Perfektering van ’n algemene notariële verband verleen géén vervreemdingsbevoegdhede aan die verbandreghebbende hetsy in daardie hoedanigheid óf as pandreghebbende nie – behalwe in dié hof

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Perfektering van ’n algemene notariële verband verleen géén vervreemdingsbevoegdhede aan die verbandreghebbende hetsy in daardie hoedanigheid óf as pandreghebbende nie – behalwe in dié hof

Authors: JC Sonnekus en EC Schlemmer

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Universiteit van Johannesburg; Universiteit van Pretoria
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2026, p. 173-185
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i1a10

Abstract

The discussion examines the legal consequences of the perfection of a general notarial bond within South African law and critically assesses the judgment of Du Plessis AJ in Spar Group Ltd v Volemo Trading Enterprise (Pty) Ltd t/a Njhaka Njhaka Build It (2025 ZALMPPHC 194). South African authority, notably Cooper NO v Die Meester and Contract Forwarding (Pty) Ltd v Chesterfin (Pty) Ltd, firmly establishes that a general notarial bond does not confer a real right in the property described in the bond until it is perfected. Upon perfection – whether through consensual delivery or an order compelling specific performance – the bondholder acquires the status of a pledgee, with a limited real security right over the specific movable property of the debtor that has come into its possession.
Before perfection, the bondholder is merely a preferent creditor in respect of the debtor’s free residue as contemplated in section 102 of the Insolvency Act, and not a secured creditor. Perfection does not, however, vest in the pledgee any powers of ownership, management, or unilateral realisation. South African law prohibits parate executie in respect of notarial bonds and disallows any arrangement amounting to a pactum commissorium. A pledgee may therefore neither appropriate the pledged assets nor dispose of them for its own account without the intervention of a court. The only functionary legally empowered to realise and distribute an insolvent’s assets is the liquidator or trustee, acting in the interests of the body of creditors and subject to the concursus creditorum.
The focus then turns to the Spar Group’s credit arrangements with Volemo (in casu), secured by several general notarial “covering” bonds. It is doubted whether these instruments complied with section 51 of the Deeds Registries Act, particularly the requirement of a stated maximum amount where future indebtedness is to be secured.
The discussion of the court’s perfection order describes it as “unprecedented”. The order authorised the Spar Group not merely to take possession of Volemo’s movable assets, but to take control of the business, regulate the movement of stock (including stock possibly owned by third-party suppliers), operate the debtor’s bank accounts, collect book debts, transfer licences and permits, and dispose of assets while purportedly passing “valid title”. These powers far exceed those of a pledgee and directly conflict with the nemo plus iuris principle. No authority was cited for such far-reaching relief, (because none exists). The court appeared to rely on the fact that the debtor did not oppose the application, but it is contended that a failure to oppose cannot enlarge a creditor’s substantive rights nor derogate from the protections afforded to other creditors under the Insolvency Act, including the statutory provisions on impeachable dispositions.
The judgment is regarded as fundamentally flawed in doctrine and dangerously out of step with established principles of South African real security law. Yet, unless overturned on appeal, it remains binding on lower courts – a disquieting outcome given the serious legal errors it contains.

Expanding consequences for ethical mishaps in the use of artificial intelligence in legal practice

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Expanding consequences for ethical mishaps in the use of artificial intelligence in legal practice

Author: MM Van Eck

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: University of Witwatersrand
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2026, p. 185-197
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i1a11

Abstract

Die etiese gebruik van kunsmatige intelligensie in die regspraktyk bly ’n uitdaging. Dit word geïllustreer deur die groot aantal sake wat in 2025 oor etiese mislukking in die regsberoep aangemeld is in jurisdiksies soos die van die Verenigde State van Amerika, Kanada, Australië, Suid-Afrika, Engeland en Wallis. Hierdie bespreking fokus dus op die mees onlangse Engelse uitspraak, Ayinde v London Borough of Haringey en Al-Haroun v Qatar National Bank (2025 EWHC 1383 (Admin)), met die klem op hoe die gedrag van regspraktisyns in hul gebruik van kunsmatige intelligensie-instrumente die regspleging negatief kan beïnvloed. Alhoewel verskeie moontlike gevolge bestaan waar regspraktisyns hul etiese en professionele standaarde verontagsaam in die gebruik van kunsmatige intelligensieinstrumente, is die impak van sodanige gedrag op die regspleging ’n meer onlangse ontwikkeling van die howe se uitkyk op sodanige etiese en professionele standaarde van regspraktisyns. As hierdie beginsels in die Suid-Afrikaanse konteks uitgebrei word, kan die regspleging gevind word in een van drie gevalle, naamlik meineed volgens die gemenereg, minagting van die hof, en regsverydeling. Die outeur argumenteer in hierdie bespreking dat regspraktisyns nie bloot kan voortgaan om kunsmatige intelligensie vir navorsing te gebruik sonder die behoorlike nakoming van eties en professionele pligte nie, want dit sou nie net ’n negatiewe impak op hulself, hul kliënte en die howe hê nie – maar het ook ’n wyer en verreikende impak op die regspleging asook die regsberoep. In hierdie verband word geargumenteer dat die behoorlike gebruik van kunsmatige intelligensie-instrumente een van die etiese dilemmas in die hedendaagse regsomgewing geword het, en dringende en onmiddellike aandag vereis, insluitend regulasies van die Regspraktyksraad om leiding aan regspraktisyns te bied, maar ook dat die howe ’n duidelike uiteensetting van riglyne vir die voorlegging van dokumente waarvoor kunsmatige intelligensie gebruik is, moet verskaf. Dit is slegs deur so ’n gekombineerde poging, en deur opleiding, leierskap en konsekwente gevolge vir die versaking van etiese en professionele pligte, dat die huidige etiese mislukkings wat verband hou met die misbruik van kunsmatige intelligensie-instrumente in die regsberoep reggestel kan word.

