Transforming the Law on Psychiatric Lesions

by | Sep 19, 2021 | SLR, SLR V32 I2

Transforming the Law on Psychiatric Lesions

Author: Emile Zitzke

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLD, Senior Lecturer, University of the Witwatersrand
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 32 Issue 2, 2021, p. 253 – 271
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2021/i2a4

Abstract

In this article, I trace the development in the law of delict of recognising general damages claims on account of psychiatric lesions with the aim of making suggestions on how to transform it. Using the tragic case of Michael Komape as a springboard for the discussion, I argue that even though the Supreme Court of Appeal has recently brought clarity on the law on psychiatric lesions, more transformative work still needs to be done. More specifically, this article contends that the constitutional right to bodily and psychological integrity might require us to rethink the high evidentiary threshold that courts have set for proving the element of harm in cases related to psychiatric lesions. I argue that this can be done in at least three ways: First, by very cautiously bringing about a development that would involve protecting victims of psychological harm whose expert witnesses are shown to be inadequate despite all other facts indicating the existence of a psychiatric lesion. Secondly, by lowering the requirement of “recognised psychiatric lesion” to “grievous mental injury”, in line with similar arguments made in England. Thirdly, and most controversially, by acknowledging that perhaps the time has come for our law to recognise claims for so-called “grief in the air”.

The Doctrine of Subjective Rights, the Actio Iniuriarum and the Constitution: A Convergent Doctrinal Basis for the Law of Personality

by | Sep 19, 2021 | SLR, SLR V32 I2

The Doctrine of Subjective Rights, the Actio Iniuriarum and the Constitution: A Convergent Doctrinal Basis for the Law of Personality

Author: CJ Visser

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB (UJ) LLM PhD (Wits), Senior Lecturer, School of Law, University of the Witwatersrand
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 32 Issue 2, 2021, p. 272 – 287
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2021/i2a5

Abstract

This article revisits the doctrinal basis of the positive law in protecting the human personality as a legal interest given the approach adopted by the judiciary. In terms of this approach, based on common law and constitutional considerations, the human personality is not articulated as a composite interest (ie the human personality is not doctrinally conceptualised as consisting of various discrete personality rights). Arguably, such an approach denigrates the traditional view that the human personality ought to be protected as a composite interest in law. Therefore, this article interrogates more carefully the doctrinal basis of the law of personality from the perspective of the common law and the Constitution in the light of the controversial nature of the judiciary’s recent approach. In this regard, the article finds that there is an overlap, or more specifically a convergence, between common-law personality rights (as premised on the doctrine of subjective rights and the actio iniuriarum) and fundamental constitutional rights regarding the human personality. The article demonstrates that in terms of scope (ie the various personality interests recognised in positive law) and framework (ie the differentiation and adjudication of the different personality interests in positive law), both the common law and the Constitution attest to the composite nature of the human personality as a legal interest. On this basis, I argue that such convergence enables the creation of a single and integrated doctrinal basis for the post-constitutional operation of the human personality as a legal interest. It is further argued that such a single and integrated doctrinal basis provides the foundation for the further constitutionalisation of the law of personality in terms of a transformative constitutionalism paradigm and the horizontal application of the Constitution.

Does the Aggravated Sentencing Regime under the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 Violate Freedom of Association? A Constitutional and Comparative Analysis

by | Sep 19, 2021 | SLR, SLR V32 I2

Does the Aggravated Sentencing Regime under the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 Violate Freedom of Association? A Constitutional and Comparative Analysis

Author: Delano Cole van der Linde

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM LLD (Stell), Senior Lecturer, Stellenbosch University
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 32 Issue 2, 2021, p. 288 – 305
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2021/i2a6

