Hidden Complexities in the Right of Recourse Between Co-debtors and Co-sureties

Hidden Complexities in the Right of Recourse Between Co-debtors and Co-sureties

Authors: Leon Kuschke SC, John Butler SC and Matthew Blumberg SC

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Members, Cape Bar
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 15 Issue 4, 2024, p. 9 – 20

 Abstract

Does a co-debtor or co-surety who is called upon to pay, and does pay, more than his or her proportionate share of the principal debt enjoy an ex lege (i e automatic) right of recourse or contribution against his or her co-debtors or co-sureties? This is the question that the authors — sitting as an arbitration appeal panel of three — were called upon to answer in recent arbitration proceedings.
The common assumption, amongst lawyers and businesspeople alike, is that there is an ex lege or automatic right of recourse or contribution in these circumstances. However, as appears from the analysis below, that assumption oversimplifies the legal position — which, on an overview of the relevant authorities, has two central tenets.
The first is that the default or presumptive position is that co-debtors and co-sureties do enjoy a mutual right of recourse or contribution in the circumstances described above.
The second is that the default or presumptive position may be displaced by the nature of the underlying relationship between the individual co-debtors or co-sureties. It is their underlying relationship — not merely the existence of a relationship of co-debtorship or co-suretyship — that is ultimately determinative of whether or not a mutual right of recourse or contribution exists.
As an example, assume that budding entrepreneur A wishes to start a business. A seeks to borrow R100 as start-up finance from lending institution X. To satisfy X’s requirements in respect of security, A’s wealthy relative B agrees to assume personal liability, jointly and severally alongside A, for repayment of the loan. The position then is that Y, as creditor, is owed R100 by A and B as co-principal debtors.
On settling the loan in full, does A then enjoy a right to recover R50 (half of the total debt paid by A) from his co-debtor B?
On the common assumption referred to above, the answer would be yes. But the legal principles, properly understood and applied, yield the opposite answer. Unlike A, B (the wealthy relative) has no genuine interest in the advance of the loan. The law recognises that in these circumstances, the underlying relationship between A and B is inconsistent with the latter owing the former an obligation to relieve him or her of the full debt burden (i e by distributing it between the two of them).
In this example, the nature of the underlying relationship between the co-debtors A and B — which, again, is inconsistent with a mutual right of recourse or contribution between them — has the result that the default or presumptive position is displaced and does not apply.

 

Early Termination of a Lease: Tax Implications in the Hands of the Lessor

Early Termination of a Lease: Tax Implications in the Hands of the Lessor

Author: Des Kruger and Karabo Mogashoa

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Consultant, Webber Wentzel Attorneys; Candidate Attorney, Webber Wentzel Attorneys
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 15 Issue 4, 2024, p. 21 – 32

Abstract

It is not uncommon for a lessee to seek to exit a lease prior to termination date, for varied reasons. The lessor will usually only be amenable to such early termination in exchange for an early termination payment. The crisp issue is: is such termination payment a receipt of a capital or revenue nature. Intuitively, the answer is that the compensation is of a revenue nature as the compensation is to compensate the lessor for a loss of the rentals that would have been paid by the lessee had the lease run its course.
However, the answer, as argued in this article, is not that straight forward. The answer is very dependent on the facts. The premise of this article is that where compensation is paid by a lessee to a lessor as compensation for the lessor agreeing to cancellation of a lease agreement, the compensation will be of a capital nature where the lease agreement constitutes the major, or the whole, business of the lessor. The fact that the lessor will in all probability be able to find a new tenant does not affect this conclusion. Nor is the conclusion different if the compensation is determined by reference to the loss of rentals that will arise in consequence of the termination of the lease agreement. By contrast, where the lease arrangement is merely a part (i e not a major or the whole) of the lessor’s business, the compensation will in all likelihood be regarded as a receipt of a revenue nature.
On the basis that the compensation derived by the lessor for the early termination of the lease agreement is a receipt of a capital nature in these specific circumstances, the issue arises as to the capital gains tax (CGT) implications that arise in consequence of such receipt. The authors conclude that while the termination payment will constitute proceeds for CGT purposes, as the lessor will not have incurred any expenditure in respect of the acquisition or creation of the lease agreement qua asset, the base cost in such asset is nil.
As the termination of the lease agreement constitutes the surrender of a right, and accordingly the supply of a service for value-added tax (VAT) purposes, VAT will need to be accounted for by the lessor (if a VAT vendor) on receipt of the termination payment.

