Traditional Justice Systems in the Nigerian Administration of Justice: Lessons from Kenya

by | Aug 15, 2023 | JCLA, JCLA V10 I1 2023

Traditional Justice Systems in the Nigerian Administration of Justice: Lessons from Kenya

Author: Abdulrazaq Adelodun Daibu

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, Department of Private and Property Law, Faculty of Law, University of Ilorin, Ilorin. Nigeria
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 10 Issue 1, p. 133 – 168
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v10/i1a6

Abstract

The Nigerian administration of justice is facing many challenges such as congestion of cases in the courts, delays in the prompt resolution of cases, corruption in the formal justice system, a punitive and retributive approach to crime with little or no room for restitution and reparation of victims of crimes, as well as the adversarial, hostile, and technical nature of litigation. Although the federal government and some states have made efforts in respect of criminal matters by the enactment of the Administration of Criminal Justice Act (ACJA) and Administration of Criminal Justice Laws (ACJL) traditional justice systems can effectively ameliorate these challenges in the resolution of both civil and criminal matters. However, the potential benefits of the effective application and operation of traditional justice systems in Nigeria are hindered by their restriction to civil disputes, the lack of a clear and specific legal and policy framework, scant regard for procedural justice, inadequate or lacking of enforcement mechanisms and a retributive and punitive approach of the criminal justice system. This article analyses the nature of the Nigerian traditional justice systems and their relationship with alternative dispute resolution (ADR) mechanisms to see how ADR could complement the Nigerian administration of justice. The article further examines the challenges of the Nigerian administration of justice and the practice of traditional justice systems in Kenya to draw lessons for Nigeria. The article argues that the reconciliatory and restorative focus of tranditional justice systems could help resolve some of the challenges facing the Nigerian administration of justice. The article suggests legal, policy, and institutional reforms and their integration for effective application in Nigeria.

Examining the Propriety of Section 84(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act of Nigeria from the Lens of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Central Bank of Nigeria V Insterstella Com Ltd

by | Aug 14, 2023 | JCLA, JCLA V10 I1 2023

Examining the Propriety of Section 84(1) of the Sheriffs and Civil Process Act of Nigeria from the Lens of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Central Bank of Nigeria V Insterstella Com Ltd

Authors: David Tarh-Akong Eyongndi, Oluwakemi Oluyinka Odeyinde

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: LLB (Hons) UNICAL, LLM (Ibadan), BL, Assistant Professor, College of Law, Bowen University, Iwo, Osun State, Nigeria; LLB (Hons) Ibadan, LLM (UNILAG), BL Lecturer Centre for Foundation Education, Bells University of Technology, Ota, Ogun State
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 10 Issue 1, p. 169 – 189
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v10/i1a7

Abstract

Where a person has litigated a case against anybody or the government and judgment is given in monetary value, where the judgment debtor fails to voluntarily settle the judgment sum, the judgment creditor must enforce the judgment. In enforcing the judgment which is usually via garnishee proceedings, the Sheriff and Civil Process Act (SCPA) provides that the consent of the Attorney General (AG) must be sought and obtained once the funds to be used in satisfying the judgment are in the possession of the public officer. This paper, while underscoring the rationale for this prerequisite, examines its propriety vis-à-vis the finality of a court judgment, by adopting doctrinal methodology. It raises the question that since the AG’s consent is to be sought and same can be denied, what option, if any, is open to a person after such denial? Can a mandamus be used to compel the AG to consent, seeing that the giving of consent is not a duty to be performed but a discretion? The paper argues that this practice amounts to subjugating the implementation of Court’s determination/decision to the discretion of the AG which is inimical to the smooth delivery of justice. It may undermine the sanctity of court’s pronouncements as well as democracy. Therefore, the paper calls for the abolition of this practice as way forward.

Murder and fraud for inheritance: Smit v The Master of the High Court, Western Cape

by | Jul 29, 2023 | SALJ, SALJ V140 I3 2023

NOTES

Murder and fraud for inheritance: Smit v The Master of the High Court, Western Cape

Author: Mohamed Paleker

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor, Department of Private Law, University of Cape Town
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 140 Issue 3, p. 465-480
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v140/i3a1

Abstract

In South African law, a beneficiary may be disqualified from inheriting for killing the deceased, forging the deceased’s will, or acting in a morally reprehensible manner towards the deceased. In Smit v The Master of the High Court, Western Cape [2022] 4 All SA 146 (WCC), the court disqualified a wife from inheriting from her deceased husband because she had conspired to kill him. The court also disqualified her for forging his testamentary documents and his mother’s will. In addition, the court held that she was not entitled to claim maintenance and other benefits from his estate. This note critically evaluates the theoretical underpinnings of the court’s findings, with regard to the facts and the evidence in the case.

A call for specialised foreclosure courts and a separate foreclosure roll — An analysis of South African Human Rights Commission v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd (CC)

by | Jul 29, 2023 | SALJ, SALJ V140 I3 2023

NOTES

A call for specialised foreclosure courts and a separate foreclosure roll — An analysis of South African Human Rights Commission v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd (CC)

Author: Ciresh Singh

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Associate Professor, University of South Africa
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 140 Issue 3, p. 481-494
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v140/i3a2

Abstract

In South African Human Rights Commission v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 2023 (3) SA 36 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that a bank is not obliged to take a foreclosure matter to the magistrate’s court, even if the magistrate’s court has jurisdiction over the matter. The apex court confirmed that a court is not entitled to decline to hear a matter properly brought before it because another court has concurrent jurisdiction. Before this decision, the Gauteng and Eastern Cape Divisions of the High Court both found that the High Court was entitled to decline to hear a matter if the matter fell within the jurisdiction of a magistrate’s court. These decisions were taken on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal, which upheld the appeal and found that the High Court has no power to refuse to hear a matter falling within its jurisdiction on the ground that another court has concurrent jurisdiction. The Constitutional Court has now confirmed the decision by the Supreme Court of Appeal, finding that complex matters such as foreclosure applications deserve more judicial scrutiny, and ought to be heard by the High Court.

Can ownership of reproductive material be transferred?

Can ownership of reproductive material be transferred?

by | Jul 29, 2023 | SALJ, SALJ V140 I3 2023

NOTES

Can ownership of reproductive material be transferred?

Author: Donrich Thaldar

ISSN: 1996-2177
Affiliations: Professor of Law, University of KwaZulu-Natal; Visiting Scholar, Petrie-Flom Center, Harvard Law School
Source: South African Law Journal, Volume 140 Issue 3, p. 495-504
https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v140/i3a3

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Thaldar, D
Can ownership of reproductive material be transferred?
South African Law Journal, Volume 140 Issue 3, p. 495-504 https://doi.org/10.47348/SALJ/v140/i3a3

Abstract

Regulation 18 of the Regulations Relating to the Artificial Fertilisation of Persons provides for an ownership scheme in reproductive material — eggs, sperm and embryos — outside the human body. Within this regulatory scheme, the following question is pertinent: can ownership of reproductive material, once acquired in terms of reg 18, be transferred to someone else? To answer this question, reg 18 is analysed using well-established tools of statutory interpretation. The conclusion drawn is that a broad interpretation of reg 18 should be followed that allows for the transfer of ownership. Attention is drawn to case law that contradicts this conclusion, but it is shown that the rationale for the relevant decision lacks any depth. Accordingly, the decision should urgently be challenged in the public interest.