One (innovation) flew over the law’s head: The intersection of artificial intelligence and copyright

One (innovation) flew over the law’s head: The intersection of artificial intelligence and copyright

Authors Razeen Khan and Ngonidzaishe Gotora

ISSN: 2521-2591
Affiliations: LLM Candidate, University of Cape Town; Candidate Legal Practitioner, Smith Tabata Buchanan Boyes (STBB); LLM Candidate, University of Cape Town; Research Assistant, DSI-NRF South African Research Chairs Initiative (SARChI) Intellectual Property, Innovation and Development
Source: South African Intellectual Property Law Journal, 2023, p. 72 – 87
https://doi.org/10.47348/SAIPL/v11/a4

Abstract

This article analyses South African copyright laws, with reference to artificial intelligence (AI). It deals specifically with the authorship of copyrightable works as contained in the Copyright Act 98 of 1978. The Act provides that authorship vests differently, depending on the type of work in question ie a work recognised by s 2 of the Act. The article seeks to provide insight into the existing jurisprudence surrounding AI and copyright in the South African context. Moreover, it relies on prevailing local jurisprudence to show that South Africa may lack an adequate legal structure to tackle the future implications of conferring authorship on non-human entities. The article also briefly explores resolutions in other regions such as China and draws on Ginsburg’s legal tests for authorship. The article’s focus is primarily on South African law in its current state, with reference to other legal jurisdictions and the future.

Artificial iintelligence facial recognition surveillance and the breach of privacy rights: The ‘Clearview AI’ and ‘Rite Aid’ case studies

Artificial iintelligence facial recognition surveillance and the breach of privacy rights: The ‘Clearview AI’ and ‘Rite Aid’ case studies

Author Ifeoma E. Nwafor

ISSN: 2521-2591
Affiliations: Senior Lecturer, Godfrey Okoye University (Nigeria); Visiting Scholar, Faculty of Law and Criminology, KU Leuven, Belgium; Member, United Nations Development Programme AI4Dev Reference Group; Research Member, Centre for Artificial Intelligence Digital Policy
Source: South African Intellectual Property Law Journal, 2023, p. 88 – 92
https://doi.org/10.47348/SAIPL/v11/a5

Abstract

The increasing sophistication of artificial intelligence (AI) facial recognition models and the accessibility of photos online by companies and governments have amounted to the excessive misuse of facial surveillance systems. The government, the police and organisations have a long history of using AI facial recognition technologies to gather data on citizens without respecting their data and privacy rights. The government relies on national security and public safety to justify such gathering of data. Marginalised groups and people of colour are disproportionately affected by such surveillance. Data protection and privacy rights activists have called on governments to regulate facial recognition systems. It is also essential to establish AI oversight agencies with the responsibility to monitor the use of AI models and to ban such use when it breaches citizens’ data and privacy rights, and any other human rights.

The European Union’s AI Act is the first comprehensive regulation on AI. It provides a risk management framework with different rules for different risk levels: unacceptable risks, high risks; and limited or low-risk applications. In June 2023, the European Parliament voted in favour of a total ban on live facial recognition in public spaces. Although the new Act did not stipulate a full ban on live facial recognition surveillance, it provides that all high-risk AI systems will be assessed before being put on the market and throughout their lifecycle.

African governments have caught the AI bug but only a few African countries have an existing AI strategy; these include Mauritius, Egypt and Rwanda. It has been argued that international AI technologies and ethical deliberations are modelled without Africa in mind. Against this backdrop, it is more likely that Africans as people of colour will be subjected to AI ethical bias, privacy and data protection concerns, risks and harms. It is essential that African countries develop AI policies. Additionally, Africa should also take a strategic place in the ongoing debate on global AI regulation.

