Regspraak: Liability of police for investigation of rape

by | May 13, 2021 | TSAR, TSAR 2021 I1

Regspraak: Liability of police for investigation of rape

Author: J Neethling

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of the Free State
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2021, p. 171 – 184
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2021/i1a11

Abstract

In hierdie sake het die eiseres K, wat ontvoer en verkrag is, ’n eis vir vergoeding teen die polisie ingestel op grond van hul beweerde nalatigheid ten opsigte van sowel die ondersoek na haar aangemelde verdwyning die middag van haar ontvoering en die nag toe sy verkrag is as die ondersoek daarna toe dit bevestig is dat sy herhaaldelik verkrag is. Haar eis slaag in die verhoorhof maar word in appèl verwerp. Albei howe bevestig dat ten einde te slaag, K al vyf elemente van ’n delik moet bewys, te wete die handeling, onregmatigheid, nalatigheid, kousaliteit en nadeel. Vir doeleindes van die beslissings word op onregmatigheid, nalatigheid en kousaliteit gefokus en albei word ingelei deur eers vas te stel of die polisie nalatig opgetree het omdat dit die gerieflikste was om dit so te doen. Hier word die klassieke redelike voorsienbaar- en voorkombaarheidstoets toegepas deur middel van die redelike deskundige, die redelike polisieman in die hof benede wat bevind dat die polisie grof nalatig was, en die redelike staatsorgaan in die hoogste hof van appèl wat beslis dat die polisie redelik opgetree het. Wat onregmatigheid betref, pas die verhoorhof die tradisionele boni mores-toets toe om vas te stel of daar ’n regsplig op die polisie was om K se nadeel te voorkom het, terwyl die hoogste hof van appèl die omstrede nuwe benadering volg deur te vra na die redelikheid daarvan om die polisie aanspreeklik te stel. Anders as die hooggeregshof bevind die hoogste hof van appèl dat onregmatigheid afwesig is omrede die toestaan van die eis tot ’n veelvuldigheid van aksies kon lei wat beleidsgewys onaanvaarbaar sou wees weens die swaar las wat dit op die polisie kon plaas. Met betrekking tot oorsaaklikheid pas beide howe die conditio sine qua non-toets vir feitelike kousaliteit en die soepel toets vir juridiese kousaliteit toe en kom net soos by nalatigheid en onregmatigheid tot teenoorgestelde gevolgtrekkings. Die beslissing van die hoogste hof van appèl verdien instemming. Dit maak egter nie sin dat hierdie hof met sy beslissing voortgegaan het nadat bevind is dat nalatigheid afwesig was en dat deliktuele aanspreeklikheid dus ontbreek het nie.

Regspraak: Einde van gemeenskaplike boedel van ’n egpaar getroud in gemeenskap van goed en aanvang van uitwissende verjaring van tersake vorderinge val saam

by | May 13, 2021 | TSAR, TSAR 2021 I1

Regspraak: Einde van gemeenskaplike boedel van ’n egpaar getroud in gemeenskap van goed en aanvang van uitwissende verjaring van tersake vorderinge val saam

Author: JC Sonnekus

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2021, p. 184 – 199
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2021/i1a12

Abstract

But for an extraordinary order for a division of the joint estate stante matrimonio under section 20 or 21 of the Matrimonial Property Act 88 of 1984, the default joint estate of spouses married in community of property will come to an end with the demise of the marriage. This is either with the death of the firstdying spouse or by an order of the divorce court. It is impossible to extend the joint estate beyond these moments. With the end of the joint estate, the erstwhile spouses (or the estate of the demised spouse) are entitled to claim half of the value of the erstwhile joint estate. If the parties are unable to reach an amicable agreement to this end, a liquidator will be appointed to finalise the division of the assets. As from the end of the marriage, the former spouses have separate estates. Any new acquisition, gift, inheritance or income acquired after that date falls into the newly founded separate estate of the holder, and the other party has no claim to share in these assets. In Koko v Koko the respondent was married in community of property to Mr Koko in 1979 but that marriage ended in divorce by court order in 2001. The respondent left the previous marital home that was registered as joint property in the names of both spouses and retained inter alia some movable property from the erstwhile joint estate. Mr Koko remained in the house and continued to pay all rates and taxes, and the outstanding debt secured by a mortgage bond was amortised by the time of his demise. He later married the applicant and the couple lived in the house until his demise in 2013. Only years later did the respondent claim half of the current value of the immovable property as the still-registered co-owner. In this contribution, attention is devoted to the justifiability of the premise of the court that the claim should succeed notwithstanding the fact that more than nineteen years had lapsed since the applicable joint estate ended with the divorce order and the claimant did not contribute to the current unencumbered value of the property. If the claim to half of the value of the former joint estate is categorised as a personal right of the claimant, it is submitted that the effect of extinctive prescription should have been considered. By default, a debt is extinguished after three years and just the listed categories of debts mentioned in section 11(a) of the Prescription Act, including a judgment debt, will prescribe only after 30 years. It is submitted that the division of the joint estate is a natural consequence of the end of the marriage in community of property, and in KwaZulu-Natal orders for a division of the joint estate of parties married in community of property are consistently refused when divorce orders are granted for the very reason that they are unnecessary. In the absence of an applicable court order, the relevant debt cannot be defined as a “judgment debt” and the default prescription period governed by section 11(d) of Act 68 of 1969 should apply. It is inequitable that a previous spouse may, more than nineteen years after the divorce, benefit from the subsequent enhanced value of an asset that formed part of the erstwhile joint estate at the cost of another, who had contributed to that currently enhanced value of the asset since the joint estate came to an end. It boils down to unjustified enrichment if this is accomplished under the guise of her joint ownership of the immovable property still registered in the names of the former spouses as original co-owners because the real right of ownership is imprescriptible. A personal claim for half of the value of the assets in the estate would, however, have been prescribed after three years since the claim had vested.

