Tackling the Boko Haram Insurgency: Causes, Challenges and Responses

by | Oct 25, 2019 | SAMLJ, SAMLJ V26 I1

Tackling the Boko Haram Insurgency: Causes, Challenges and Responses

Authors Michael Addaney

ISSN: 2521-2583
Affiliations: None
Source: South African Yearbook of International Law, 2014, p. 157 – 171

Abstract

Over the past five years, a wide ambit of narratives has been proffered on the Boko Haram insurgence in northern Nigeria, particularly its causes and possible solutions. Most of these narratives conflict and thus compete with one another. This is effectively making it difficult for the government of Nigeria and the international community to devise a clearcut approach to deal with the crisis. It has also played an immense role in worsening the relationship between the predominantly Muslim North and the mainly Christian South. This paper critically tests a number of existing narratives that seek both to explain the origins of Boko Haram and propose solutions. It does this through a meta-analysis and critical content analysis of literature as well as information from both local and international media sources. It is organised under two commanding schools of thought: (i) the human development theory and (ii) the Islamic-state theory. Without doubt, the Boko Haram phenomenon is extremely complex. Yet these two theoretical explanations of the insurgence have a significant influence on public thinking about the crisis. While the Islamic-state theory seems to be mainly advanced by the locals who are mostly civilians (Nigerians), the West tends to think that human development issues of poverty are more important. It was found that there was no specific authoritative way of thinking about the crisis in terms of its causes. The study is designed to play an instrumental role in finding a sustainable solution for the crisis in a modest way. In terms of solutions, however, a military intervention through force is suitable should dialogue fail by March 2015.

National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and Another 2015 (1) SA 315 (CC)

by | Oct 25, 2019 | SAYIL, SAYIL 2014

National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and Another 2015 (1) SA 315 (CC)

Authors Dire Tladi, Martha Bradley

ISSN: 2521-2583
Affiliations: Member of the UN International Law Commission. Professor of International Law at the Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria; Doctoral Candidate and Academic Associate at the Department of Public Law, Faculty of Law, University of Pretoria
Source: South African Yearbook of International Law, 2014, p. 137 – 143

Abstract

None

Land Sovereignty and the Law of the Sea Convention: Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Republic of Mauritius v United Kingdom)

by | Oct 25, 2019 | SAYIL, SAYIL 2014

Land Sovereignty and the Law of the Sea Convention: Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration (Republic of Mauritius v United Kingdom)

Authors Prof Patrick Vrancken, Siqhama Yamkela Ntola

ISSN: 2521-2583
Affiliations: Incumbent of the South African Research Chair in the Law of the Sea and Development in Africa, Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University
Source: South African Yearbook of International Law, 2014, p. 105 – 134

Abstract

None

International Responsibility of Armed Opposition Groups

by | Oct 25, 2019 | SAYIL, SAYIL 2014

International Responsibility of Armed Opposition Groups

Authors Antal Berkes

ISSN: 2521-2583
Affiliations: None
Source: South African Yearbook of International Law, 2014, p. 81 – 99

Abstract

Armed opposition groups (‘AOGs’), as non-state parties to an armed conflict, are partial subjects of international law in that they have rights and obligations under international humanitarian law (IHL), international criminal law, and arguably under international human rights law (IHRL). Nevertheless, this notwithstanding, positive international law has not codified rules on the international responsibility of armed opposition groups as such, and there are no judicial mechanisms reviewing their conduct as collective entities. I argue here that despite the absence of written rules and judicial procedures engaging the responsibility of AOGs, there is a wide- ranging practice among states and international organisations to recognise and develop the concept of responsibility for armed opposition groups as such. However, it must be stressed that the detailed rules governing the consequences of such responsibility are not clear, and the analysed practice consists of non-judicial mechanisms. In the first part of this discussion, I argue that international law recognises the concept of the responsibility of AOGs notwithstanding its un-codified status. In the second part, I review selected accountability mechanisms which condemn the internationally unlawful conduct of AOGs. These institutions, which could be termed ‘mechanisms for the accountability of AOGs’ — reading accountability in the wider sense of responsibility — are likely to hold armed opposition groups accountable for their unlawful acts, albeit outside of the framework of judicial procedures binding AOGs. I here investigate effective, existing institutions involved in the responsibility of AOGs in positive international law, with a special regard to the current armed conflicts on the African continent involving AOGs such as Boko Haram, M23, Forces D\xc3\xa9mocratiques Alli\xc3\xa9es/Arm\xc3\xa9e Nationale de Liberation de l’Ouganda, le Mouvement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (‘MUJAO’) or Ansar Eddine, to mention only the principal players.