Franchise termination with particular reference to the petroleum sector: Goodbye and good luck, but who owns the goodwill?

by | Apr 19, 2025 | SAMLJ, SAMLJ V36 I3

Franchise termination with particular reference to the petroleum sector: Goodbye and good luck, but who owns the goodwill?

Author: Tanya Woker

ISSN: 1996-2185
Affiliations: Professor of Law (Retired), and Senior Research Associate, University of KwaZulu-Natal (Durban)
Source: South African Mercantile Law Journal, Volume 36 Issue 3, 2024, p. 544 – 571
https://doi.org/10.47348/SAMLJ/v36/i3a10

 Abstract

This article focuses on the controversial issue of franchise agreement termination with particular reference to the petroleum sector. Although franchisees are said to ‘own’ their own businesses, it is never intended that they will have access to the franchisor’s trademarks and other intellectual property on a permanent basis. The franchise relationship will eventually terminate. The question then arises: who owns the goodwill of the particular franchise outlet operated by the franchisee – franchisee or franchisor? The issue of goodwill has arisen in a number of petroleum sector related cases recently, including the Constitutional Court, and although the courts have referred to goodwill, the question has not been definitively addressed. This article seeks to show why the issue of goodwill is a complicated issue in the context of franchise termination, how goodwill is traditionally dealt with in franchise agreements and to make some suggestions going forward. This topic is complex especially since it is not always easy to distinguish national or international goodwill from local goodwill. The two are deeply entwined. So, there is a need for further and more detailed research. This article is intended to start the debate.

No Boardroom, No Debate: Resolving the Tension Between Round-Robin Resolutions and Company Law Democratic Principles

by | Apr 14, 2025 | BTCLQ, BTCLQ V16 I1

No Boardroom, No Debate: Resolving the Tension Between Round-Robin Resolutions and Company Law Democratic Principles

Authors: Matthew Blumberg SC and Matt Williams

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: N/A
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 16 Issue 1, 2025, p. 1 – 6

Abstract

The primary decision-making organ of a company is its board of directors. The board functions based on majority rule, but only once the minority has had an opportunity of ventilating their views. This is the basic democratic principle of our company law. Board decisions are normally made at board meetings, where the minority has a forum to ventilate their view. But board decisions can also be made through round-robin resolutions, where there is no meeting. Without a meeting, the minority has no forum to ventilate their views. There is therefore a measure of tension between (non-unanimous) round-robin resolutions and the basic democratic principle. In this article, we consider — following a recent High Court judgment on the topic — how this tension is to be resolved. We describe the basic democratic principle and demonstrate that it is also reflected in the provisions of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. We then explore the tension between (non-unanimous) round-robin decision-making and the basic democratic principle. We conclude — as did the court in the aforementioned judgment — that any potential tension is reconciled through the requirement of proper notice. In this way, round-robin resolutions strike a balance — between pragmatism and efficiency, on the one hand, and adherence to the democratic principle, on the other.

The Deferral of Unrealised Foreign Exchange Gains and Losses Rules, and the Applicability to Parties Other Than the Lender or Borrower

by | Apr 14, 2025 | BTCLQ, BTCLQ V16 I1

The Deferral of Unrealised Foreign Exchange Gains and Losses Rules, and the Applicability to Parties Other Than the Lender or Borrower

Author: Michael Rudnicki

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: N/A
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 16 Issue 1, 2025, p. 7 – 13