Abstract

In terms of section 10(3) of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (“POCA”), a court may impose an aggravated sentence on a criminal offender if the offender was a gang member at the time of the commission of a crime. The court is entitled to apply section 10(3) to the sentencing of any common-law or statutory offence, save for the gang-related offences in Chapter 4 of POCA. As aggravated punishment is attached directly to a person’s status as a gang member, one must question whether such aggravated punishment does not violate the right to freedom of association in section 18 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. Section 18 is an unqualified right and subject only to the limitations clause under section 36 of the Constitution. The purpose of this contribution is to investigate whether the associational freedom guaranteed by the Constitution may be limited in light of considerations under international law (such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) as well as foreign law (specifically the United States and Germany). The consensus is, broadly speaking, that persons are nondeserving of associational protection where the conduct connected to such an association is criminal in nature. Increased criminal consequences are justifiable where a person’s unlawful conduct is also connected to their status and activity as a member of a criminal organisation. However, increased criminal consequences based merely on a person’s membership of a criminal organisation, as is the case in terms of section 10(3) of POCA, is considered arbitrary and irrational. The conclusion is that section 10(3) of POCA should be amended so that it applies only to crimes that are related to a convicted person’s gang-related activities.

A Doctrinal Assessment of the Insolvency Frameworks of African Countries in Coping with the Pandemic-Triggered Economic Crisis

by | Sep 19, 2021 | SLR, SLR V32 I2

A Doctrinal Assessment of the Insolvency Frameworks of African Countries in Coping with the Pandemic-Triggered Economic Crisis

Authors: Williams C Iheme and Sanford U Mba

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: LLB LLM SJD, Associate Professor of Law, Jindal Global Law School; Visiting Professor, Strathmore Law School; LLB LLM SJD, Senior Associate in the law firm Dentons ACAS-Law
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 32 Issue 2, 2021, p. 306 – 329
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2021/i2a7

Abstract

The COVID-19 pandemic has no doubt impacted all countries of the world. In its wake, it has left a trail of mortality and an economic crisis of immense proportions. As the virus continues to mutate and containment measures are introduced, the economic challenges posed by the pandemic continue to be felt by households and businesses. By arguing that times of economic crises provide an auspicious occasion for countries to rework their insolvency frameworks and their debt restructuring regimes, this article interrogates the existing debt restructuring regimes in both Kenya and Nigeria, as provided for in the Kenyan Insolvency Act 2015 and the Nigerian Companies and Allied Matters Act 2020, and considers the role of their statutes and institutions created to facilitate debt restructuring. The article further highlights key defects and proposes important and critical changes to these legal frameworks to ensure that they are sufficiently responsive to the pandemic-triggered crisis.

The Role of the Judiciary in Foreign Affairs To Be Duly Recognised, with Special Reference to the Supreme Court of the USA

by | Sep 19, 2021 | SLR, SLR V32 I2

The Role of the Judiciary in Foreign Affairs To Be Duly Recognised, with Special Reference to the Supreme Court of the USA

Author: Riaan Eksteen

ISSN: 1996-2193
Affiliations: BA BA (Hon) MA PhD; Senior Research Associate at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Johannesburg
Source: Stellenbosch Law Review, Volume 32 Issue 2, 2021, p. 330 – 361
https://doi.org/10.47348/SLR/2021/i2a8

Abstract

The judiciary’s influence on foreign affairs has been neglected for too long as the focus has been confined to the role of the two political branches – thus, a state-centrism orientation. Studies on foreign affairs confirm this omission. Hence, the question: what is the role of the judiciary in foreign affairs and what precisely is its influence? Consequential decisions by the Supreme Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) underscore the extent of the court’s engagement with foreign policy-related issues. While the political branches of government most directly determine foreign-policy outcomes, the contribution of the court by way of its relevance and influence is no less significant. Its impact is incontrovertible. The executive can no longer assume that its actions in foreign affairs will not be scrutinised and evaluated constitutionally. Presidential decisions often stem from overreach, especially in matters with implications for foreign affairs. Over the years, it has become increasingly apparent that the President is not immune from rebuke. SCOTUS is the only constitutional interpreter and consequently a vital compass. The result is that the executive has to bend to the judiciary. The latter will not accommodate the former when its judicial mandate is to interpret the Constitution in order to make clear what the executive has decreed, however unpalatable that may be to the executive. The response by SCOTUS is no longer confined to single, isolated cases; it has become widespread. The court no longer shies away from displaying judicial power when it is faced with cases dealing with foreign affairs. What SCOTUS has declared unequivocally is that when the political branches are allowed to switch the Constitution on or off at will, this will lead to a regime in which the executive, and not SCOTUS, says what the law is. This article concludes that the recognition of this role of SCOTUS in foreign affairs is long overdue.