Regspraak: Towards a new form of customary marriage and ignorance of precedence

by | May 13, 2021 | TSAR, TSAR 2021 I1

Regspraak: Towards a new form of customary marriage and ignorance of precedence

Author: TA Manthwa

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of South Africa
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2021, p. 199 – 208
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2021/i1a13

Abstract

Die doel van die outeur met hierdie bydrae is om aan te voer dat daar ’n behoefte bestaan om die gewoontereg van huwelike te bewaar omdat dit moontlike uitwissing in die gesig staar as ’n mens die ontwikkelings in howe in ag neem waar vereistes aangepas word om die gewoontereg van huwelike progressief te maak sodat dit by ’n grondwetlike model sal aanpas. Die probleem het ontstaan met intieme verhoudings wat nie tradisioneel die legitimiteit van die families en gemeenskappe geniet nie omdat sekere praktyke wat deur die families vereis word om die huwelike te wettig, nie gehandhaaf word nie. Die howe erken egter deesdae sulke verbintenisse, met die gevolg dat die gaping tussen lewende wetgewing en amptelike wetgewing al groter word. Die onderliggende oogmerk van die outeur met hierdie bydrae is om aan te toon dat daar ’n behoefte is om intieme verhoudings te erken wat tradisioneel nie dieselfde status as ’n burgerlike huwelik geniet het nie. Dit beteken egter nie dat die hof hierdie intieme verhoudings as gebruiklike huwelike sal beskou bloot omdat lobola betaal is, die partye saamwoon en die bedoeling het om saam te wees nie. Die verklaring van oorhandiging as ongrondwetlik en die aanvaarding van die algehele afstanddoening daarvan het implikasies vir die gebruik van lobola. Dieselfde argument wat teen die oorhandiging gebruik is, kan ook gebruik word om van lobola ontslae te raak, wat noodsaaklik is vir die voltrekking van ’n gebruiklike huwelik. ’n Oorweging wat net so belangrik in die hof is wanneer oor die vereistes van die geldigheid van ’n gebruiklike huwelik besluit word, is respek vir voorkeur. Die beginsel bly ’n verskanste deel van die Suid-Afrikaanse reg. In gevalle waar die hof beslis dat ’n praktyk belangrik is en steeds gehandhaaf moet word ten einde die lewende reg van die gemeenskappe af te dwing, kan dieselfde hof nie later teruggaan op sy woord en die gevolgtrekking maak dat die praktyk nie meer belangrik is sonder om oortuigende redes vir die verandering van die vroeëre besluit te gee nie. As die hof dit doen, ondermyn hy die oppergesag van die reg en bied ’n platform vir wettige chaos omdat die publiek waarskynlik vertroue in die behoorlike regspleging van howe sal verloor.

Journal of Ocean Governance in Africa 2021

by | May 10, 2021 | Uncategorized

Journal of Ocean Governance in Africa

Prof P Ndlovu; Prof M Tsamenyi; Prof P Vrancken; Ms A Buchanan; Mr S Ntola

ISSN: 2710-4044
Year: 2021
Published: Annually

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About this publication

iilwandle zethu: The Journal of Ocean Law and Governance in Africa is a blind peer reviewed Journal of note, under the editorship of the South African Research Chair in the Law of the Sea and Development in Africa. The journal publishes submissions relating to marine law, maritime law or ocean governance as they apply to the African continent, or to one or more African states.

In 2020, it was decided to rename the publication the Journal of Ocean Governance in Africa in order to remove any suggestion that the Journal might focus primarily on ocean law by removing the word ‘law’ from the title of the Journal. The  disciplinary and geographical width of the editorial team has also been broadened. The vision of the journal is to encourage and support the fast-growing pool of emerging African ocean-governance scholars in publishing excellent research outputs on a scientific and policy platform with which they are as comfortable as possible.

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Problems relating to the formation of online contracts: A South African perspective

by | May 8, 2021 | SALJ, SALJ V138 I2 2021

Problems relating to the formation of online contracts: A South African perspective

Author: Sanmarie van Deventer

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: BCom LLB LLM LLD (Stellenbosch)
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 138 Issue 2, p. 221-259
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v138/i2a1

Abstract

This article analyses the formation of online contracts, or standard-form contracts appearing in electronic form, in the South African context. The unique characteristics of online contracts — such as their length and ubiquity — render it more difficult to establish assent to these contracts than in the case of traditional standard-form contracts. In general, it is simply not reasonable to expect of consumers to study online contracts, because the cost of reading (in the form of time spent) outweighs the potential benefit. Furthermore, evidence shows that consumers do not perceive online contracts in the same manner as their paper-based equivalent. The article investigates whether contractual liability to online contracts can be established in terms of the reliance theory, and considers how and when notice of contractual terms should be given. It further argues that the unexpected terms doctrine potentially provides important protection to online consumers’ reasonable expectations, and may encourage suppliers to identify surprising terms and bring them to the attention of consumers. This approach requires of courts to recognise that it may be quite reasonable for consumers to decide not to read online contracts, and that consumers’ mistakes about surprising terms in online contracts must almost always be reasonable.