law, New York (USA); Senior Research Associate, Research Centre for Private International Law in Emerging Countries (RCPILEC), Faculty of Law, University of Johannesburg, South Africa
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 12 Issue 1, p. 103 – 145
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v12/i1a3

Abstract

Before rendering a binding judgment against a party, a court must have personal jurisdiction over that party. Courts may assume jurisdiction over a person in various ways. The oldest and most contentious method is the personal service of the defendant with the court process while they are present in the state. This basis is known as the mere presence, temporary presence, or physical presence rule, which originates from English common law. Under common law, the defendant’s presence within the court’s jurisdiction remains one of the primary bases for the court to assume jurisdiction over a civil action. The physical presence grounds for jurisdiction have recently faced significant challenges and criticisms from some scholars. Others contend that it is still relevant, primarily for the reasons behind its original justification. There is also the question of how the presence of a legal person is determined for establishing a court’s jurisdiction. Considering the foregoing, re-examining presence as a ground for jurisdiction appears warranted. This article, therefore, investigates presence as a basis for jurisdiction, its history, and the presence of natural and legal persons. Given the various common law countries with somewhat divergent approaches, a comparative study of relevant countries will be conducted, leading to pertinent observations, remarks, and recommendations regarding the way forward. With recent technological developments and advancements in common law African countries, this article explores whether the presence doctrine is an appropriate tool for courts to exercise jurisdiction.