Rosen v First National Bank Short Term Insurance and Another Case number NCT/391919/2025/75(1)(b) Rule 34; [2025] ZANCT 47 (18 September 2025)

Rosen v First National Bank Short Term Insurance and Another Case number NCT/391919/2025/75(1)(b) Rule 34; [2025] ZANCT 47 (18 September 2025)

Author Daleen Millard

ISSN: 2517-9543
Affiliations: Dean: Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University
Source: Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin, Volume 28 Issue 4, 2025, p. 62-63

Abstract

None

AIG South Africa Limited and Others v Azrapart (Pty) Ltd and Another Case number 898/2024; [2025] ZASCA 172; [2026] 1 All SA 1 (SCA) (14 November 2025)

AIG South Africa Limited and Others v Azrapart (Pty) Ltd and Another Case number 898/2024; [2025] ZASCA 172; [2026] 1 All SA 1 (SCA) (14 November 2025)

Author Daleen Millard

ISSN: 2517-9543
Affiliations: Dean: Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University
Source: Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin, Volume 28 Issue 4, 2025, p. 63-66

Abstract

None

Paulina Binfa and Associates t/a PBA Financial Services CC v Dabrowa and Others Case number 2023/103509; 2025 JDR 5330 (GJ); [2025] ZAGPJHC 1274 (12 December 2025)

Paulina Binfa and Associates t/a PBA Financial Services CC v Dabrowa and Others
Case number 2023/103509; 2025 JDR 5330 (GJ); [2025] ZAGPJHC 1274 (12 December 2025)

Author Daleen Millard

ISSN: 2517-9543
Affiliations: Dean: Faculty of Law, Thompson Rivers University
Source: Juta’s Insurance Law Bulletin, Volume 28 Issue 4, 2025, p. 66-70

Abstract

None

Taxpayer TAT: What the Test Case Interlocutory Judgment Means for Employment Tax Incentive Disputes

Taxpayer TAT: What the Test Case Interlocutory Judgment Means for Employment Tax Incentive Disputes

Author: Joon Chong

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Partner, Webber Wentzel
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 17 Issue 1, 2025, p. 1 – 12

Abstract

This article examines the evolution of Employment Tax Incentive (ETI) disputes in South Africa focusing on legislative amendments, test case litigation, and the systemic challenges facing over 400 employers with disputed assessments. The ETI, introduced in 2014 to reduce youth unemployment, has become a significant source of tax litigation following SARS’ disallowance of claims under training-based arrangements. Key legislative amendments in 2018 and 2022 responded first to the Assign Services judgment on labour broking, then to perceived abusive schemes involving training arrangements. The designated test case, Taxpayer TAT (IT 46233) has not been heard on the merits. A recent judgment from the Tax Court disallowed the SARS’ application to amend its pleadings by introducing new legal grounds based on the Occupational Health and Safety Act. The Tax Court held that this was a novation prohibited under rule 31(3). The interlocutory application judgement highlights fundamental issues of procedural fairness, the impermissible importation of definitions from unrelated statutes, and the impact of systemic delays on employers facing accumulating interest and penalties. With the merits still unresolved and potential appeals looming, affected employers remain in legal and financial limbo, bearing mounting tax debt exposures while the substantive questions of what constitutes ‘work’ and ‘remuneration’ under the ETI Act await determination.

The Paradox(es) of General Anti- Avoidance Rules — Part I

The Paradox(es) of General Anti- Avoidance Rules — Part I

Author: Ed Liptak

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Independent Consultant
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 17 Issue 1, 2025, p. 13 – 21

Abstract

This article considers the role that a so-called General Anti-avoidance Rule (GAAR) can or should play in changing the odds in a continuous battle between taxpayers and SARS as regards the parameter of permissible tax avoidance. Put another way, the question posed by the article is whether, or to what extent, the principles underlying the economic tax base can help to inform the application of the GAAR so as to guarantee fairness.
It is argued that any answer to this question is subject to one fundamental caveat. It is widely recognised that adopting a pure academic tax base is simply unfeasible and that the task for policy makers, therefore, is to devise a ‘second best’ solution, one that tracks that tax base as closely as possible but can work in practice. Amongst other things, this requires that the law identifies the correct taxable person; that it provides clear rules when realised income or gains should be recognised for tax purposes; that items and transactions are treated consistently; and that any deviations from the economic tax base are supported by clear policy considerations. Unfortunately, the article suggests, all too often the Income Tax Act (Act) falls short in these areas.
The ‘business purpose tests’ as used in several countries to identify impermissible tax avoidance are discussed. It is noted that the tests may look solely to the subjective purpose of the taxpayer, as was the case under section 103 of the South African Act, the objective purpose of the arrangement at issue, as in the case of New Zealand, or a combination of the two, as is currently the case under the South African GAAR.
The article notes that the degree of ‘business purpose’ required also varies. It ranges from the relatively high threshold required under the South African GAAR to the stringent New Zealand GAAR, which applies if an arrangement directly or indirectly has tax avoidance as its purpose and effect, but only if that purpose or effect is ‘not merely incidental’ to ordinary business or family dealings.

The GAAR’s Objectively Subjective Purpose Requirement

The GAAR’s Objectively Subjective Purpose Requirement

Authors: Albertus Marais and Dewald Pieterse

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Attorney of the High Court, CA(SA), Certified Tax Advisor (SAIT); LLM (Tax Law) (UCT)
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 17 Issue 1, 2025, p. 22 – 40

Abstract

This article examines whether the ‘sole or main purpose’ requirement of the so-called general anti-avoidance rule (‘the GAAR’) in sections 80A–80L of the Income Tax Act1 is tested subjectively, objectively, or, as some commentators and the recent Tax Court judgment in Mr Taxpayer G2 have suggested, involves a ‘hybrid’ of the two.
The article begins by explaining the distinction between a subjective and an objective approach to the sole or main purpose requirement, before outlining the approach as it previously existed in section 103(1) of the Income Tax Act. It then critically examines the principal arguments advanced in favour of a ‘more objective’ or hybrid test under the new GAAR, after which the arguments in favour of a subjective test are expounded on.
The authors conclude that the sole or main purpose test in the GAAR today must necessarily be binary, meaning it can be either objective or subjective, but cannot be a hybrid of the two. In light of the compelling arguments in favour of such a position, it is ultimately concluded that the test for the sole or main purpose requirement in the new GAAR remains decidedly subjective, and, ironically, that the test applied in Mr Taxpayer G, notwithstanding the Court’s doctrinal endorsement of a ‘more objective’ hybrid test, is in fact the very same subjective purpose test that has applied to the GAAR since its inception.