Abstract

This article considers the tax rules in relation to the deferral of unrealised foreign exchange gains and losses (referred to in tax terms as ‘exchange differences’) in respect of foreign loans between related parties and whether the deferral rules can be extended to include parties to the loan agreement other than the debtor and creditor. The rules applicable to foreign exchange gains and losses are dealt with in section 24I of the Income Tax Act, 1962 (‘the Act’). This provision subjects realised gains or losses to income tax, but defers the tax treatment of exchange differences on certain loans and debts to subsequent years in which the underlying asset is brought into use.
Unrealised foreign exchange gains and losses (referred to as ‘exchange differences’) in respect of foreign currency loans (loans in foreign currency constitute ‘exchange items’) between related parties are deferred until the settlement or realised date of the loan, meaning that these gains and losses are not reflected in taxable income while the loan is not settled.
The deferral rules applicable to a ‘group of companies’ and ‘connected persons’ are found in section 24I(10A)(a) of the Act. The rules are comprehensive, but the particular issue for consideration in this article is the meaning of the words in the following extract:
‘… [N]o exchange difference arising during any year of assessment in respect of an exchange item … shall be included in or deducted from the income of a person in terms of this section—
(i) if, at the end of that year of assessment—
(aa) that person and the other party to the contractual provisions of that exchange item—
(A) form part of the same group of companies; or
(B) are connected persons in relation to each other …’ (my emphasis).
The key question considered in this article is whether a guarantor to a loan agreement or any other party for that matter, being a party to a loan agreement, brings the agreement within the ambit of section 24I(10A)(a)(i)(aa), where such party or parties are either a ‘connected person’ in relation to the borrower or part of the same ‘group of companies. The hypothesis here is that these entities are party to the contractual provisions of the exchange item, namely the loan. The crisp issue is whether ‘the other party’ referred to in section 24I(10A)(a)(i)(aa) is intended to apply narrowly to a typical lender-borrower relationship or whether it should apply broadly to any party to the contractual provisions of an exchange item.
The article considers principles of statutory interpretation applicable to the definitive article ‘the’ in respect of ‘the other party’. It is submitted that the legislature could have used phrases such as ‘a party’, ‘any party’ or ‘another party’ but instead deliberately chose the phrase ‘the other party’. The article concludes that the provisions must have been intended to apply to an arrangement between the borrower and lender in the context of a loan arrangement and not any other party to the contractual provisions of the loan arrangement.
Accordingly, it is submitted that the deferral of unrealised gains and losses in respect of a foreign loan or debt between parties within a ‘group of companies’, or who are ‘connected persons’, is restricted to the debtor and creditor in relation to the loan agreement and does not extend to other persons (such as a guarantor) that may be party to such an agreement.

Asset-for-share Transactions: The Number-of-Shares Conundrum

by | Apr 14, 2025 | BTCLQ, BTCLQ V16 I1

Asset-for-share Transactions: The Number-of-Shares Conundrum

Author: Duncan Mcallister

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: MCom (Tax), CA(SA)
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 16 Issue 1, 2025, p. 14 – 19

Abstract

This article relates to asset-for-share transactions under section 42 of the Income Tax Act and addresses the question as to how many shares must be issued to the transferee company in exchange for the asset or assets transferred, so as to comply with the section.
The author gives examples to illustrate the operation of section 42 and the problems that can arise in asset-for-share transactions, particularly where assets have different values and more than one share is issued in exchange. It is suggested that if there are insufficient shares available to match the relative value of the assets being exchanged, the solution is to allocate the aggregate base cost of the assets to the shares issued. This solution will not, however work in the case of pre-valuation date assets, for which there are different methods prescribed for determining value. In such a case, the solution suggested is to allocate shares with distinctive certificate numbers to particular pre-valuation date assets based on their relative market value. The author suggests that, alternatively, it may be time for legislative intervention to simplify matters, by the introduction of a rule similar to that in paragraph 76B of the Eighth Schedule to the Act.
The article suggests that SARS should give comfort to taxpayers by adopting the suggested solution for post-valuation date assets in an Interpretation Note, or perhaps resorting to legislation to resolve the complexity. Finally, the article also considers the application and effect of the value-for-value rule in section 24BA of the Income Tax Act, which applies to section 42 asset-for-share transactions.

Tacit terms versus non-agreed obligation

by | Apr 13, 2025 | TSAR, TSAR 2025 I2

Tacit terms versus non-agreed obligations

Author: HCJ Flemming

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Retired Deputy Judge President, Gauteng
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 2, 2025, p. 231-246
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2025/i2a1

Abstract

Daar is alle rede om die toedig van ’n nie-ooreengekome kontraktuele reg te erken as ’n selfstandige proses om die ooreengekome doel van ’n kontrak te beskerm, vry van die omstandertoets. Die regspraak het in Suid Afrika in die verloop van sowat vyftig jaar sedert 1974 ’n rigting ingeslaan wat nie geregverdig kan word nie. Dit het onnodige inperking op die toedig van regte geskep en gepaardgaande onreg veroorsaak. ’n Ompad van spekulasie oor hoe ’n niebestaande mens ’n vraag sou geformuleer het, is onnodig en minder akkuraat as ’n direkte vraag na watter plan die partye sou gemaak het as hulle voorsien het watter onvolledigheid van die kontrak in die toekoms sou blyk.
In die proses is selfs die onuitgedrukte werklike ooreenkoms, die gebied waar die bystandertoets bekend geword het, met onaanvaarbare byvoegsels belas. Die beoordeling van ’n stilswyende beding (“tacit term”) moet gesuiwer word.