A Comparative Legal Analysis of Local Government Autonomy in South Africa and Tanzania

A Comparative Legal Analysis of Local Government Autonomy in South Africa and Tanzania

Authors: Oliver Fuo and Daniel Mirisho Pallangyo

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: LLB, LLM, & LLD. Associate Professor, North-West University, South Africa; LLB, LLM & LLD. Extraordinary Senior Lecturer, North-West University, South Africa; Senior Lecturer, Tumaini University, Tumaini Makumira, Tanzania
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 10 Issue 2, p. 1 – 39
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v10/i2a1

Abstract

Over the past thirty years, there has been an increased drive towards decentralisation in Africa with the adoption of national constitutions that guarantee varying degrees of protection to local governments. In 2014, the African Union (AU) adopted the African Charter on Values and Principles of Decentralisation, Local Governance and Local Development (2014) to guide the decentralisation project for member states. The Charter acknowledges that the protection of local autonomy in decentralised legal frameworks is necessary for local governments to deliver on their developmental mandates. In this article, we explore from a comparative law perspective, how local autonomy is protected in the constitutions of South Africa and Tanzania. We also consider legislation regulating decentralisation in South Africa and Tanzania, comparing the similarities, differences, and challenges to local autonomy in these two countries in view of their different national legal frameworks. The comparative legal analysis helps to show the unique nature of the systems of decentralisation in both countries and lessons that can inform law reform. Although there are comparative studies on subnational autonomy in Africa, none has specifically compared local government autonomy in South Africa and Tanzania. The research is based on a critical and integrated analysis of primary and secondary sources of law.

A New Legal Framework for the “Ownership” of a Deceased Person in a Legally Plural Ghana

A New Legal Framework for the “Ownership” of a Deceased Person in a Legally Plural Ghana

Authors: Ama F. Hammond and Prosper Batariwah

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: BA (Cape Coast); LLB (Ghana); LLM (Harvard); PhD (Uni. British Columbia); Senior Lecturer, University of Ghana School of Law; LB (Ghana); Barrister-at-Law; Graduate and Teaching Assistant, University of Ghana School of Law
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 10 Issue 2, p. 40 – 76
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v10/i2a2

Abstract

Any funeral in Ghana is a family business. Families hold elaborate ceremonies to mark the death of their deceased family members. Strict fulfilment of the duty to bury is said to ensure the seamless transition of the deceased from this life to the next. In Ghana, the extended family of the deceased has custody and control over the dead body for the purpose of burial. However, the heterogeneous nature of modern Ghanaian society, the rise of the nuclear family, and modern socio-legal values have increased disputes over the dead body, often between the extended family and the nuclear family. Against the background of Ghana’s pluralistic legal system, we investigate the context in which such disputes take place and how the legal system responds. We draw on field interviews to critically compare the living customary law with Ghanaian common law, judicial customary law, statutory law, and the experience of other jurisdictions. We note that the customary law principle of being owned by one’s extended family is well established, usually overriding other systems of law. Nonetheless, we argue, drawing on the experiences of other African countries, that the nuclear family should be given greater opportunities to participate in decisions relating to the burial of the deceased. We propose a framework that reflects the needs and aspirations of both kinds of families.

The Right Against Double Jeopardy (Non Bis In Idem) in the Constitutions of African Countries

The Right Against Double Jeopardy (Non Bis In Idem) in the Constitutions of African Countries

Author: Jamil Ddamulira Mujuzi

ISSN: 2521-2605
Affiliations: Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of the Western Cape
Source: Journal of Comparative Law in Africa, Volume 10 Issue 2, p. 77 – 106
https://doi.org/10.47348/JCLA/v10/i2a3

Abstract

Article 14(7) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) provides that “[n]o one shall be liable to be tried or punished again for an offence for which he has already been finally convicted or acquitted in accordance with the law and penal procedure of each country”. In human rights law, this is referred to as the right against double jeopardy (non bis in idem). The ICCPR has been ratified or acceded to by all African countries with the exception of Comoros and South Sudan. This implies, inter alia, that African countries must ensure that the right against double jeopardy is protected in their legislation. In this article, the author examines the constitutional provisions of all the African countries to analyse the extent to which they deal with the right against double jeopardy. The author also refers to legislation and case law from different African countries to demonstrate the circumstances in which a person who has been convicted or acquitted may be prosecuted again for the same offence (retrial) without violating their right against double jeopardy. The discussion shows, inter alia, that some of the constitutional provisions on the right against double jeopardy are contrary to art 14(7) of the ICCPR and some constitutions are silent on the right against double jeopardy. However, this loophole is rectified through subsidiary legislation or direct or indirect incorporation of art 14(7) in domestic legislation.