Regspraak: Skynverwekking deur ’n derde ten koste van ’n eienaar se rei vindicatio – reëlreg in stryd met gevestigde uitsprake van die hoogste hof van appèl

Regspraak: Skynverwekking deur ’n derde ten koste van ’n eienaar se rei vindicatio – reëlreg in stryd met gevestigde uitsprake van die hoogste hof van appèl

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2024, p. 166-184
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2024/i1a13

Abstract

The owner who wanted to sell her used luxury bush trailer agreed with an accredited agent of the manufacturer of the trailer to park it on their premises in Wellington where it would be available for viewing by prospective buyers. She explicitly agreed with the manager of the company that she would retain all registration documents regarding the trailer and would personally enter into the final obligatory and real agreements when a suitable interested buyer was identified. It was, however, agreed that the finalisation of the asking price would be at the discretion of the agent, provided that she received her indicated set reserved minimum price. This would allow the agent to negotiate with an interested buyer for a price that would leave it with some profit.
When an interested buyer was identified, the agent, however, neglected to inform the buyer of the conditions and refrained to disclose that neither he nor the agency held the necessary ius disponendi to transfer ownership, although he accepted the transferred sum as significantly inflated final payment for the purchased trailer. He never disclosed to the owner that her trailer had found a buyer and was no longer in his possession. Nor did he transfer the amount as agreed to the account of the owner. When she discovered the fraud, she immediately instituted the rei vindicatio to retrieve her property. There was no real agreement between the owner and the buyer and consequently she retained her ownership and should be entitled to the rei vindicatio as remedy. The buyer could rely on his remedy under the law of contract (for eviction) because he was not placed in vacua possessio and was entitled to restitution of the amount paid. He was thus not without remedy.
The court, however, dismissed the owner’s application for the rei vindicatio with costs because in the court’s judgment the poor buyer was entitled to the defence of his bona fides. South African law does not recognise the bona fides of a buyer as a separate mode of acquisition of ownership. The recognised defence of estoppel is not mentioned by name in the judgment, although some of the case law that was referred to concerned that defence. The judgment, however, does not instil confidence that all the requirements for that defence had been mastered. At the very least the judgment does not disclose how the court was satisfied that those requirements were all met. The mere fact that the buyer alleged that he had been misled by the agent to believe that, in exchange for the transfer of the full asking price he would receive ownership of the trailer, is irrelevant, as would be the excuse of the receiver of stolen goods who was gullible enough to think the thief selling the stolen property had the ius disponendi to transfer ownership. The judgment does not disclose how the buyer would be able to renew the yearly registration of the trailer because the true owner was still holding back all the relevant registration documents and the successful reliance on estoppel does not alter the material legal position regarding the ownership.
Clearly the misrepresentation of a fraudulent third party should not result in the effective loss of the owner’s entitlements to her property. The defence of estoppel can successfully be relied on against the rei vindicatio of the owner only if the estoppel asserter can prove that he acted to his detriment because of the misrepresentation of the owner as estoppel denier, who acted negligently. The misrepresentation must have been so flagrant that the reasonable person in his position as the estoppel asserter would also have acted to his detriment on it.
In this matter the judgment does not disclose how the court established that the reasonable person in the position of the true owner of the trailer would have acted otherwise to prevent an unknown third party as prospective buyer from being misled by the fraudulent agent who pretended to be either the owner or authorised agent with ius disponendi. What more could the owner have done than to retain all the relevant registration documents to forewarn third parties of the limited powers of the agency? Attaching large neon-coloured stickers to the vehicle to publish the limited powers of the agency does not seem practical. It is submitted that no negligence can be found in the conduct of the owner, because it was on par with what could be expected from the reasonable person in her shoes. It is submitted that the reasonable person in the position of the buyer would by contrast not have been so gullible as to transfer the significant amount of the asking price without ascertaining that the alleged seller had the registration documents to transfer ownership as proof of his ius disponendi.

Boekbesprekings: M Awarab and C Mukaya: General Principles on Workplace Disciplinary Procedures: A Namibian Perspective

Boekbesprekings: M Awarab and C Mukaya: General Principles on Workplace Disciplinary Procedures: A Namibian Perspective

Author: M Van Staden

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of the Witwatersrand
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2024, p. 186-187
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2024/i1a15

Abstract

None

Foreign Pension Schemes: There be Dragons, and some Confusion: South African Members Qua Beneficiaries Have a Vested Right to the Income and Capital of the Foreign Pension Scheme (Trust) Ab Initio — Part 2

Foreign Pension Schemes: There be Dragons, and some Confusion: South African Members Qua Beneficiaries Have a Vested Right to the Income and Capital of the Foreign Pension Scheme (Trust) Ab Initio — Part 2

Author: Des Kruger

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Consultant, Webber Wentzel, Adjunct Professor, University of Cape Town
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 14 Issue 4, 2023, p. 22 – 29

