Envisaging provincial powers: A curious journey with the Constitutional Court

Envisaging provincial powers: A curious journey with the Constitutional Court

Authors Victoria Bronstein

ISSN: 1996-2126
Affiliations: Associate Professor, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand
Source: South African Journal on Human Rights, Volume 30 Issue 1, 2014, p. 24 – 40

Abstract

This article examines the Constitutional Court’s attitude to federalism over the last two decades. The Chaskalson court was affirming and respectful of provincial powers. Justice Ngcobo’s majority judgment in DVB Behuising in 2000 epitomised this trend. A decade later Chief Justice Ngcobo wrote the judgment of the court in Tongoane which also showed a powerful appreciation of the constitutional design when it came to provincial powers. These two judgments illustrate a functional approach to federalism, which aims to make the constitutional scheme work as a coherent whole. Tongoane is also an illustration of the previous Chief Justice’s preoccupation with facilitating democratic accountability at both national and provincial levels. Justice Ngcobo’s nuanced approach to federalism matters makes his last judgment in Limpopo all the more surprising. The tone of the Limpopo judgment is that the court must be on its guard to prevent provincial government from usurping national powers. The decision foists extreme dependence on provincial legislative bodies in practice and on a symbolic level. Strong dissents from Justice Cameron and now retired Justice Yacoob resonate with positions that they had taken during the Chaskalson years. Curiously Justice Ngcobo’s final majority judgment with which the new Chief Justice Mogoeng concurs, resonates strongly with a previous attitude to provincial powers taken by Justice Mogoeng in the court a quo in DVB Behuising. Justice Ngcobo respectfully rejected Judge Mogoeng’s approach when that case came before the Constitutional Court on appeal. In Limpopo Justice Ngcobo could be seen as adopting the tenor of Justice Mogoeng’s previous judgment. Is increasing hostility to provincial powers likely to become a feature of the jurisprudence of the future Constitutional Court?

Common purpose: Thebus, Marikana and unnecessary evil

Common purpose: Thebus, Marikana and unnecessary evil

Authors James Grant

ISSN: 1996-2126
Affiliations: Associate Professor of Law, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
Source: South African Journal on Human Rights, Volume 30 Issue 1, 2014, p. 1 – 23

Abstract

This article will engage with the difficult question of whether common purpose could be successfully used to prosecute the surviving Marikana miners for the murder of their fellow miners, shot and killed by the police. It will conclude that this is entirely possible, on the law as it stands. However, I will argue that the law is not what it ought to be. I will argue that common purpose violates fundamental principles of criminal law, beyond the arguments traditionally raised. The one traditional argument raised and rejected by the Constitutional Court in Thebus, which bears repeating, is that it is a violation of the presumption of innocence to attribute causation and that this is not solved, as the Constitutional Court stated, by placing the issue of causation beyond questions of proof for both parties. I will note also that Thebus does not seem to answer the charge that common purpose violates the dignity of an accused. In addition, I will argue that, contrary to fundamental principles, common purpose punishes evil thoughts alone to the extent that it relies upon subjective thought to establish conduct, and it violates the requirement of voluntariness and capacity for self-control because it allows for liability where the accused did not, and could not, control the conduct in question. It allows for the resort to unreasonable force in response to an attack. Furthermore, I will argue that common purpose has an effect which can, in many instances, be met with a valid defence of mistake of law. I will conclude that, if principle is observed, and while fairly broad defences are conceivable, common purpose ought to be abolished as a deep source of embarrassment in our criminal law.

Statistic: Constitutional Court statistics for the 2011 term

Statistic: Constitutional Court statistics for the 2011 term?

Authors Johan Viljoen, Isabel Magaya, John Paul Ongeso, Cebile Ndebele, Grant Tungay SJ, Charmika Samaradiwakera-Wijesundara, Marc Cooke, Lisa Chamberlain

ISSN: 1996-2126
Affiliations: Senior Researcher, Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC); Junior Researcher, HSRC; PhD student, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand (Wits); Intern, Centre for Applied Legal Studies, Wits Bertha Foundation Intern; Intern, Centre for Applied Legal Studies, Wits; Research and Teaching Associate, School of Law, Wits; Candidate Attorney; Acting Director, Centre for Applied Legal Studies, Wits; Senior lecturer, School of Law, Wits
Source: South African Journal on Human Rights, Volume 31 Issue 1, 2015, p. 219 – 233

Abstract

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