 

Analysis of the Effect of Artificial Intelligence on Employment Relationships in South Africa: Ethical Implications for Workers’ Rights, Privacy and Policy Frameworks

Analysis of the Effect of Artificial Intelligence on Employment Relationships in South Africa: Ethical Implications for Workers’ Rights, Privacy and Policy Frameworks

Authors Professor Franaaz Khan & Kirstin Hagglund

ISSN: 2413-9874
Affiliations: rofessor, Department of Private Law, University of Johannesburg; LLB, LLM, PhD (UKZN); LLD Candidate, Stellenbosch University; LLB, LLM (cum laude)
Source: Industrial Law Journal, Volume 46 Issue 1, 2025, p. 1 – 28
https://doi.org/10.47348/ILJ/v46/i1a1

Abstract

The sharp rise of artificial intelligence (AI) has dramatically changed the employer and employee relationship. The advantages are, for example, an increase in efficiency and improved decision making. However, it has also given rise to challenges relating to ethical and policy issues, primarily regarding privacy, bias, accountability, and job safety. AI systems rely on datasets. These datasets include sensitive personal information that can raise privacy concerns within a working environment. Another concern is bias in AI algorithms, which can unwittingly perpetuate discrimination. This may result in unfair outcomes in respect of hiring, performance assessments, and promotions that would solidify disparities in the workplace. In addition, the computerisation of tasks through AI poses threats to job security, as it could disrupt workers’ stability. These ethical concerns compel employers and policymakers to alleviate the negative consequences of AI. This article addresses the ethical implications of AI in the workplace, with a focus on South African labour law. It discusses current relevant legislation, such as the Labour Relations Act, to assess its efficacy in addressing AI-related issues as well as the new National Artificial Intelligence Framework Policy 2024. A comparative analysis of AI legislation in the European Union and United States is also included in which best practices are identified. The article suggests a balanced regulatory approach that supports innovation while providing clear guidelines to protect employee rights and maintain fairness.

Note: The Influence of Disability Models on the Employment of People with Disabilities in the Public Service

Notes: The Influence of Disability Models on the Employment of People with Disabilities in the Public Service

Authors CJ Tchawouo Mbiada & MA Nkosi

ISSN: 2413-9874
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, Department of Mercantile and Private Law, University of Venda; Deputy Director: Employee Health and Wellness, Department of Sport, Arts and Culture; LLB, LLM (UNISA), LLD Candidate (UNISA)
Source: Industrial Law Journal, Volume 46 Issue 1, 2025, p. 29 – 43
https://doi.org/10.47348/ILJ/v46/i1a2

Abstract

In 2005 and subsequently the government adopted a social model of disabilities with the aim that the public service should comprise at least 2% of persons with disabilities (PWDs), thus distancing itself from past practices under the apartheid regime that ostracised PWDs from the mainstream economy and society. Yet almost two decades later, the government is yet to achieve this target. The note examines different models of disability to ascertain whether they may account for this failure. It argues that despite adopting the social model, government’s adherence in practice to the previous medical model accounts for its failure to meet the 2% target of employment of PWDs.

Case Notes: The Making of a ‘Modern’ Trade Union: Simunye Workers Forum v Registrar of Labour Relations (2023) 44 ILJ 2021 (LC)

Case Notes: The Making of a ‘Modern’ Trade Union: Simunye Workers Forum v Registrar of Labour Relations (2023) 44 ILJ 2021 (LC)

Author Marlese von Broembsen

ISSN: 2413-9874
Affiliations: Associate Professor of Law, Centre for the Transformative Regulation of Work (CENTROW), University of the Western Cape; Senior Researcher in Labour Rights, Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO); BA (Stell), LLB (UCT), MA (UWC), LLM (Harv), PhD (UCT)
Source: Industrial Law Journal, Volume 46 Issue 1, 2025, p. 44 – 59
https://doi.org/10.47348/ILJ/v46/i1a3

Abstract

In Simunye Workers Forum v Registrar of Labour Relations the court considers whether trade unions established by non-standard workers must conform to a traditional trade union structure in order to be registered as a trade union. It is argued that the court’s generous interpretation of s 95 of the LRA is correct in the light of Bader Bop and the jurisprudence of the ILO supervisory mechanisms on the conventions that apply to non-standard workers. Moreover, it is contended that a restrictive interpretation of s 95 would contravene international law and the spirit, purpose and objectives of s 23 of the Constitution and of s 8 of the LRA.