Abstract

Given South Africa’s present political and economic position, a significant number of wealthy taxpayers are either engaged in making contributions to foreign pension schemes or are contemplating doing so. As the heading to this article suggests, the South African tax implications that arise when a South African resident taxpayer embarks on this journey are complex and confusing. Whilst SARS has provided some guidance in terms of a binding class ruling, this guidance is limited to the position where the South African participants participate in the foreign pension scheme as vested beneficiaries — not the general position. The ruling nevertheless provides some indication of SARS’ views as regards the application of the law in these circumstances. However, SARS neatly side-stepped the real issue, namely that a strict application of the law results in double taxation in certain instances by declining to rule on the application of section 25B of, and paragraph 80 of the Eighth Schedule to, the Income Tax Act, 1962. This article explores the South African tax implications that are triggered for South African residents in consequence of their participation as vested beneficiaries in these foreign pension schemes — the situation addressed in SARS’ binding class ruling. The South African implications that arise are wholly dependent on the rights and obligations that are established under the foreign pension scheme rules. However, as a general proposition it may be said that under a vested scenario the South African participants are required to make regular contributions to the foreign pension scheme, although lump sum contributions are allowed in certain instances. The contributions are then accounted for in a bespoke account, as is any accretion in value. When the time comes for payment of the retirement benefits (the income capital will already have vested in the beneficiaries), the trustees generally have a discretion as to the nature and value of the payments — but the participant has a right to request the trustees to exercise their discretion in a specific manner. The article concludes in the first instance that the contributions made by the South African participants to the foreign pension scheme do not constitute a donation that is subject to donations tax. As regards accretions in value in the bespoke account (e g interest, dividends, realised capital gains, the article argues that those amounts fall to be taxed in the hands of the resident Once the trustees exercise their discretion to pay the South African participants either an annuity or a lump sum, South African income tax or capital gains tax is triggered again. A possible double taxation conundrum accordingly arises should any income or capital derived by the foreign pension scheme have previously been vested in the South African beneficiary. On death, it is strongly arguable that the amount standing to the credit of the resident beneficiary in his or her bespoke account does not form part of the deceased South African beneficiary’s estate for estate duty purposes, or an asset for capital gains tax purposes.

‘Dividend–stripping’ Complexities and the Interaction with the ‘Rollover’ Relief Provisions

‘Dividend–stripping’ Complexities and the Interaction with the ‘Rollover’ Relief Provisions

Authors: Michael Rudnicki and Dean du Toit

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Michael Rudnicki (Executive, Tax) and Dean du Toit (Senior Associate, Tax) — Bowmans
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 14 Issue 4, 2023, p. 22 – 29

Abstract

The legislative rules relating to ‘dividend-stripping’ are complex and everevolving. This article seeks to examine the more complex aspects of those rules, particularly as they relate to the anti-avoidance elements of the legislation. The simplest way to explain the application of these rules is to illustrate their application with concrete examples. Prior to the application of the dividend-stripping rules it was relatively easy to escape tax on share exits, whereby a purchaser subscribed for shares in a target company and the target company repurchased the sellers’ shares free of tax by way of a ‘return of capital’ and/or a dividend distribution. The article deals with the rules as they apply in relation to (a) deferral transactions; and (b) ‘clawback’ transactions. The former transactions are excluded from the dividend-stripping rules and the latter are brought into the dividendstripping rules. Deferral transactions escape the application of the dividend-stripping rules. These transactions include transactions covered by the roll-over relief provisions contained in sections 41 to 47 of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (‘the Act’). ‘Extraordinary dividends’ are recharacterized in the Act for tax purposes. These are dividends that arise within 18 months of a sale of shares transaction, or arise in respect of a sale of shares and exceed 15% of the value of shares at the date of sale or 18 months prior thereto, whichever is the higher. A distribution of shares by a company in anticipation of the liquidation of the company (section 47 of the Act) will escape the dividend stripping rules. The recipient company of distributions from the liquidating company will also escape the dividend-stripping rules, as distributions derived by section 47 (liquidation distributions) and section 46 (unbundling transactions) are excluded from ‘extraordinary dividends’. So too does section 47 of the Act exempt from tax the disposal by a company of shares in the liquidating company.

The ‘clawback’ rules work as follows:

  • Dividends derived by a company that disposes of shares to another company in terms of the rollover relief rules, other than a section 46 unbundling, will form part of the proceeds for capital gains tax (‘CGT’) purposes in the hands of the company disposing of these shares to third parties.
  • A similar provision will apply to dividends declared by one company to another company (‘old shares’) where the shares in the declaring company are sold under section 42 of the Act (asset-for-share transactions) to a new company which issues shares to the disposing company (‘new shares’) and the disposing company sells such new shares to a third person. The dividends declared on the old shares will form part of the proceeds for CGT purposes in the hands of the company disposing of these shares to third parties.