’n Stap in die regte rigting ten opsigte van onuitgevoerde kontrakte in ondernemingsredding?

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’n Stap in die regte rigting ten opsigte van onuitgevoerde kontrakte in ondernemingsredding?

Author: Jacobus Jan Louw Nieuwoudt

ISSN: 1996-2207
Affiliations: Stadio Higher Education
Source: Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg, Issue 1, 2026, p. 197-206
https://doi.org/10.47348/TSAR/2026/i1a12

Abstract

For a long time, executory contracts in business rescue have been a contentious legal issue, particularly regarding how the section 133 moratorium and the concept of lawful possession of property affect their treatment before the courts. The moratorium was introduced to protect the company during the rehabilitation process of business rescue proceedings and confers protection against legal proceedings and enforcement action so that the business rescue practitioner could manage the company’s affairs and enable the company to function again as a going concern.
Until the decision in Capitec Bank Limited v Ubuntu Family Health Centre Grayston (Pty) Ltd the prevailing legal position was that cancellation of a contract would cause the company no longer to be in lawful possession of the relevant property. Section 133 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 provides that the moratorium protecting the company during business rescue proceedings applies only to property that is in the lawful possession of the company. The protection therefore does not extend to property that the company possesses unlawfully or without valid title.
Unfortunately, section 133 of the Companies Act has in certain cases had adverse implications for companies. If a counterparty was entitled to cancel a contract due to breach, that party could institute enforcement actions and reclaim its property – thereby effectively circumventing the protection envisaged by section 133.
The Capitec decision has shed new light on this area of law and points to an expected change in how the courts will interpret “lawful possession”. According to this judgment, cancellation of an executory contract may no longer result in the company being in unlawful possession of the property. This discussion is one of the first to analyse the high court’s redefinition of “lawful possession” under section 133 of the Companies Act, signalling a shift in South African business rescue law. The case note also examines in depth the implications of this landmark decision.
Earlier case law equated the cancellation of a contract with unlawful possession, thereby limiting protection by the moratorium. The court now confirms that possession is unlawful only if criminal unlawful possession is prevalent and no longer civil unlawful possession. This strengthens the moratorium, enabling business rescue practitioners to use company assets effectively while formulating a rescue plan. The decision aligns South Africa more closely with the debtor-friendly model used in the United States of America, rather than the creditor-oriented approaches of Germany and Australia and creates a more balanced framework that gives distressed companies a fair chance to rehabilitate.
The decision makes an important contribution to business rescue law, extending its reach to instalment and potentially lease agreements. However, courts must carefully balance debtor protection with contractual certainty. In Capitec Bank Limited v Ubuntu Family Health Centre Grayston (Pty) Ltd (2023/127918) 2025 ZAGPJHC 304 (19 March 2025) leave to appeal the decision to the supreme court of appeal was granted. The outcome of that appeal was still being awaited at the time of finalisation of this note.

Section 15(7) of the Companies Act, 2008: Acta Non Sunt Servanda – How Far Does It Go?

Section 15(7) of the Companies Act, 2008: Acta Non Sunt Servanda – How Far Does It Go?

Authors: Matthew Blumberg SC and Tumelo Ntsewa

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Member, Cape Bar
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 16 Issue 4, 2025, p. 1 – 9

Abstract

Shareholders’ agreements are a common feature of limited liability trading and investing. That was the case under the Companies Act, 1973, and it remains the case under its successor, the Companies Act, 2008. Under the former, shareholders’ agreements generally took precedence over the company’s articles of association in cases of conflict. Under the latter, the position is different. This is captured in section 15(7) of the Companies Act, 2008 which provides that a shareholders’ agreement that is inconsistent with the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation is void to the extent of the inconsistency. A recent Western Cape High Court judgment dealing with section 15(7) provides an opportunity to take stock of the jurisprudence. An analysis of the case law and academic writing reveals the ambit and operation of section 15(7) to be more nuanced and complex than may at first blush appear to be the case. The exact extent to which section 15(7) marks a departure from the previous regime remains, in important respects, yet to be decided on an authoritative basis.

Reversing Leave to Appeal: Navigating Procedural Uncertainty in South African Tax Dispute Resolution

Reversing Leave to Appeal: Navigating Procedural Uncertainty in South African Tax Dispute Resolution

Authors: Bradely Khethwa and Des Kruger

ISSN: 2219-1585
Affiliations: Associate, Webber Wentzel Attorneys
Source: Business Tax & Company Law Quarterly, Volume 16 Issue 4, 2025, p. 10 – 15

Abstract

It is well established that the Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 provides several avenues through which an aggrieved taxpayer may seek recourse before the tax court. However, a complex jurisdictional dilemma arises when SARS, having initially granted a taxpayer leave to appeal, subsequently contends that the Tax Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter. This reversal not only undermines procedural certainty but also raises critical questions about the scope of the tax court’s authority and the integrity of the dispute resolution process under the Tax Administration Act. This article explores this legal uncertainty, examining its implications for taxpayers and the broader tax adjudication framework. This question will be explored in detail with a specific focus on the recent judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service v African Bank Limited (242/2024) [2025] ZASCA 101.