Abstract

In an era of increasing tax disputes, rule 32(3) – a provision governing when taxpayers may introduce new grounds of appeal under the rules promulgated in terms of section 103 of the South African Tax Administration Act 28 of 2011 – raises important questions about whether it ensures the correct tax outcome. The rule’s prohibition seeks to balance procedural efficiency with the taxpayer’s right to fully dispute assessments issued by the South African Revenue Service (“SARS”). However, its practical application has drawn criticism due to inconsistent interpretations of the terms “part” and “amount” in the prohibition clause, and uncertainty over whether the prohibition should be read conjunctively or disjunctively. This contribution examines the conflicting interpretations adopted by the High Courts in Baseline Civil Contractors (Pty) Ltd v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (a restrictive interpretation) and Avin Lieberman Trust v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (a less restrictive interpretation). These conflicting interpretations are evaluated against the backdrop of existing jurisprudence concerning the permissibility of introducing new grounds during the appeal process. Ultimately, this contribution argues in favour of a less restrictive interpretation. It proposes an interpretation of the terms “part” and “amount”, and clarifies whether the prohibition should be understood as a conjunctive or disjunctive test, drawing on constitutional principles and statutory interpretive doctrine.